Tag: OT (Page 4 of 5)

Entente Turn

The second fortnight of May opened with both sides rejuvenating their forces and the Entente upgrading Italian formations. German replacements filled one cadre while Frenchmen did likewise to two divisions. Many Italian divisions and regiments procured emergency shipments of French artillery and machineguns, dramatically increasing the combat strength of the Italian Army even though much remains to be done in that regard. Finally, in keeping with Canadian tradition, the recently arrived rifle division from that Dominion remains at reduced effectiveness.

As if cued to the clearing weather, in late May the Italian Army leapt to grapple with its Austro-Hungarian foes amidst the suddenly dry Alpine passes while British and French forces shifted to support the first geographically significant Entente offensive of the war in the West. Nearest the English Channel, the British again massed forces for an attempt against German forces somewhere inland of Oostende. French forces further nudged their huge yet relatively weak force facing Maubeuge toward a possible attack. In the Ardennes, the French contemplated a probable failure into the contested field in the region and instead opted to strike further south. Between the Ardennes and Switzerland, the French maintained fairly strong positions facing equally quiet Germans. A British cavalry corps moved over the Franco-Italian border on hoof, to support a rifle corps already backstopping the Italians west of Venice. Italians over a division in total slipped into Austria near the Swiss border while strong forces moved toward the fortress as Trient on a thirty mile front. Other Italian corps occupied various passes leading into the tallest portion of the Alps, of little immediate value but potentially positions from which to make flank attacks against more valuable passes to the north and south. Two Italian corps occupied clear terrain up to the Isonzo River along the Adriatic Sea coast. In all Italian cases, the advance continued until encountering Austro-Hungarian border fortress formations, in most cases consolidated in key passes fifteen miles or further from the border.

In the event, British and French support for the Italian offensive was more moral than physical. The French offensive in the Ardennes, with already battered forces, non-conducted after three air groups failed to usefully observe the German defenders. Not far from the coast, the potential British offensive simply did not happen; apparently the top generals were simply too discouraged by the French failure to overcome their own lethargy – and relative lack of replacements – simply in order to order their forces into an attack that might reasonably achieve a disastrous AX result. In between, French forces facing Maubeuge, without fixed wing air support to spot fall of shot for the massed French heavy artillery arm, never seriously considered attempting what would probably end up costing the French double any German morale loss from even a probable BX result.

Blissfully ignorant, the Italians rolled over Austrian fortress units in mountain passes throughout the southern Austrian Alps.

At 3714, with no extra ammunition on either side, elite Italians achieved a DL on the 9:1 positional chart. The fractional combat strength rule helped the Italians resolve this fight.
Italian loss: 0*-1-2 fort III
Austrian loss: 0*-1-2 fort III

At 3915, with no extra ammunition on either side, much less adept Italians did almost as well and seized the position.
Italian loss: 1-2-5 rifle X
Austrian loss: 0*-2-2 fort III

At 4015, again with no extra ammunition on either side, battle raged on the north shore of Lake Garda and the “rampage” continued.
Italian loss: 1-2-7 lt III
Austrian loss: 0*-2-2 fort III

At 4115, with both sides spending extra ammunition, the Italians attacked up both banks of the Adige River and forced the position in a BX.
Italian loss: 2-3-5 fld art III
Austrian loss: 1*-3-2 fort X

At 4113, some Italians and all Austrians enjoyed stockpiled ammunition, but the results were the same as everywhere else: weak, destroyed Austrians and strong, weakened Italians.
Italian loss: 1-2-5 rifle X
Austrian loss: 0*-1-2 fort III and 1*-3-2 fort X

At 3910 the Italians continued their ammunition-free assault and victorious ways.
Italian loss: 1-2-7 lt III
Austrian loss: 1*-3-2 fort X

At 4008, across the high mountain pass against Austrians enjoying plentiful ammunition, the Italians worked further into the alpine wilderness with elite troops. Austrian mountain troops would have liked to shift combat to a mobile format, but Italian mountain troops pinned them to their positions.
Italian loss: 2-3-7 lt mtn X
Austrian loss: 2*-6 mtn III

At 4307, the head of the Isonzo River, the full force of Italian (pre-mobilization) might struck a serious Austro-Hungarian defense with mixed results. Austro-Hungary’s Eugene provided a penalty for the attackers, reconnaissance aircraft failed to find targets, and the Italian Zeppelin successfully provided a bit of ground support in this interesting encounter. Austro-Hungarian construction troops could have been a tasty treat for the Italians had the battle gone much better, but in the mountains and with the mandatory Italian penalty to combat rolls on their first offensive things became unpleasant rather quickly in a BX result.
Italian loss: 6-4-7 hvy cav XX to 2-1-7 cadre
Austro-Hungarian loss: 6-4-6 rifle XX to 1-2-4 cadre

During the entire Italian wave, Italy suffered -4 1/3 morale points as against Austro-Hungary suffering -4 2/3. Each side expended a resource point. Italian forces suffered 16 manpower and inflicted 15.5 Austro-Hungarian manpower of losses. Italian forces expended 3 equipment points and destroyed 5.5 Austro-Hungarian equipment points. All in all, the Italian offensive was an economic success in its first phase besides gaining ground on a wide front.

Central Powers reaction during the Entente II MAY 1915 turn was very limited. Eugene activated his army, shifted his forces, and planned a counterattack on the Isonzo River for later in the month when the Austro-Hungarian Navy could provide naval gunfire support. Germany’s Fourth Army activated, speeding various light, mountain, ski and engineer units from the southern Ardennes Forest toward the Alps Mountains. The remaining German armies remained quiet, digesting news from Austria and wondering why the French had not struck for the first time since the ground dried out.

Aside from the effective entry of Italy into the war, the third week of May 1915 contained two other firsts for the war: a danger zone sinking and a resource point bombing. The French bomber group, CauG3’s, left off attacking infantry and in company with numerous bomb-laden fighters, successfully hunted an ammunition dump. The success doubled when the explosions cascaded into another dump nearby and the Germans watched two prospective forts go up in smoke. Italian morale suffered half a hit when the Italian mine warfare task force swept some torpedoes the hard way as Italian and French dreadnought and destroyer squadrons moved to Venice to protect the seaward flank of the Isonzo River line from the larger, less modern Austro-Hungarian fleet. Italian and French pre-dreadnoughts and cruisers moved to Malta for contingencies that will, with the Balkans out of play, never arise. By comparison, the British covering fifty miles of the Italian second line and the Italians shifting a few formations rearward to add equipment were tame events. Italian forward exploitation in the Alps, however, was much more significant; Trient is now the tip of an eighty mile long, one valley wide salient and the Italians are also working on sweeping around the inland end of the Isonzo River line. Four fingers of Italian troops reach north and east through the Alps, including a mountain brigade cutting a rail line in the northern foothills of the range near Switzerland, and the imminent Central Powers counteroffensive is guaranteed to consume all available rail capacity during the second half of May.

