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Europa Games and Military History

Tag: Second World War (Page 3 of 3)

Screenshot of Vectorsite.net
Screenshot of vectorsite.net, taken March 20th, 2015

Planes, Spaceflight, and Things That Go Boom: Vectorsite

July 2, 2012 / / 0 Comments

This article should be linking to two articles, too. But unlike our previous reccomendation, in which one site hosted the other, in this case the contents of “Vectorsite” have grown to a point at which the author and owner of the site decided some weeks ago to split his website into two. So http://www.airvectors.net/ contains all articles about planes now, while the vectorsite has everything else.

Before you head over to look at planes, however, I’d like to say a few words to Vectorsite itself and why I reccommend it here. The choice of topics is a big reason, of course. Greg Goebel picks interesting topics of modern military technology and presents them in an concise, entertaining and informative style. Most of the articles are more of an extended reference than a full coverage of the topic, but especially for me as an european the articles (for example about the “Caribou”) provided new insights about US military history during the cold war and its interservice relationships.

Another reason is that I actually like the websites layout, which refrains from any design elements and focuses on delivering content. The vast amount of material produced in such a short time, and the willingness of Mr. Goebel to put all of that under the GPL also deserve special praise. But most of all its the unpretentious and friendly style of writing that drew me to read even about topics I alread knew well enough – or so I thought. The joy and curiousity with which Mr Goebel approaches his topics is one I would like to pass on.

Date: June 20th, 2012

URL: http://vectorsite.net

Screenshot bayonetstrength.150m.com
Screenshot of Bayonettstrength150.com, taken March 20th, 2015

Battalion Organisation during the Second World War

April 18, 2012 / / 2 Comments

“Bayonetstrength 150” is the most knowledgeable website on bataillon sized units in second world war that we know of. Its name aptly describes focus and content: its all about organisation, training, equipment, and action of bataillion-sized units on the various battlefields of World War II. Its author, Gary Kennedy, not only manages to describe the theoretical structures of these fundamental buidling blocks of armies, but also captures the reality of their emplyoment and the subsequent changes that attrition and battle wear forced on them.

Based on a prolific bibliography on the subject Kennedy manages to describe the close interaction between organisation, equipment, and training in a way that makes it accessible even for laymen.

The page is spartan and in simple HTML, the only compromise to usability is the color coding of various sections. A host of index-pages and introductions lead to some redundancy, but ensure the reader never feels lost. A must-read for anyone interested in the topic of tactical combat in World War II.

Date: April 18th, 2012

URL: http://www.bayonetstrength.150m.com/index.htm

Update, Sep 11th, 2017: Bayonettstrength has been offline since this summer. While the Owner of the website has publicly stated that he wants to re-up the site in the future, currently it remains offline. If you need any information previously available at bayonettstrength150, you can find an offline copy in the ubiquous web archive at

https://web.archive.org/web/20160425143250/http://www.bayonetstrength.150m.com/General/site_map.htm,

or you can contact me, since I do have an offline copy.

Selected Bibliography

July 13, 2010 /

Boyd, Alexander. The Soviet Air Force since 1918. New York: Stein and Day, 1977.

Erickson, John. “Alexander Alexandrovich Novikov.” In Stalin’s Generals, ed. Harold, Shukman, 155-174.   New York: Grove Press, 1993.

Hardesty, Von.  Red Phoenix, the Rise of Soviet Air Power, 1941-1945.  Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1982.

Kozhevnikov, M. N.  The
Command and Staff of the Soviet Army Air Force in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Moscow: Nauka, 1977, Soviet Military Thought, no. 17. Translated by United States Air Force. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, n.d.

Miller, Russell.  The Soviet Air Force at War.  The Epic of Flight. Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life
Books, 1983.

Victory and Disgrace

July 12, 2010 /

Marshal Novikov participated in many further operations, but continued to operate in much the same capacity, that of Stavka air representative, often commanding and coordinating air resources for multiple fronts.  A list of his battles includes the Kuban, Kursk, and Kiev (1943); Korsun, Ternopol, the relief of Leningrad, the Karelian campaign, and operation ‘Bagration’ (1944); the Vistula-Oder operation, Konigsberg, Berlin and the campaign against Japan (1945).  This constant presence of Novikov was recognized with another promotion, to Chief Air Marshal, on 21 February 1944.[23]  Among his many honors, Alexander Alexandrovich Novikov was twice named a Hero of the Soviet Union.[24]