Central Powers Turn

For the Central Powers, the second half of May 1915 began mostly with heavy activity in the newly active, Austro-Hungarian command. Austro-Hungarian depot officers forwarded to two mountain brigades replacements even as Italian forces hammered at the customers. Bavarians in useful quantity departed depots in Alsace with civilian train tickets in hand and reported after leave to newly established depots in Austria. Closer to the North Sea, German replacements fleshed out an engineer regiment and two machinegun regiments while the French upgraded a field artillery battalion to a regiment. Bavarian replacements brought one of the best standard German rifle divisions back to full strength. The only substantial new forces to arrive on the Western Front(s) were a short corps of Austro-Hungarians.

On the ground too, the main action of the fortnight happened in and about the Italian Front. The newly arrived Austro-Hungarian corps greatly strengthened the Isonzo River line after moving up by strategic rail, a slight complication to hopes for combat and exploitation. In the Alps Mountains, Austro-Hungarian forces either concentrated at the fortress of Trient or edged northward, either decision being made to clear the field for German forces with superior morale.

German forces in and for Austria grew tremendously in size and aggressiveness in late May. The short corps, previously forwarded and moving along the Swiss border on foot, continued its march until running into patrols and then the main body of the Italian mountain brigade pushing down out of the passes along the Swiss border. Italian aggressiveness here threw other German moves off schedule by blocking the shortest railroad connection between Austria and Alsace, so that German forces moving up to protect the eastern flank of the Trient salient could only move to confront, rather than force back, Italian spearheads in that area.

Along the original Western Front, German forces moved conservatively during late May 1915. Having sent a corps toward Austria in early May, amidst the dispatch of another corps thence – including an artillery division and the theater’s only gas engineers – the front required significant reorganization. Too, the rebuilding of numerous divisions from cadre, reinforcement of sectors of the front threatened and/or being punished by the French and the recently taken decision to upgrade fortifications as far as possible wherever possible all pushed the Germans toward rationalizing rather than attacking. Finally, stockpiles of ammunition and construction materials both began to seem just a bit thin due to recent losses in Aachen and the dispatch of four dumps worth of material to Austria.

Half of German reconnaissance aircraft departed the French border region for bases in Austria while others attacked French bombers on the ground at Verdun. The former moved too far to involve themselves in active operations before June. The counter-air effort braved relevant flak, which missed, before missing the bombers in turn.

In Austria, German attacks against Italian forces ended up being both less devastating and less widespread than either side had expected only days earlier. The first action, predicted by both sides and ordained by Italian aggressiveness was against alpini come down the passes near Switzerland at grid 3613. German forces faced elite Italians in mountainous terrain, enjoyed neither reconnaissance aircraft support nor notable operational leadership. On the other hand, German forces maintain the superior morale that will probably forever make them superior on the battlefield to Italians and, in this rare case, enough German mountain troops could involve themselves to overcome the less skillful presence of regular rifle formations and the Germans too claimed the elite bonus. German forces did not spend ammunition prolifically against a mere brigade and the Italian “lines” lay well beyond the reach of pack mule-borne artillery ammunition. In the end, 5.5:1 odds rolled up to 6:1 but overconfident attackers still managed only a both exchange result, suffering disproportionately heavy losses.
Italian loss: 4*-5-7 alpini X to 1*-7 remnant and retreat
German loss: 3-4-7 mtn III and 3-6-5 mg III eliminated without follow-up

The second and last German attack of late May came to widen the corridor into Trient, specifically against Italian forces at grid 3913. Here, Italian forces partly intentionally laid a clever defense where they could not have massed one of straightforward potency. In the mountains and without aerial support, German rifle forces faced significant problems that superior morale could not fully overcome. Gas engineer support was expected to provide significant advantage to the attack, but vastly superior numbers and firepower provided the truly important advantage. Against this, Italian cavalry and artillery could not hope to hold and attempted rather to finesse the situation to advantage. When the magnitude of the attack became clear, with Italian forces in several other grids then safe from assault, the local cavalry division successfully retreated before combat, leaving a lone artillery regiment to face the German horde. The Germans then faced the cruel decision whether to expend significant ammunition in a very small cause, or to risk the Italians doing the same unanswered before successfully attempting to commit reserves that might change a sure victory into a stalemate or even a pyrrhic attacker exchange. In the event, the Germans chose the safe course, spending ammunition in quantity while the Italians then happily avoided a significant battle and large expense of forces. Finally, even a 9:1 German attack with successful gas effects managed an inept defender exchange result that still seized the field.
Italian loss: 3-7 mtn fld art III
German loss: RP, 1-7 mtn fld art II

During Central Powers combat phase of II MAY 1915, Italian forces thus suffered 5/6 morale points, 4.5 manpower and 2.5 equipment points of losses. German forces suffered 5/6 morale points, 3.75 equipment points and 7.25 Prussian manpower points of losses.

fter new, widespread excitement south of the Alps and unusual quiet north of the mountains, during most of May 1915, the trend reversed itself radically late in the month. Italian forces became suddenly quiet, as if unable to believe their good fortune in the war to date. Belgian and British forces bucked the trend by simply remaining quiet as they have for months, the former for lack of possibilities (the Belgians almost always activate and rarely redeploy a unit) and the latter through simple lethargy (the British almost never activate). The French, however, made up for their allies with a series of attacks in the Ardennes Forest during the last week of the month – renewing what had been ferocious activity in the sector throughout April.

From Verdun, General Foch spurred three corps into quickly massing against and attacking the German-held salient and iron mines around Briey. In theory, the location’s immense economic value should have held the attention of an insurmountable German garrison, but disorganization inherent in the immense shifting of German forces left the region temporarily vulnerable. Three corps, almost entirely of first-line (though not elite) French units spent munitions prolifically but otherwise lacked much in the way of assistance from army-level. Falkenhayn failed to impact the battle but the Germans did make skillful use of the tailing piles and entrenchments. Foch maintained his excitement in positive fashion, as did his countrymen their high morale, and the first successful use of gas on the Western Front helped the otherwise hapless French, who rolled a 3.6:1 down to 3:1 and achieved a BX result.
French losses: 4x 8*-11-5 rfl XX to 3*-5-5 cadre and 1x RP
German losses: 14*-16-5 BAV XX to 6*-7-5 cadre, 9*-12-5 PR XX to 4*-5-4 cadre and 3*-4-4 rfl X and RP eliminated

French activity along the western edge of the Ardennes Forest continued with high intensity and the usual decreasing success as May wore toward its end. The worst-waged battle of the war for the French to date came, appropriately, in a narrow-front coup de main attempt against the German siege train at Charleroi. The German artillery lay there, awaiting its chance to counterattack what may eventually become contested Maubeuge, and the train guard consisted primarily of weak brigades that appeared almost as tasty to the French as the huge tubes themselves. In the event, everything except for the observation balloon corps worked against the French: two engineer brigades made no impact, a siege engineer regiment failed despite expending massive quantities of explosives, entrenchments and mine shafts provided Germans excellent cover, and 1.2:1 odds and a roll of 2 revealed basic tactical incompetence to top things off as the French procured an AL result.
French losses: 4x 8*-11-5 rfl XX to 3*-5-5 cadre and 4-5-5 fld art III and 2x RP eliminated
German losses: 15-17-5 WUR XX to 7*-8-5 cadre and 1-2-5 eng III and RP eliminated