After the war Marshal Novikov began working to bring his air force into the jet age.  Sadly, before the first Yak-9 was flight-tested he was arrested on the order of Stalin.  This occurred on 23 February 1946, and Novikov was far from the only senior military officer caught in Stalin’s ‘purge of the victors’. Stripped of title, rank and decorations, he was left to the tender mercies of Lavrentii Beria’s prisons for almost six years.[25]  Novikov was released in May 1953, two months after Stalin’s death.  By June, with rank and decorations restored, he was again in a place of honor as Commander of Long-Range Aviation and Air Force Deputy Commander-in-Chief.  Novikov also found a new wife, Tamara Potapovna Fomina, an aeronautical engineer and graduate of the Military Academy.[26]  Soon however, manned bombers gave way to missiles, and Novikov was likewise retired due to his health.  He was given the position head of the Higher Civil Aviation School in Leningrad, which he held from 1956 to 1967.[27]

On 3 February 1976 Air Chief Marshal Alexander Novikov passed from this earth. Yet how much do we know of his personality?  The fact that at least one child was with him in Leningrad in 1941 indicates that he did discharge some family responsibilities. Anecdotes contained in the referenced sources indicate he was a drinking man.  First the reprimand as a tippler, then a note that he gave American Lieutenant-General Ira Eaker advice that an apple eaten before vodka toasts would absorb the alcohol,[28] and finally a quote of Krushchev “He drank more than was probably good for him.”[29] Yet Krushchev, who knew him from Stalingrad, also said, “He was a dedicated, honest and honorable man”,[30] and in that time, under those pressures, a great many men drank more than they should.  That this twice Hero of the Soviet Union was betrayed by Stalin, a man he had served for so many years, is not an indictment.  He was certainly a hard worker, and could not have risen to such a high military position or survived the war if he had not been an extremely competent leader.  The reforms he instituted in tactics and organizational structures greatly aided the Red Air Force in coming to grips with Germany’s Luftwaffe, and his personal direction of many key aerial campaigns in the greatest war of the air age marks him as one of history’s preeminent air commanders.

Footnotes

[23] Kozhevnikov, 234; Erickson, 168-9.

[24] Kozhevnikov, 180, 208

[25] Erickson, 173-4; Hardesty, 213; Boyd, 216-7.

[26] Erickson, 174.

[27] Erickson, 174; Hardesty, 213.

[28] Miller, 156.

[29] Miller, 110.

[30] Ibid.

During the Great Patriotic War

July 8, 2010 /

From the very beginning of the war with Germany Major-General Novikov skillfully used the forces available to him.  As early as 25 June 1941 Novikov launched offensive raids against German and Finish airfields.[9]  Although Novikov’s airmen flew 16,567 sorties in 22 days[10], nothing seemed to slow the Axis advance.  As German and Finnish forces closed in on Leningrad our air commander found himself with fewer and fewer operational aircraft.  Zhukov arrived on 10 September, and by the time he left in early October the city was surrounded.  But the city was held; though hundreds of thousands would die during the siege.  Novikov’s own young son was flown out over the ‘air bridge’.[11]

On 3 February 1942 Novikov met with Stalin and was given the job of Air Force First Deputy Commander.  He was immediately sent to Western Front to plan and coordinate air operations for Zhukov.[12]  Further assignments to key operations quickly followed.  In these operations Novikov stressed the importance of one central authority over air assets, so that they could be massed and coordinated.  Previously, Soviet aircraft had often been dispersed and lacked meaningful coordination.

Alexander Novikov was named Commander of the Soviet Army Air Force on 11 April 1942 and concurrently promoted to Lieutenant-General. With the new commander came a new senior staff.[13]  The structure and tactics of the air force were also changed by what were known as the “Novikov Reforms”.  Certain ideas were copied from the Germans while others were of Soviet origin.  A new long-range aviation organization (ADD) was created.  The Air Army replaced frontal aviation.  Except for some liaison and reconnaissance aircraft, army level commanders lost their aviation assets.  Reserve formations were organized into Air Corps of two or more Air Divisions, with a strength of 120-270 aircraft.  Several Air Corps would be given to an Air Army for critical operations, then moved to another sector on an as needed basis.[14]  Further reform measures covered rear services, lower level organizational structures, training, and other areas.

The new Air Armies and reserve Air Corps gave the Soviet Air Force (VVS) a strategic mobility, which it had lacked. This new ability was demonstrated in the Stalingrad campaign.  During the Axis advance to Stalingrad and stubborn defense the VVS didn’t seriously challenge the Luftwaffe. This allowed the Soviets to conserve strength, adapt to the new organizational structure, and gain experience with the large numbers of new aircraft coming into inventory.[15]  Once the Soviets decided to go over to the offensive this quickly changed.