Events went better southwest of Namur in an attack of simple attrition. German defenders used woods and entrenchments skillfully, besides drawing upon ammunition stockpiles also used by the siege train while the standard fire brigade, a lonely mounted rifle formation, reacted into the hex and shifted the odds by a decimal. French morale was their only advantage and the usually better skill of 1st Colonial and 1st Cavalry Corps held strong as 2.4:1 rolled upward and a BX resulted.
French losses: 8*-5-7 cav XX to 3*-2-7 cadre, 2x 8*-11-5 rfl XX to 3*-5-5 cadre and 2-4-7 mot mg III eliminated
German losses: 16-18-5 rfl XX to 7*-8-5 cadre and 4-8-5 BAV MG [X] eliminated

During exploitation, German forces shuffled as much as limited speed made possible. A German division joined the garrison of Trient at the tip of the Germanic salient pointed toward Lake Garda; the fortress is radically stronger now but resident Austrians will drag down morale if the Italians attack. Other Germans pushed deeper into the Alps to consolidate the defense of many passes against Italian aggression. In France and Belgium, German forces shifted to cover the various new weak spots and to prepare conversions.

Entente Turn

May 1915 dawned with mud still prevalent in the Alps and Italy entering the war on the side of the Entente while economies on both sides chugged along. Both the Entente and Central Powers economies produced equipment and munitions at historical rates, despite the considerably less than historical German advance into France in this war. The equipment stockpiles of both sides are inadequate, but the Entente enjoys a much more dramatic deficit between reality and potential – especially given Italy’s pathetic state – and unlike the Central Powers the Entente is seriously short of munitions too. Coal mines at Leige and Namur began producing coal in useful quantities in May, which will buff the Central Powers economic strength during upcoming production cycles. The Entente also cannot match the tremendous flow of German manpower to the front and has only managed to survive so far by expending field artillery units and suffering casualties preferentially in French elite units, the on-map availability of both of which is suffering noticeably and loss rates of which cannot be sustained for long.

Concrete measures on both sides revitalized the field armies for an active beginning to a long, bloody summer. German forces refilled two Prussian cadres, a Bavarian cadre, and a Prussian remnant to full strength. French forces refilled two cadres, increased an artillery battalion to regimental size, and replaced two artillery regiments, consuming almost the entire limit for monthly artillery and light troops. The Italian Army drew upon Entente equipment stockpiles for numerous upgrades to rifle divisions as well as a scattering of rifle brigades and Bersagliari regiments and the lone rail engineer regiment.

Early May in Flanders brought another abortive British offensive, as the British Expeditionary Force felt its growing power. Various unsupported divisions moved to backstop another thirty miles of the French front line, leaving the British in charge of fifty miles of front and easily double that of rear. London directed a reversal of its previous reversal of the plan to form an army in Italy, moving a headquarters, three rifle divisions, and a couple of regiments almost to Venice by rail and sending all three British cavalry divisions that way by hoof. This would not be enough for a British offensive out of Italy, but it would certainly free Italian forces from second-line duties. More immediately, the British once again poised for an attack in Belgium; this time they cancelled it after both recon aircraft failed their missions: munitions and replacements are too scarce to commit to a mere 2.9:1 without the verifiable benefit of aerial observation.

Italian forces, in early May, acted as if frozen in place by the immensity of their mobilization, but plans grew swiftly back in Rome for a sweeping offensive through the Alps. The Austro-Hungarian Army is grossly insufficient to even screen the long frontier, though it is as good unit-for-unit as the French and thus considerably better than the Italians. Starting A-H forces are barely noticeable, regular reinforcements are thin, and conditional reinforcement for when Italy goes to war do not begin to make up the difference. It is difficult to imagine how the A-H’s can avoid a calamitous defeat, albeit one delivered in slow motion, as the Italians ooze through the mountains and eventually go around the flank of the Isonzo River line without ever having to bother attacking across the river the hard way. It may be fortunate for the Central Powers that the vast bulk of Austro-Hungary is off-map and invulnerable and that any Italian army debauching into Bavaria through the Alps would be easy prey for the unimaginably superior German military.

Of course, the Germans can hold back the Italians another way – and they exercise their option to immediately declare war as a prelude to the arrival of German forces in Austria. The Italians will be able to ooze into the mountains, but they will never ooze out the other end of the passes if the Germans commit even a couple of corps against them. If the Germans forgo some offensive potential against the French, they might clear the north bank of the Po River by autumn.

The French Army continued in early May its manful effort to exhaust the Germans in a series of pounding matches in the Ardennes Forest. This time the blow fell in the previously “safe” sector of the forest line, where hills made the woodlands even less attractive to an attacker. The French actually botched a good bit of the attack, immolating a pair of engineer regiments and having another pair, flame reinforced, fail in their attacks. Observation planes contributed well, however, as did the brand-new gas engineers, so that the morale advantage carried through the 4.7:1 attack as a defender loss result. German forces completely eliminated 12-14-5 rifle divisions to cover the retreat of specialist units, including the so far useless gas engineers, who failed their craft yet again. French forces eliminated 5*-7-6 African cadre and 2x 1-5 eng regiments A variety of French units then advanced into the hex, almost all to become disorganized in the still contested hex.

German reaction to this unexpected breach in their line was disappointing, to Berlin. Both armies nearest Switzerland activated, shifting a few forces toward Austria and more forces toward the Ardennes. An army in northern Belgium also activated, doing the same. Armies aimed toward Paris failed to activate and, most disappointingly, so did a pair of armies that attempted to coordinate a counterattack against the new French salient.

Entente exploitation came and went with little fanfare, except around the new French salient into German lines in the Ardennes. There, almost all of the French units pulled back out of the position, leaving only a mountain division, a disorganized rifle division, and a field artillery regiment to defend the very solid position. The Germans, with four hexes around the salient, could mass 6:1 against any possible French force, so the French opted to attempt to hold the hex through finesse rather than mass.

Central Powers Turn

The Central Powers’ half of early May began with a huge effort to prepare for imminent carnage. German depots dispatched replacements to rebuild six cadres into divisions and to replace three jaeger regiments, an engineer regiment, a Saxon cadre, and two field artillery regiments. This colossal effort accomplished three things, each of them potentially more important than it might appear at first glance. First, this quantity of rejuvenation greatly strengthened the German armies on the front, enabling a counterattack in the Ardennes that could easily result in an attacker quartered result without consequently opening the way for an actual, clean French break through the resulting German weakness. Second, in refilling so many cadres with riflemen the Germans both decreased their own striking power by removing a great deal of divisional artillery from the non-divisional unit lists and increased their own defensive power by placing many of their best remaining divisions – which had made the best cadres – back onto divisional duty alongside the many lesser-quality formations that sprang from the April reorganization of many divisions to a four regiment structure. Third, perhaps most important but certainly most nebulous, seeing the Germans plump 80 percent of their Prussian infantry replacements in one phase gave the Entente dramatic evidence that their offensives actually were making a difference. If the Prussians burned through a hundred infantry in one phase, their savings plus two-thirds of new production, and the other states and the general equipment pool both made large proportional expenditures at the same time, and if the effort could not be afforded again – which it could not before July – then the Entente might really be able to exhaust the German armies at the front through a continuous series of attritional attacks over the course of the summer.

The idea that Entente offensives might bleed the Germans to death without winning a geographic victory seems obvious from a historical viewpoint, but is by no means so clear when immersed in the game experience for the first time. Given relatively anemic Entente replacement rates, it is hard to see how the Entente can actually accomplish that goal, especially when most battles result in larger Entente than German losses. Looking ahead, the French Army is going to get offensively weaker without much regard to events at the front, though its defensive strength per regiment should get better. The British still cannot form even half a corps of elite troops and have even worse replacement rates than the French, though at least the trickle of reinforcing divisions are, on a one-to-one bases, almost as good as German second-line units; the long-term prospect for the British seems dim. The Italians are a pathetic joke, stacking up evenly only against the absolute worst German formations. It seems most likely that if the Entente is going to win the war, it will be through hunger; the Germans did not secure the Gent granary and should thus go into starvation sooner than was historical. To that end, the Entente can probably best directly contribute by continuing to pound in well-chosen, advantageous attacks rather than on broader-front, less advantageous attacks that would bleed the Entente dramatically more severely than they would the Germans. The problem with that plan is that it might easily not inflict enough damage on the Germans by early 1918 to prevent a last-gasp German maneuver victory when infantry enter the battlefield. Without whole campaign experience to draw upon, we cannot predict how this will end – and that might be a good thing if we could not also look ahead and see mandatory evolutions in the strategic situation and battlefield tactics.

Be that as it may, the men in Berlin took the decision that the French salient in the Ardennes Forest had to be counterattacked immediately. If the French were allowed to hold the region uncontested, the German line would be made thirty miles longer and have the vulnerability of thirty more miles dramatically amplified. With the requirement for a German army in Austria, a failed counterattack would be cheaper than a permanent extension of the line. French weakness in the salient allowed the Germans to bring against it a force composed solely of divisions and of precisely the strength to achieve 6:1 odds, further minimizing the downside risk of the move.

The German attack succeeded almost as well as possible despite formidable difficulties. Wooded rough terrain, the disputed nature of the hex, French morale superiority, and French elite troops began the competition with a negative five modifier to the German chance for success. Falkenhayn, from his headquarters facing Verdun, could not influence all sixty miles of frontage around the salient and was thus impotent. German gas engineers maintained their perfect record of failing to usefully impact battles. Engineer attacks were impossible, as the local entrenchments were not broadly controlled by either side. Only observation aircraft assisted the attack in useful fashion. The Germans having spent munitions to ensure good odds, the French did not, saving the stockpile at no measurable penalty in combat. The German roll of 4 resulted in a retreat result, which converted to a full exchange after which two French cadres were destroyed by zones of control. French losses: 10-13-5 rifle XX, 13-16-7 mtn lt XX, 4-5-5 fld art III German losses: 18-20-6 BAV XX and 16-18-5 PR XX reduced to cadres German forces advanced into the still disputed hex in great quantity, and most duly became disorganized in so doing, but their overall strength was so great that the Entente could not plausibly attack again into the region – the disputed hex and lack of ability to use engineers, or during reaction phase any aircraft ensured the absence of immediate French response.

In counterpoise to this affront against probability, the Entente was willing to attack in several locations during reaction phase, but only one of twelve armies activated successfully. Oddly, the lone activation among Entente armies was B8L, one of two armies poking busily at the German lines in the Ardennes. With the previous battlefield too unfavorable, and with German forces having been sucked toward the center, B8L directed an attack against the southernmost tip of Belgium as a way to further batter German defenses. French forces, including most of the higher quality formations sliding inland along the line, struck against a slight bulge in the German line along a forty mile front. Both sides spent munitions prolifically and Falkenhayn was active and effective, besides woodlands and entrenchments both hindering the attack and preventing reserve commitment. The French counter to all of this, ground support bombing, contributed little after the bombers went fleeing accurate German machinegun fire. French engineers, one brigade with flamethrowers, continued their dismal recent record with another failure. The odds, 5.8:1, rolled up to 6:1 – a truly fantastic Entente attack – but the muddled and hurried nature of the attack demonstrated itself again in the result of both exchange. French losses: 2x 10-13-5 rfl XX’s to cadre German losses: 7-10-4 and 9-11-5 rfl XX’s to cadre.

During exploitation, only Germans moved of the Central Powers in the West. Three more formations entered the contested zone of the Ardennes Forest, all becoming disrupted and making the hex even more formidable: fifty defense strength on wooded rough terrain. Otherwise, the Germans merely fixed a few soft spots in their line and continued marching a small corps toward the Austrian Alps.

Entente Turn

Entente II APR 1915 followed the same trajectory as did the previous version. French forces rebuilt a cadre and two engineer regiments. The Canadian heavy cavalry brigade finally, after close to six months, became fully capable – though a 2*-1-7 heavy cavalry brigade is useful on the Western Front only as one point of a non-overrunnable second line.

The French finally made “good” on their massing against Maubeuge, and it was a costly setback. After both observation missions failed, the Entente wasted a resource point bombarding with three fully-stacked hexes of heavy and field artillery to achieve three hits: the Germans lost 13 points of defense strength while the French lost 39.75 points of effective attack strength. The odds thus shifted such that a chance for 3:1 became just barely 2:1, making reserve commitment irrelevant (it would still have been just barely 2:1). The Germans used the ruined fortress as entrenchments while the French enjoyed morale superiority and a successful engineer attack to make the result the usual both exchange. The well stacked Germans thus made mincemeat out of the French combined arms attack.

German forces suffered: 16-18-5 Prussian, 13-15-5 Prussian, 8*-11-4 Prussian, and 7*-10-4 Bavarian XX’s all to cadre for -4 1/3 morale points.

French forces suffered: 2x 10*-13-5 Colonial, 10*-13-5 rifle, 2x 8*-11-5 rifle, and 6*-9-5 rifle XX’s to cadre plus 2x 1-5 eng III’s eliminated for -6 2/3 morale points.

Daunted but resigned, the French continued the offensive versus the now usual target, the east bank of the Maas River just inside Belgium. French forces brought superior morale, elite troops, a successful aerial observation mission, and a successful engineering attack against German defended entrenchments in woodlands. 1st and 2nd Cavalry Corps did their usual good job, rolling 2.5:1 up to 3:1 and achieved the usual both exchange result.

German forces suffered 16-18-5 Prussian XX reduced to cadre plus 7*-8-5 Saxon and 2*-4-4 Prussian cadres eliminated for -2 morale points.

French forces suffered 13*-16-7 alpine and 9*-12-5 rifle XX’s reduced to cadre plus 2-7 Foreign Legion III, 4-5-5 fld arty III, and 1-5 eng III eliminated for -3 morale points.