General Novikov continued to be a key player in the Soviet command team, and he was sent as a Stavka (Headquarters, Supreme High Command) representative to various parts of the front.  General Novikov arrived at Stalingrad in November 1942, once again at the request of Zhukov, who said, “We work well together.”[16]  Novikov concentrated 1,414 aircraft in three Air Armies to support operation ‘Uranus’.[17]  The expansible nature of the new Air Armies is demonstrated by the inclusion of four Air Corps from Stavka Reserve.[18]  When the attack began poor weather limited the Luftwaffe to 150 sorties over four days. In contrast the VVS flew 1,000 sorties, mostly ground support.[19]

Much of the massed Soviet air power was sent against 6th Army and the German ‘air bridge’.  Several hundred obsolete Soviet planes were used as night harassment bombers.  Novikov concentrated his own efforts on organizing a blockade based on hitting the German airfields within and without the pocket, strong antiaircraft defenses along likely routes, and interceptors directed by ground stations.[20]  The combination of poor weather and a more effective Red Air Force did not stop the Luftwaffe, but they inflicted heavy losses and kept the rate of supply well below the required level.  During the period 19 November 1942 through 2 February 1943 the Soviets flew 35,920 sorties.[21]  For his exploits General Novikov was named the Soviet Union’s first ever Air Marshal on 17 March 1943.[22]

Footnotes

[9] Kozhevnikov, 41; Erickson, 161.

[10] Kozhevnikov, 44

[11] Erickson, 162.

[12] Erickson, 162; Kozhevnikov, 68.

[13] Kozhevnikov, 234; Alexander Boyd, The Soviet Air Force since 1918, (New York: Stein and Day, 1977), 140; Erickson, 163; Von Hardesty, Red Phoenix, the Rise of Soviet Air Power, 1941-1945, (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1982), 83-85.

[14] Boyd, 141; Hardesty, 87; Kozhevnikov, 72-74.

[15] Hardesty, 91-2; Boyd, 159; Russell Miller, The Soviet Air Force at War, The Epic of Flight, (Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1983), 117.

[16] Erickson, 165.

[17] Erickson, 165; Kozhevnikov, 95; Hardesty, 105.

[18] Kozhevnikov, 95.

[19] Miller, 123.

[20] Hardesty, 124; Kozhevnikov, 97-98.

[21] Kozhevnikov, 100.

[22] Kozhevnikov, 234; Erickson, 166.

The Wings of Revolution: Youth and Civil War

July 5, 2010 /

Born into a peasant home in November 1900, Alexander Novikov was noted as a diligent student.  Rather than work the fields, he became a teacher, and it appears he was quite satisfied with that profession.  It wasn’t until 1917 that the war caught up with his family.  His father had been a NCO in the Tsar’s army and was called to serve in the Red Army.  Two years later Alexander found himself called to duty, with the 27th PriVolga Regiment.  Evidently he drew the attention of his superiors, for in 1920 he has selected to attend a course for junior infantry commanders at Nizhni Novgorod.  On 24 May 1920 he was admitted into the Communist Party.[1]

Novikov’s Civil War service took him first to the northern front, and then to Petrograd, where he arrive just days after the Kronshtadt mutiny.  Novikov was soon attached to Tukhachevsky’s 7th Army staff, and saw the tiny Red Air Force in action against the mutineers. After the campaign was resolved young Novikov was posted back with the infantry.[2]  An instructor from his infantry leaders’ course had become Chief of Staff of the Independent Caucasus Army and got Novikov posted to the south. Once there, this benefactor convinced Novikov to apply for further schools.  He was accepted at the Higher Rifle School for Commanders where he won a drawing for a fifteen-minute flight. Novikov was immediately smitten with a strong desire to fly, but could not gain the permission of his superiors to become an aviator.[3]

After the war ended Novikov was assigned command positions at the company and battalion level. By 1925 Alexander had a wife Militsa and son Lev, and in 1927 he entered the Frunze Academy which he graduated in 1930 near the top of his class. He was then posted to Smolensk as head of reconnaissance with 11th Rifle Corps. Though thousands of heretofore ground officers were being transferred into the Air Force during the thirties, Novikov’s vision had not considered good enough for an aviator.  It took arm twisting by his Military District commander, but Novikov was reassigned as chief of staff of the 450th Aviation Brigade.  Initially assigned as a non-flyer, by 1933 he passed his pilot’s examination.[4]

In 1935 Alexander Novikov accepted a demotion to command a bomber squadron. This personal triumph was mixed with tragedy due to the death of his wife.  Left with three young children and now a squadron to command, Novikov had many responsibilities.[5] Promoted to Colonel in 1936, Novikov was caught up in the purges of 1937, relieved of command, and issued a reprimand. Luck had it that Colonel Novikov was found “neither a tippler nor an associate of women of dubious virtue”[6] and the reprimand was withdrawn.[7]

A former brigade commander was named air commander for the Leningrad Military District and asked for Novikov as Chief of Staff.  Holding this post during the Finish war, Novikov came in for some criticism when the ill-trained Soviet Air Force failed to live up to expectations.  Most of the blame fell on his commander and one time benefactor, Ptukhin, who was transferred to Kiev. Surprisingly, Stalin appointed Novikov as air commander for the district effective July 1940.[8]

Footnotes

[1] John Erickson, “Alexander Alexandrovich Novikov,” In Stalin’s Generals, ed. Harold Shukman, 155-174, (New York: Grove Press, 1993), 155-156.