Cognizant that in May enough ships would sink to reduce the army’s morale, the British high command directed an attack in late April to enjoy their national will superiority in ground combat just this one time. The arrow straight German line in the sector offered little to choose, so the British went straight up the middle. The British brought morale and successful observation but their unpracticed engineering forces failed both attempts and the British lack enough elite troops to make even a non-overrunnable stack let alone to make a real attack. The Germans defended open ground with entrenchments and brought a 3-4-7 light III in reserve movement, but the massed British regular divisions, the best the Entente will see before 1918, pushed a 2.8:1 up to 3:1 and achieved the obligatory both exchange result.

German forces suffered 12*-14-5 Prussian and 12*-14-5 Wurtemburger XX’s reduced to cadre plus a 1-2-5 eng III eliminated for -2 1/3 morale points.

British forces suffered 11*-14-5, 12-15-5, and 7*-10-5 XX’s reduced to cadre for -3 morale points, a clear example of the effect of the combat superiority of German second line divisions over Entente first line stuff.

The Central Powers reaction phase of the Entente II APR 15 turn passed uneventfully. The armies where the Germans might have attacked did not activate. Only two armies did activate and both spent their effort organizing the German Army for a massive divisional reorganization.

Central Powers Turn

During the Central Powers II APR 15 initial phase, the British, French, and Germans all kept themselves busy. The Germans reorganized, converted, and/or withdrew about thirty formations, including removing about ten 16-18-5 and 18-20-5 divisions from their order of battle – replaced by substantial numbers of 13-15-5 and slightly weaker divisions. The Germans also prepared the some forces for transfer to Italy, in expectation that the country would attack Austria soon. British forces rebuilt four imperial cadres to divisions, French forces did the same with five metropolitan and two colonial cadres, and the Germans did the same with one each Prussian, Bavarian, and Wurtemburger cadres.

The major tactical move for the Germans in late April was a shifting of forces to attack a weak spot in the French line in the southern Ardennes Forest. Four divisions of French troops sat on the north-south railway, that otherwise runs along or behind much of the German front line, suddenly facing three corps of Germans where before the constricted terrain had kept the threat minimal. The French used entrenchments, national will, woodlands, and defensive air support to good effect in the battle. The Germans used Falkenhayn’s planning, two engineering exploits – including flamethrowers, and aerial reconnaissance to better effect. German gas engineers failed to alter the battle and French reserve commitment failed too. Five point three to one odds rolled down to 5:1 but could still have achieved a defender loss result; instead the attack went in botched and the roll of “1” resulted in a both exchange. French forces suffered 12-15-6 African and 8-11-5 rifle divisions reduced to cadre: -2 morale German forces suffered 1-2-5 eng III eliminated and 7-10-4 Prussian and 16-18-5 Bavarian rifle divisions reduced to cadre: -2 2/3 morale

The Entente largely failed to react to that affront, but the local French did strike back. Belgian and British headquarters remained quiet, though the British would have attacked had either army been alert. Almost all French armies remained equally quiet, but the staff in the southern Ardennes was already alert due to the give and take battles ongoing and put together another attack against on the same battlefield as had hosted a French attack the previous week: 1219. Two French corps mustered 2.4:1 odds, which rolled up to 3:1. German forces used entrenchments and woods to excellent effect. French forces used national will, elite troops, one of two engineering attempts – including flamethrowers, and aerial reconnaissance to better effect. German forces failed reserve commitment and the French put in a solid effort, rolling a “3” for a both exchange result. French forces suffered 1-5 eng III eliminated and 2x 13-16-7 light mountain divisions (one colonial) reduced to cadre: -2 1/3 morale German forces suffered 2x 3-6-5 mg III’s eliminated and 16-18-5 Prussian division reduced to cadre: -2 morale

The Germans focused their exploitation in late April on the entry of Italy into the war, pulling various forces, including the bulk of the mountain troops, off of the line for railing to the Alps in May. Naturally, the Germans also moved to cover weaknesses created by the latest in the series of punches in the Ardennes.

Entente Turn

The onset of clear weather across Western Europe shocked the high commands in Berlin, Paris, and London as April dawned and furry meteorologists backpedaled on predictions of six more weeks of mud. German forces, caught with incomplete entrenchments in many places, braced for the long expected offensive that Entente forces, with superior morale, seemed likely to mount as the ground dried out. The British Expeditionary Force, swelling with a constant influx of Territorial and New Army divisions, reversed its formation of an army on the Italian border and moved back to the front lines in Belgium. Some French forces took immediate advantage of their winter reorganization to mount a serious offensive for the first time in the war while others huddled in entrenchments awaiting the likely German storm.

The long winter build-up on both sides left relatively little work for logistical and personnel officers as April dawned. Prussian personnel flowed to one cadre, bringing it back to full strength. French replacements did the same with one cadre while three artillery regiments received drafts of unskilled personnel and recently mobilized tubes. Canadian heavy cavalrymen infuriated hometown reporters with polo games, supposedly injuring enough men and horses to make military training impossible – the unit remained at reduced effectiveness in the measure of their British corps commander.

British generals took a longer sector of the front in response to urgent French requests. Grumblers showed reinforcements around trenches and shell holes so familiar they’d begun to seem like fifty miles of home between Oostende to Kortrijk. Corps commanders worried vocally about the lack of artillery for seventeen unsupported rifle divisions and the host of independent regiments and brigades that clung to the older divisions – and their howitzers – like bits of wood on a storm tossed sea. A great many of those formations formed an idle second line, from the coast west of Oostende clear to the shipping canal at Cambrai, the only a break being the Franco-Belgian garrisoned fortress city and industrial center of Lille.

The King of Belgium, from his well protected army headquarters in Lille, disposed his field forces on each end of the British sector. Most of the Belgian artillery corps waited on the coast west of Oostende, prepared to backstop the British entrenchments but really aimed seaward lest the High Seas Fleet decide to support with naval gunfire a ground offensive to seize the vital port. The entire Belgian field army, except for most of the heavy and siege artillery units, assembled over the fortnight in the twenty mile salient on the northwest bank of the uppermost reaches of the Schelde River. The position is dangerous, particularly to hold with dispirited troops, but the river is as good a shield as any the Entente enjoys outside the Vosges and the massed firepower of the partially reorganized Belgian Army – well over six divisions strong – is nothing the Germans will lust to tangle with.

Marshall Foch greeted the arrival of sun and warm breezes with public confidence but private concern and his army’s stance conformed to those feelings. A winter-long reorganization of French deployments left the French primed for offensive activity between Lille and the southern Ardennes, with virtually all colonial, naval, French Foreign Legion, Army of Africa, heavy artillery, and light units, together with the best regular divisions, all the cavalry divisions, and most of the first line field artillery massed on and behind a meager hundred thirty miles of front. The reorganization that arranged the French for attack also dangerously weakened the remainder of the front, from northwest of Verdun all the way to Switzerland, both in frontline firepower and local reserves. The French rail network, rejuvanated by British equipment over the past months and nearly free of operational redeployments because of French readiness and the cancellation of the British move toward Italy, added unusual mobility to French tactical actions.

The bulk of French heavy artillery, massed in front of and near Maubeuge, had been scheduled for a massive bombardment, but the plan changed at the last moment. The Kaiser’s men had not strengthened their garrison at the captured fortress, and the French could have assaulted it frontally with a fair chance of giving as good as they got, but in a miracle of openmindedness a craftier plan was put forth by a division commander and adopted by two armies with next to no notice. German construction gangs had recently completed entrenching a lone section of the front in the Ardennes while other gangs worked dilatorily on most of the remainder of the line, including a suddenly interesting salient in the woodlands southeast of Maubeuge. If French forces could seize that salient, they could later attack the fortress from around half of its perimeter rather than only a third and prospects would become much brighter for taking the place without quite such a long and severe bloodletting. In the Ardennes, on the other hand, German forces tied more closely to fixed fortifications were suddenly ripe for a diversionary strike that might also bleed the Germans disproportionately.

The sector of the central Ardennes in Belgium, south of the Maas River, known to some later historians as grid 1219, hosted the French diversionary assault. The Prussian Tenth Corps, centerpieced by a first-line Saxon division and including a weak Prussian division plus a brigade and three regiments, with defensive power rated at 42, held the sector in entrenchments with additional protection from the woodlands and the generally unimportant geography of their position. Against this force, modest by German standards, French railways helped bring a suddenly formidable array commanded by First and Second Cavalry Corps: three first-line rifle, two light, and two African divisions together with six regiments of artillery, three light brigades, two motor machinegun regiments, and seven engineer regiments plus a flamethrower battalion. In response to this sudden concentration, German reserve commitment – a single mounted rifle brigade was available – failed to arrive in time to intervene effectively. The inability of French aerial observors to penetrate German woodland camouflage rendered almost irrelevant the potential French bombardment and boded ill for the attack but Frenchmen on the ground, daunted without doubt, were not dismayed. Adverse terrain capabilities of the numerous light units in the French array made the woodlands as helpful as they were a hindrance in the assault and two pairs of engineer brigades did stellar work in converting protective entrenchments into pre-dug mass graves for German defenders. 114 attack power, with a morale superiority, rolled fractional odds up to 3:1 and a roll of 6 with a net +2 modifier brought victory with a DX result, though the Germans held onto the hex. Saxon forces reduced 15-17-5 rifle division to cadre and eliminated 3-4-7 Prussian jager regiment (7 Saxon and 3 Prussian manpower plus 1 2/3 morale points lost). French forces reduced 9*-12-6 chasseur division to cadre and eliminated two 1-5 engineer regiments (6 metropolitan manpower plus 1 2/3 morale points lost). Both sides in this combat drew upon ammunition stockpiles that also supplied by next described battle. Given the higher German morale point total this battle could be considered a German victory, but given the superiority of French morale relative to historical patterns the reverse could also be true; relative manpower losses seem concretely in the French favor though German replacement rates again seem higher.

The geographically important battle of early April appears now to have been the one begun by the French in grid 1022, the woodlands immediately east of Maubeuge that shielded the fortress from a three sided French attack. Prussian arms defended the sector in fieldworks with two second-line rifle divisions, a rifle brigade, four rifle regiments, an artillery division of two regiments, and a construction brigade. French plans for Maubeuge, a massive artillery barrage followed by an assault of elite rifle units, formed the basis for this attack instead, though the artillery barrage did not much resemble what could have been fired against the fortress. Nine French divisions, including all the elite divisions of the French army in Europe, together with six elite brigades, two Foreign Legion regiments, two motor machinegun regiments, eleven field and two heavy artillery regiments, and a field and two heavy artillery brigades combined for the attack. Balloon reconnaissance failed to contribute much intelligence but fleeter fixed wing aircraft usefully spotted fall of shot and French artillery roared forth in the second bombardment of the war: five disruption hits did not meet the average expected but still badly disrupted all three components of the Prussian artillery division and reduced German defensive power by about a quarter. French adverse terrain expertise, the bombardment, a morale superiority, aerial reconnaissance, and the elite nature of most of the assault troops far overmatched the defensive advantages of fieldworks and woodlands, so that despite odds rolling down to 3:1 the roll of 2 resulted in an DR result that converted, almost automatically in this war to date, to an HX. Prussian forces suffered 13-15-5 and 12-14-5 rifle divisions reduced to cadre; 4*-5-5 rifle brigade reduced to remnant; and artillery headquarters, 7-8-5 and 5-7-5 foot regiments, two 3-4-7 jager regiments, 1-2-5 and 1-2-4 rifle regiments, and 0-4 construction brigade eliminated as they were cleared from the sector. French forces did not accomplish this lightly, suffering both 13*-16-7 mountain and an 8*-11-5 rifle divisions reduced to cadre in the effort. Prussian losses amounted to 34 manpower, 15 equipment, and 5 2/3 morale points; the aborted observation balloon is completely irrelevant in the face of numerous German air replacements that will go unused. French losses amounted to 24 manpower and 3 morale points. French forces deemed sufficient to garrison the sector advanced in good order, organized to enjoy the advantages of eliteness and the woodland against any mobile German counterattack. The French high command set forth with enthusiasm to plan the use of this new position in the struggle to force the Germans out of Flanders.

The German high command did not neglect to react to these unusually but expectedly aggressive French attacks, but could not quite manage to coordinate any immediate counterstrokes. First and Second Armies, around Maubeuge, busily dealing with the immediate defeats, could not organize effective redeployments under stress – the French had gotten inside the decision loops of staffs and commanders accustomed only to calling the tune. Sixth and Seventh Armies, near Switzerland, saw little need for immediate action in the face of the broad Rhine and looming Vosges. Third Army, in the southern Ardennes, was content to sit in its impregnable defenses facing the French, in their own maximized arrangements. Fifth Army, just northwest of the Vosges, was not so timid and reacted to the clear weather by pulling many units off of the front line so that they could shift as necessary for an imminent offensive. Fourth Army, near Metz, alertly shifted an engineer regiment to continue upgrading frontline defenses. FAL/A, in the northwestern Ardennes, reacted to the French attack against it by shifting static and artillery units to backstop the line and cadres to positions where they could receive fresh drafts from the replacement depots. FAL/B eventually made the most dramatic reaction to the weather and the French by ordering the siege train, in all its massed glory, away from its position against Oostende toward Maubeuge.

The Entente exploitation passed quickly, with the French cleaning up the debris of their attacks and nothing of particular note happening elsewhere.

Central Powers Turn

The predominant activities during the Central Powers I APR 15 turn were German reorganization and French aggression. German replacements flowed to two cadres while the French brought both of their best light alpine divisions and one standard division back to full strength. The French know already that they will soon have too few elite divisions to make elite-bonus attacks because the replacement rate for light troops is so low. The Germans also looked forward to a late-April mass reorganization and significant withdrawal of forces, so that they spent most of their effort in withdrawing and co-locating various specific types of units. German forces also completed entrenching the remainder of their front line, excepting two locations with particularly severe terrain and constricted-access.