[2] Erickson, 156.

[3] Erickson, 155, 157.

[4] Erickson, 157-8; M. N. Kozhevnikov, The Command and Staff of the Soviet Army Air Force in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Moscow: Nauka, 1977, Soviet Military Thought, no. 17. Translated by United States Air Force. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, n.d.), 68.

[5] Erickson, 158.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Erickson, 160; Kozhevnikov, 68.

Italian Soldiers with Mules in the USSR
Italian Soldiers with Mules in the USSR

Corpo Spedizione in Russia

July 17, 2008 /

I don’t have the information as to arrival times of Italian units on the Eastern Front an hand any more, but seem to recall that it was difficult to justify them all being available on the Jul I 1941 turn — some I think arrived after the 15th. But I can not confirm this. You may wish to consider historical alternatives. The Italian High command also considered other options as to the troops to be sent to the Eastern Front. They considered sending (1) a corps of two celere divisions and one armoured division or (2) a corps consisting of two armoured divisions and one celere division in addition to the option they finally chose.
I have suggestions as to the ratings of Italian units during the period of Total War.

9ª Divisione Autotrasportabile «Pasubio»
52ª Divisione Autotrasportabile «Torino»

These two divisions were part of the Italian army’s regular establishment and were complete at the start of the war. They had only a minor involvement in the Western Alps campaign of June 1940. During the period July 1940 to March 1941, they were were involved in hard training in northern Italy. This paid off in the Yugoslav campaign in the spring of 1941, were the divisions were considered to have performed very well.

It was on the basis of this performance and their intrinsic mobility they were chosen for service on the Eastern Front. These two divisions were re-organized in late June and early July 1941, as they prepared to be sent to the Eastern Front. The 9th Pasubio Division received the 5th Cosseria Division’s Mortar Battalion and an AT company from one of the Bersaglieri regiments. Its artillery regiment was fully motorized.

The 52nd Torino division got the 26th Assietta Division’s Mortar Battalion and the AT company from the Bersaglieri regiment of the 1st Eugenio di Savoia Celere Division. Its artillery regiment was also fully motorized. It is also reported that at sometime in 1941, 81 mm mortars replaced the 45 mm ones in the support company of each battalion of this and the Torino Division. This would be easy to dismiss this but there are some numbers to support it. There were 144x 81 mm mortars in the two divisions (72x in each) according to their establishments listed below, 9x 81 mm mortars in the 63rd CC.NN. Legion for a total of 153 mortars in active service in these formations.

CSIR is supposed to have had 189x 81 mm mortars in active service in the summer/fall of 1941 according to an annex in the logistical history of the Eastern front. The Celere division had none. It is possible that some of the chemical warfare units with CSIR converted into support units in the field as sometimes happened, but they normally became flamethrower units. So it could be possible. It should be noted that a fully equipped 1940 type autotrasportabile division had 45 of these mortars, a 1940 infantry division had 30, and a North African autotrasportabile division had but 12. As mortars were one of the most important killers on the World War Two battlefield, the great increase in the divisional holdings of these weapons must be reflected in the divisional combat ratings.

Leaving aside the question of the question whether the battalion support company had converted to 81 mm mortars, the two divisions had the following establishments during the period of Total War:

Pasubio Division

  • 6x infantry battalion
  • 2x mortar battalion (54x 81 mm)
  • 2x regimental mortar company (18x 81 mm)
  • 2x divisional AT company(16x 47/32)
  • one group of 100/17 howitzers (12x 100 mm)
  • 2x group of 75/27 field guns (24x 75 mm)
  • 2x battery of 65/17 infantry guns (8x 65/17)
  • 2x battery of 20 mm AA guns (16x 20 mm).

Torino Division

  • 6x infantry battalions
  • 2x mortar battalions (54x 81 mm)
  • 2x regimental cannon company (12x/later 16x 47/32)
  • 2x regimental mortar company (18x 81 mm)
  • 2x divisional AT company (16x 47/32)
  • one group of 100/17 howitzers (12x 100 mm)
  • 2x group of 75/27 field guns (24x 75 mm)
  • 2x battery of 20 mm AA guns (16x 20 mm).

Given the additional weaponry, the improvements in command and control arrangements, and the heightened combat readiness due to long training and some battle experience, some increase in the combat rating is required for Total War. At a minimum, this division should be rated as a 4-5-8 for Total War, and perhaps it should go to a 5-8.

2x 4-8 Infantry XX 9 Pas, 52 Tor (1940-1941)
2x 4-5-8 Infantry XX (1-6 Inf Cdr) 9 Pas, 52 Tor (1941-1943)

3ª Divisione Celere «Principe Amadeo Duca d’Aosta»
6º Reggimento bersaglieri
120º Reggimento artiglieria motorizzato

This division was also part of the Italian army’s regular establishment and was probably the best of the celere divisions. It could justifiably be called an elite division. It was part of the Italian army’s mobilization covering force in 1940 and took part in the Yugoslav campaign. It was expanded for service on the Eastern front. Its bersaglieri regiment, which had been a bicyclist unit, was converted to a motorized unit. It received the organic bersaglieri motorcycle companies from both the 1st and 2nd Celere Divisions to join its own. It took the organic AT company from the 2nd Celere Division. The division’s armoured cavalry group (III Gruppo Carri Veloci «San Giorgio») was either brought up strength/reinforced from the other two celere divisions. The Horse Artillery Regiment, as mentioned in a previous posting, was reformed to give it a divisional artillery regiment. The three motorcycle companies would eventually be re-organized as one battalion.

During its service on the Eastern Front during 1941/42, the division fought better than a statistical counting up of its elements would suggest. There was a synergy that accounts for its 5-8* suggested rating.

In the first few months of 1942 (e.g.. during TW) the 6º Reggimento bersaglieri and 120º Reggimento artiglieria motorizzato were sent out as part of a planned re-organization of the 3rd Celere. The rest of the new units did not arrive until the summer of 1942 The 120º Reggimento artiglieria motorizzato was a newly raised unit at the depot of the 20º Reggimento artiglieria divisionale «Piave». The Italian official history of the artillery service says it arrived in Russia on the February 15th 1942 and operationally joined CSIR in the second half of March 1942. It was fully motorized in the Europa sense and consisted of one group of 100/17 (12x 100 mm) and two groups of 75/27 (24x 75 mm).

The 6º Bersaglieri Regiment was detached from the 2nd Celere Division on January 20th 1942 and sent to Russia. The exact date of its arrival can be found in the Italian official history that is just on the CSIR operations, probably sometime in February. While it had been a bicyclist unit, the regiment as sent was now fully motorized. Its organic motorcycle and anti-tank companies were already serving with the 3rd Celere Division. The Feb I 1942 conversion in the SE Axis OB should be scrubbed. The process of conversion formally began on March 15th 1942. It was not completed until July 1942 when the horse borne units of the division were formally detached from the division. I think you are looking at a Jun I or Jul I 1942 conversion date in Total Victory with entirely revised values given to the successor units.

Its war establishment during most of Total War was the following:

  • 2x cavalry regiment
  • 3x  motorized Bersaglieri battalion
  • 3x Bersaglieri motorcycle company
  • 1x armoured cavalry group (61x CV3/35)
  • 1x horse artillery regiment (24x 75 mm)
  • 2x AT company (16x 47 mm)
  • 2x battery of 20 mm AA guns (16x 20 mm).

1x 5-8* Cavalry XX 3 PADA (1941-1942)
1x 6-10 mot Infantry XX 3 PADA (1942-1943)
1x 4-3-8 Cavalry XX Gp RTCR (1942-1943)
1x 2-10 mot Infantry III 6 Br
1x 1-8 mot Artillery III 120

30º Raggruppamento Artiglieria di Corpo d’Armata

This raggruppamento consisted of the following groups: LX (60º), LXI (61º), LXII (62º). Each group was equipped with twelve 105/32 medium howitzers for a total of thirty-six in this formation. The raggruppamento was fully motorized, but I have gone back and forth whether to make it combat/motorized in the Europa sense. On top of this, there is the “stripping” factor I have seen in every FitE/SE game I have played, where useful Axis allied combat units are used to support German stacks the reverse of what happened historically.

I suggest the following two rules in TW to take care of this, at least in part. Only command and control rules would fully take care of it entirely.

1. No artillery unit from Italy or an Axis allied country can provide support for German units. Italian and Axis allied artillery units are halved in strength unless stacked with a division (or equivalent in REs of non-divisional units) from their own country.

2. No Italian combat/motorized non divisional unit with a movement factor of 8 may move in the Exploitation phase unless it begins that phase stacked with an Italian division that is capable of exploitation movement. [This to counter the “stripping” factor and to take into account Italian operational doctrine.]

No additional rules, do not make it combat/motorized.

1x 2-1-8 mot Artillery III 30C

63ª Legione d’Assalto CC.NN.

This regimental sized unit consisted of two M.S.V.N. battalions and one army raised heavy weapons battalion (12?x medium MGs/9x 81 mortars/8x 47/32 AT guns). It appears not have been organically motorized, but usually was by the assignment of corps assets to do so. I would keep the counter as it was in Scorched Earth rather than a 1-6 Infantry III plus 1 RE transport counter.

1x 1-8 mot Infantry III 63 (MSVN)

Battaglione alpini sciatori «Monte Cervino»

No changes from SE Axis OB, keep as a Feb I 1942 reinforcement.