Entente reaction to the German shifts was of an unusually high significance. Many Entente armies activated, apparently spurred by the dried-out roads and apparent imminence of Italian entry into the war. A moderate quantity of British and French units shifted out of the line, so that later in the month they could choose from many possible locations to re-enter it for attacks. French 10th Army took the opportunity more seriously by attacking German entrenchments on the east bank of the Maas River just inside Belgium. German 10th Corps deployed Saxon, Prussian, and Prussian Landwehr divisions in the sector, together with various supporting elements. French 1st and 2nd Cavalry Corps, noted for their aggressiveness in this sector only the previous week, again pulled the Army into attacking, this time too with an elite force of mountain, African, and light units, a mass of field artillery, and significant engineers and motorized machine gunners. German forces enjoyed the protection of the woodlands and entrenchments. French forces enjoyed their elite status, superior morale, and the success of one of two engineering adventures, while the French air forces failed to adequately observe for the unexpected offensive. In the end, the odds rolled up to 3:1, a fantastic Entente attack, and the attack went in with skill (roll 5), but the event remained the very usual both exchange result.

German forces suffered 15-17-5 Saxon XX to cadre, 6*-9-4 Landwehr Prussian XX to cadre, and 2*-3-4 static X eliminated, for -3 morale.

French forces suffered 12*-15-6 African XX to cadre, 10*-13-7 mtn XX to cadre, 4-5-6 Colonial X to remnant, and 1-5 eng III eliminated. The French are also piling up engineer casualties far faster than fresh engineer troops are being produced at schools. -3 morale.

The constant question is, “was it worth it?” For the Entente, a 3:1 attack is excellent and a BX result therefore as good as it almost ever gets. By picking a German hex not optimally stacked, the Entente managed to generate equal morale point losses, but such hexes are rare – the usual BX has the Entente losing morale points at about a 6:5 ratio due to higher German strengths per RE. The Germans, for example, have machinegun regiments that are more than twice as strong per RE as French machinegun brigades, and the French units are among the best French non-divisional units and suffer from lesser granularity besides. As German divisions reorganize into 4 RE structure divisions, they will lose no strength per RE but will gain greater granularity at the top end of the loss-taking spectrum – and the Germans still have plenty of divisions to ensure that the Entente will be happy to be able to make a 2.5:1 attack.

To amplify this problem, the Entente is perpetually in worse condition for resource points. The Entente powers cannot share the same point, of course, which is a minor trouble. More serious, if the Entente wants to take the chance that a bombardment will achieve anything worthwhile – and the best one has done for us to date is to ALMOST break even – then it spends a resource point for that and another for a combat in which the Germans spend only one. If the Entente full stacks three hexes of troops for an attack the next attack down the line cannot use the same resource point because the 150RE limit will be breached – but the Germans can almost always use the same resource point for two defensive battle. The Entente has siege engineer units that can consume further resource points in exchange for a 50% chance of self-eliminating with the added bonus of dragging down the strength per RE of the attack and a grand 1-in-6 chance of achieving a +1 on a die roll that will almost certainly only shift the BX result to another BX result. All this means that the Entente has siege engineers that it will not pay to use and cannot risk using while still paying usually three resource points to conduct two battles in which the Germans consume only one. Given a historical shell shortage, one also must consider that the Entente did eventually grind down the Germans over the course of years.

In our game, the Entente could at the rate so far achieved under optimum conditions, easily inflict fewer than 300 morale points of losses on the Germans before autumn 1918. And the Entente will not always enjoy optimal conditions: French light troop replacement rates will bite and engineer replacement rates are already biting, resource points will be a problem – worse when better siege engineers become available, German gas engineers will proliferate and always be better than their Entente counterparts, the air situation will intermittently be unfavorable, the Germans will get serious bombers and long-range artillery to attack Entente cities while the Entente will be feeble in comparison, the British morale advantage will disappear no later than the beginning of May 1915 and may never reappear, the French are wearing down their morale advantage with each attack, and if the Entente steps up the offensive by conducting 2:1 attacks with fewer advantages then it will suffer disastrous AX results.

German exploitation in early April 1915 was to insert reserves into the line and shift forces to cover locations newly under potential threat.

Entente Turn

Note: Errata from game report 14 reveals that the British are in fact at a National Will of 5 – by about two morale points.

The Entente side of the front line during the second half of March 1915 was a seething mass of slow shifts of forces. Pervasive mud prevented any excitement.

Logistical and administrative officers received chief mention during the period. German depots released personnel to rebuild another division from its cadre. French personnel and equipment officers released stocks sufficient to empty the French replacement pool of its lone occupants: one each field artillery regiment and brigade. Petulant Canadian heavy cavalrymen continued to refuse to conduct serious training, thus remaining at reduced effectiveness.

In the trenches, British movements might have overshadowed those of their allies and enemies, but did not for reasons to be revealed later. French forces continued shifting light and mountain infantry and field artillery, any heavy artillery, and most of the especially strong first line regular units toward the sector of the front from Maubeuge through the central Ardennes. Second and third line French forces meanwhile shifted generally southward. Belgian forces joined some French troops to relieve a sector of the British line in front of Lille. Indian and Canadian forces, within the British sector, together with the pre-war British regulars massed from Oostende toward Lille on a fifty mile front. A succession of second line British divisions, all self-supported, correspondingly pulled out of the front line to fill those sectors of the second along major railroads while a couple of British cavalry divisions left the second line and moved southward at best overland speed. One British territorial division, just arrived from England, boarded trains in Caen for a quick trip to Nice, where the troops were issued tourist maps and Italian language primers. The British gunboat flotilla similarly left the misty rivers of northern France for a sojourn in sunny Toulon.

Entente forces deliberately stood sedately on the defensive, avoiding ammunition expenditures in order to retain stocks for operations in better weather.

German reaction to these events might not have been so sedate, had an attempted double-activation not failed, but it did and a plotted second attack against the French salient at 2520 did not go off. Scattered activations did allow some construction units to shift positions preparatory to entrenching further sectors of the German front line.

Central Powers Turn

In keeping with the weather and their continuing plans, German forces roused themselves for some offensive activity during the second half of March 1915.

Logistical and administrative officers once again acted importantly during the period. French depots sent personnel to rebuild one cadre into a division. German staff officers were busier, rebuilding an eliminated cadre together with a field artillery brigade and two mountain jager brigades to clear the German replacement pool.

German engineer officers, suddenly alive to the threat of Entente bombardments of sketchy fieldworks during upcoming clear weather, amplified previous desultory entrenching into a frenzy of widespread, far flying mud.

German forces conducted only minor shifts, retaining confidence in their nigh overwhelming front line strength and being already massed for the continuing attack against the Vosges Mountains in the 2520 region.