1x 1-8 Ski II MC

CIV Battaglione Mitraglieri di Corpo d’Armata

Italian machine gun battalions should be shown in Europa. They stand for themselves, but also for all the independent flame thrower, mortar, and chemical (converted in the field to the former two types) companies/battalions not presently shown. The 100 series battalions were fully motorized and can be considered combat/motorized for Europa.

1x 1-8 mot Machingeun II 104

IV Gruppo cannoni contraerei da 75/46 autocampali
XIX Gruppo cannoni contraerei da 75/46 autocampali

These two groups were not strong enough to be normally shown at the Europa level. However, I think they should be shown if people agree with the rationale I have come up with on how to represent Italian AA. There was originally a very long explanation of how Italian AA should be rated in this text, but I have cut it out because it was far too long to include in a message ostensibly about the CSIR. So given that other things are factored in, these two groups should be shown as 0-8 lt Anti-Aircraft II’s with AA strength of 1. The 75/46 was a good AT gun when pressed into service, but something has to be lost to give these units an AA factor.

2x 0-8 lt Anti-Aircraft II (AA=1) 4, 19

The following is my recommendation for Total War (an asterisk following the unit’s combat values means it is self supporting):

Suggested Italian Historical Force Pool for Total War:

2x 4-5-8 Infantry XX 9 Pas, 52 Tor
1x 5-8* Cavalry XX 3 PADA
1x 2-10 mot Infantry III 6 Br
1x 1-8 mot Infantry III 63 (MSVN)
1x 1-8 Ski II MC
1x 2-1-8 mot Artillery III 30C
1x 1-8 mot Artillery III 120
1x mot Machingeun II 104
2x 0-8 lt Anti-Aircraft II (AA=1) 4, 19

Suggested Italian Optional Force Pool for Total War:

1x 5-8* Cavalry XX 1 EdS
2x 4-8* lt Armour XX 131 Cen, 133 Lit

Italian prisoners
A column of Italian prisoners captured during the assault on Bardia, Libya

64th Catanzaro Truckborne Infantry Division

July 17, 2008 /

64a Divisione autotrasportabile “Catanzaro” tipo A.S.

The service history of the 64th Catanzaro Division was ill-starred throughout its brief existence. The 64th Catanzaro Division was formed in late May/early June 1940 in Cyrenaica. To form this new division, the 203rd Artillery Regiment and certain other the support and service troops of the disbanded 3rd CC.NN. Division “21 Aprile” were utilized. The majority of the troops however were newly raised and the division’s two infantry regiments (141st, 142nd) were completely green. It should have taken six months to work this division up to level acceptable for a combat formation, but it was not to get it.

On formation, the division was composed of the following elements:

  • 141st Infantry Regiment
  • 142nd Infantry Regiment
  • 203rd Artillery Regiment
  • 64th Machinegun Battalion
  • 64th Mixed Engineer Battalion
  • 64th Antitank Company

After only two months of training, the Catanzaro Division was activated for war service even though it was rated as being not capable of combat operations. In the “great invasion” of Egypt in September 1940, the Catanzaro was placed in reserve at Tobruk. Only after Italian forces had consolidated their positions in the Sidi al-Barrani area was the inestimable Catanzaro Division brought forward. On October 5th 1940, the Catanzaro Division, supposedly a semi-motorized formation, had 105 trucks on strength of which only 39 were working. The 63rd Cirene Division on the same day had 274 trucks on strength of which 192 were working. The situation in terms of weapons and other equipment was similar if not so bad. In true awareness of the unique qualities of this division, the Italian command chose not to deploy any units to reinforce the Catanzaro Division in its positions southeast of Buq Buq in the region of Alam Samalus. It was in these positions, the Catanzaro Division found itself at the start of Operation Compass. Fortunately for the men of the Catanzaro Division, the initial British attack did not fall upon them as had been the case in the original draft of the British operational plan.

After the destruction of the Italian forces in the military camps in and around Sidi al-Barrani, the remaining Italian forces in Egypt were ordered to withdraw back into Libya. While the Cirene Division (deployed to the south of the Catanzaro Division in the Sofafi area) was able to side slip the advancing Commonwealth forces using its greater mobility, the slow moving 64th Catanzaro Division was confronted by the 7th Armoured Brigade (plus some troops from the support group) as it began its retreat. The British 7th Armoured Brigade caught the Catanzaro a few miles west of Buq Buq. The divisional artillery engaged the tanks, either in a desultory manner or to some effect depending upon the sources you read. When the tanks closed, the mass of the division quickly surrendered showing its ill trained men (and bad officers) had no desire to fight. The lead elements of the retreating columns of the division managed to escape the collapse, and passed into the fortress of Bardia. These remnants showed they were of like mind of their former comrades, and played no role, that I know of, during the battle for Bardia. When the last troops in the fortress surrendered on January 6th 1941, the sorry history of the 64th Catanzaro Truckborne Infantry Division finally ended. There were no plans ever conceived to reform this miserable division.

As you can see below, I accept the current rating of the 64th Division in WitD. However, the rating given for the other 60 series division is not, I think, as accurate as it could be. The 60th to 63rd Divisions had been existence for some time, and were the best equipped of any of the Italian divisions at least in terms of transport. They had an Achilles heel, which was the fact they were still organized under the 1938 organizational scheme, and thus were woefully short of close support weapons even as compared to a standard Italian infantry division of 1940. Thus I give this class of divisions a 3-8 rating. The Catanzaro Division lacking training, transport, and anything resembling leadership amongst its officers is doing well to receive a 2-6 rating. The higher rating of the 60 series divisions is available to the Catanzaro on the assumption that further training would have allowed the Italian command to remove from the division of its cadre of misfits and incompetents and set up a proper training programme for the division

As for the Dec I 1940 Scenario, the 64th Catanzaro Division was deployed not in Buq Buq itself (eg. 19A:0519) but to the southeast of it in (19A:0619).

MAY II 1940

Place in Forming (Cyrenaica Military Region):
2x 1-8 Infantry III 141, 142
1x 8 Infantry XX HQ 64 Cat

AUG I 1940

Optional: Remove from Forming (Cyrenaica Military Region)
2x 1-8 Infantry III 141, 142
1x 8 Infantry XX HQ 64 Cat
and place instead in any City in Cyrenaica Military Region:
1x 2-6 Infantry XX 64 Cat

DEC I 1940

If not received in Aug I 1940 as optional reinforcement, then
Full; Place in any city in Cyrenaica Military Region:
2x 1-8 Infantry III
1x 8 Infantry XX HQ 64 Cat
Add to Breakdown Display:
1x 3-8 Infantry XX 64 Cat

Dec I 1940 Scenario Deployment

19A:0619:
1x 2-6 Infantry XX 64 Cat
(no other units in the stack)

Additional Libyan Divisions

July 17, 2008 /

When the British intelligence officers went through the papers of General Pescatori of the 2nd Libyan Division, they found much information on the organization of and plans regarding Italy’s colonial forces. Amongst these documents were studies on a proposal to raise two additional Libyan divisions regarding its technical, manpower and financial aspects. These the British authorities excerpted/summarized, copies of which were in the file I looked at the PRO.

There were real constraints on the availability of Libyan manpower for employment in military units. Of the estimated Libyan population of 786,000, there were some 100,000 men of military age. Only about 65,000 of these men of military age could likely be enrolled in the military. Political reasons (the antipathy of the population of Cyrenaica to the Italian colonial government, economic reasons (raising food) and the impossibility of getting the men of nomadic groups reduced the available manpower pool.

The war establishment of a Libyan Division consisted of a headquarters element, two groups of artillery (each with 12x 77/28 field guns), two 20 mm AA batteries (should have been 8 guns in each but there were only six in the winter of 1940/41 due to shortages), six Libyan infantry battalions organized into two raggruppamenti (equivalent to regiments in this case), a small mixed engineer battalion, and service units. At “normal distribution”, there was enough organic transport to lift almost two battalions. There was an augmented establishment provided for these divisions, which gave them the transport capacity to lift up to four of the infantry battalions.

The division was quite small, barely being over 7000 men in strength. With only 24 field guns, even though the Libyan gunners were good, these divisions did not have enough organic artillery to be rated as anything but self-supporting. Furthermore, the 1940 Ordinamento had merely ratified the provisional 1938 organizational schemes for formations in North Africa. Thus these Libyan divisions had no mortars and had only the weaker six gun AT battery found in all the North African type divisions. Simply put the Libyan divisions were short on firepower. It is clear from these documents that any additional “Libyan” division(s) would have been organized as per the establishment laid out above. The “Libyan Armoured Division” is a mirage. An additional Italian armoured division may well have been formed in Italian North Africa in 1941, but that’s another story.

The time factor was considered as well for raising these divisions. The Italian army estimated it required two full months to get Libyan troops with previous military experience functioning at a minimal acceptable level of military efficiency. With completely untrained manpower, it would take an additional three months intensive training to get them to a similar acceptable level of military efficiency. It was also estimated that it would take two months to collect the transport and draft animals necessary for these proposed divisions. This could partially overlap the period of raising the troops. No estimate was given about the time necessary to obtain the required equipment from the Italian mainland.

3rd Libyan Division (3a Divisione libica)

The 3rd Libyan Division was to be raised from existing non-divisional units (3460 Libyans), from trained men (3250 Libyans) not already called up in Italian North Africa, and a cadre of Italian officers and technical troops from the usual sources. The army in North Africa had the resources to clothe the troops, give them a rifle, provide most of the draft animals, and provide some of the other equipment. The rest would have to come from Italy. The total financial cost to the taxpayers of Italy, always an important consideration, for raising a third division was estimated at 60 million lire. My guess, not including the initial preparations of gathering equipment, provisions and draft animals, is that it would have taken four months to raise this division from the reservists and existing units..

4th Libyan Division (4a Divisione libica)

The 4th Libyan Division would have been more difficult to raise. The forming of the Third Division would have scraped the bottom of the barrel of trained reserves. There were a few thousand trained men left (3500 Libyans) could be utilized, but this was effectively the training reserve and if these were taken up then the reports state it would be impossible to provide any more replacements (complementari) for the existing formations. This factor, not surprisingly, was seen as a great obstacle to raising this division. Drawing upon the existing reserve stores would have brought down the cost of the raising of the Third Division, but the entire complement of weapons, equipment and other stores for the Fourth Division would have to have been provided by the metropolitan army in Italy. Total cost for raising this division was placed at 90 million lire. My estimate is that it would have taken nine months to a year to form this division from start to finish.

The documents have no reference to any decision having been taken whether to proceed with the raising of these extra divisions by the time disaster overthrew the Italian Tenth Army in Cyrenaica. The Italian military authorities did rebuild a significant number of the lost Libyan units in 1941/42, but only used them for garrison/security duties. The higher levels of organization: raggruppamenti and divisions were never restored.
Source: P.R.O., WO 208/4807

Could these division have been raised? Yes, especially the Third Libyan Division could have been formed sometime in 1941 if the Italians had not been annihilated in Cyrenaica. Thereafter, the Italian military authorities necessarily always gave higher priority to rebuilding of Italian units (for they had a greater potential combat strength). The Fourth Libyan Division really could not have been raised until the pool of trained manpower had been expanded, otherwise the rest of the colonial army risked being utterly unable to replace any losses. Thus it is possible the Fourth Libyan Division might have been able to formed in1942 if losses up to that date had not been too severe. Reading some of these documents, I am starting to come to the feeling that the original values assigned to Libyan units in WD may have been too generous.

The ID numbers assigned to the Libyan infantry raggruppamenti (shown below) are guesses, but well founded ones. It is possible these new divisions could have been organized in Sirtica or Cyrenaica, but the only remaining manpower and other resources necessary to form these divisions had to come from Tripolitania and therefore it is likely they would have been organized there.

MAY I 1941

Expend: 2 Lib Col RPs and 1 It Inf RP* and Place in Forming (Tripolitania Military Region):
2x 1-6 Infantry III 5 Lib, 6 Lib (Col)
1x 6* Infantry XX HQ 3 Lib (Col)

SEP I 1941

Full; Place in any City in the Tripolitania Military Region:
2x 1-6 Infantry III 5 Lib, 6 Lib (Col)
1x 6* Infantry XX HQ 3 Lib (Col)

Add to Breakdown Display:
1x 2-3-6* Infantry XX 3 Lib (Col)

JAN I 1942

Expend: 2 Lib Col RPs and 1 It Inf RP and Place in Forming (Tripolitania Military Region):
2x 1-6 Infantry III 7 Lib, 8 Lib (Col)
1x 6* Infantry XX HQ 4 Lib (Col)

SEP I 1942

Full; Place in any City in the Tripolitania Military Region:
2x 1-6 Infantry III 7 Lib, 8 Lib (Col)
1x 6* Infantry XX HQ 4 Lib (Col)

Add to Breakdown Display:
1x 2-6* Infantry XX 4 Lib (Col)

Options:

1. Increased mobility:

The Libyan divisions were always intended to become celere type formations. The 1st and 2nd Libyan
Divisions had been given sufficient additional resources by the fall of 1940 to achieve this status. It is possible that the 3rd and 4th Divisions could have been similarly enhanced.

Convert: 1x 2-3-6* Infantry XX any (Col) and: 1x SMP to:
1x 1x 2-3-8* lt Infantry XX any (Col)

Convert: 1x 2-6* Infantry XX 4 Lib (Col) and: 1x SMP to:
1x 1x 2-8* Infantry XX 4 Lib Col)

2. Increased artillery:

All Italian divisions that survived the winter of 1940/41 eventually saw their organic artillery substantially increased. This could have happened to the Libyan divisions, though the additional guns would have been less than those given to the metropolitan divisions.

Convert: 1x 1x 2-3-6* Infantry XX 3 Lib (Col) and 0.5 Italian RP to:
1x 1x 3-6 Infantry XX 3 Lib (Col)

Convert: 1x 1x 2-6* Infantry XX 4 Lib Col) and 0.5 Italian RP to:
1x 1x 2-3-6 Infantry XX 4 Lib (Col)

* At a Grand Europa level this would probably work out to something like 2.0 Libyan manpower points, 0.5 Italian manpower points, 1.0 Italian equipment point, and 0.5 Italian artillery points.

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