Three corps of Germans hurled themselves against the Vosges salient with considerably greater effect in late March than they had earlier in the month. French forces, previously a rifle division and three fortress brigades, were buffed with a further fortress brigade and a field artillery regiment before the German attack, but the battle was severe anyway. Falkenhayn’s previously miscarried plan worked far better this time, offsetting with reconnaissance aircraft the penalty of attacking into mountains. Gas effects failed for the second time running, leaving the mud, fieldworks, and superior French national will to operate against German success, but it was not enough. Odds in this attack, down from 8:1 previously, were only 5.9:1, and they stayed their as both sides opened the ammunition floodgates. The attack rolled up to 6:1 and the die roll, despite the net -3, resulted in a both exchange result. French forces suffered heavily in this, reducing their division to cadre besides eliminating the field artillery regiment: -1 1/3 morale, -4 inf, -3 equip. German forces came better prepared this time too, suffering only a 13*-15-5 rifle division reduced: -1 morale, -6 Prussian inf. The Germans definitely came out ahead in this battle, unlike the previous round where the results were decidedly mixed.

In response to this activity, British forces continued the rearward edging of territorial divisions while scattered French activations continued the shifting of forces preparatory to clear weather. Potentially of some interest, British port engineers arrived in Oostende and the press buzzed that a coastal flotilla might move into that advanced harbor.

Entente Turn

Being a production phase, the Entente initial phase of I MAR15 consumed considerable time and mattered a great deal to the course of the war. The contested hex at 1121 went Entente-owned, with the resident entrenchment downgrading to fieldworks and any tiny chance of German counterattack now gone unless the hex be upgraded back to entrenchment or the weather should turn clear. A new wave of Entente manpower, equipment, and ammunition production sent a wave of optimism through the ranks as the replacement depots filled to new highs and almost the last un-fielded or shattered formations received their human and artillery requirements. French forces rebuild one each cadre and remnant to full strength and replaced one engineer and three field artillery regiments. In the air events turned less well for the Entente, with superior aircraft in both French and British service withdrawing in favor of lesser models, though the French did also acquire their first observation balloon and
bomber aerial units. In another depressing situation, Canadian cavalrymen continue to refuse to go to full effectiveness. Finally, the British funded at cost of a valuable RP the transfer of three regiments’ worth of rail cars from Britain to the French rail system; continuing degradation is reducing the French net to dangerously low levels.

During Entente movement of early March 1915, the French continued to mass in the Ardennes Forest while the British and Belgians continued to try to help them do that. By mid-month, Belgian forces substantively occupied the first eighty miles of second line trenches, measured from the Channel coast southward. British forces replaced Belgian front line forces to occupy the first sixty-five miles of front running southward from the coast; another weak corps of British forces is en route to the front and should enable the British to relieve still more Frenchmen in the St. Niklaas sector. For their part, in the face of continued mud and reinforced German forces, the French shifted their aim to strike at the martyred fortress of Maubeuge.

As the month dawned, French artillery began to beat the drum of an abortive attack against Maubeuge. Eight brigades of heavy artillery, already in position, opened fire in a two week bombardment to soften the defense for the best non-salient attack the French Army could muster. Unfortunately, after the expenditure of a resource point and the massing of the best light and rifle forces of in the country, the attack failed to go off. The drum fell silent after German anti-aircraft aborted one French reconnaissance air unit and two others failed to usefully spot the fall of so much shot. After die roll modifiers for mud and fortress, eight brigades failed to roll even one hit and the French, unwilling to risk a 1.9:1 attack if German anti-aircraft should hit the unproven bomber air unit, cancelled the follow-up ground attack. In mud, at least, 55 defense factors of Germans – an easy feat at any point on the line – can be sufficient to prevent the French from conducting their b
es t possible two-hex, positional attack (far less than 55 will prevent any mobile attack).

In German reaction at the end of ENT IMAR15, Sixth and First Armies activated to conduct minor shifting. Fifth and Second Armies might have conducted attacks, had they activated, but the situation did not arise and calculation remained unnecessary.

Entente exploitation in mid-March 1915 proved likewise unexciting.

Interlude

After a 21 month delay, DJ05 is again rolling forward. In brief, the German advance into France stalled after a series of battles at the fortress of Maubeuge gradually inflicted serious damage on both French and Germans before finally taking the place on a brutal AX result. British forces currently hold Oostende and a front running about 80 miles southwest from there. Belgian and British forces backstop the British sector as well as a short segment of the French front. French forces hold the front from southwest of Maubeuge, a salient in the Belgian Ardennes, and all the way to Switzerland far enough forward that none of the French “border fortresses” are even on the front. The key German ore fields in Luxembourg and north of Metz, the fortress at Metz, and the fortress at Neu Breisach are all on the German front line. Casualties on both sides in 1914 were light enough, despite being brutal for a series of German attacks on Maubeuge during the autumn and winter, that the front is, in poor weather, almost unassailable almost everywhere to both sides (meaning that the likeliest combat results are AQ and AX when we compute odds, and that isn’t a recipe for winning wars). Belgium collapsed and then recovered with 50 morale points, so it can never be forced out of the war. Britain is not far below a national will of five; the Germans are substantially further but have a long way to go before reaching three. The French are solidly holding their national will of five. We look forward to Italian entry into the war and the return of clear weather, speculating that this may somehow make widespread attacking more plausible.

Central Powers Turn

In the Central Powers half of I MAR 15, the impenetrable front only became more pronounced, despite a modest battle in the southern mountains. With mud everywhere, German forces replaced a cadre and an engineer regiment, further plowing half of the huge wave of new soldiers (better than 100 assorted German infantry replacements arrived this month) into rebuilding five divisions; Entente forces found no cadres available. Falkenhayn, having returned from the front to Berlin for consultation in late February, brought to the West with him in March a plan to attack a weak French salient in the southern mountains near Neu Breisach. A trio of French fortress brigades and a solitary division held the low peaks, confident in their morale superiority, the terrain, the weather, and their fieldworks to beat off even the most serious German assault. With minor other shifting, largely to strengthen the front even further by pulling out the last cadres and inserting the newly rebuilt divisions, the Germans duly massed their mountain and Bavarian forces for their only plausible attack – on that same French salient. Three corps of attackers could not muster enough mountain troops for an elite bonus and Falkenhayn could not adequately control his forces in the mountains as mudslides repeatedly cut telegraph wires, but aerial reconnaissance did assist local commanders in a few instances. The liberal provision of ammunition to the attackers further assisted the effort, as French commanders deliberately starved their troops of shells, letting the odds move from 8:1 to 9:1. None of this mattered much, however, as the extremely difficult conditions brought the assault to an expensive, grinding halt with no permanent gains in geography. The DX result reduced the French 6*-9-5 division to cadre but also sent one each Bavarian and Prussian 3-4-7 mountain regiments into the replacement pool. French morale suffered more: one point as against two-thirds of a point lost for the Germans. The Entente came out ahead in other ways, losing three and a third infantry points as against six German infantry points and a resource point. It will be interesting to find out, in a couple of years of game time, which side regrets the battle more.

In the Entente reaction phase, three French armies in the central portion of the front activated, mounting no attacks but continuing the process of shifting higher quality forces toward Maubeuge and the Ardennes and lower quality forces southward. The French have to make a serious push somewhere in Spring 1915 and everything from Luxembourg southward is likely to remain impenetrable for reasons of garrison size, vertical terrain, and rivers.

Entente Turn

The second half of February 1915 began with the usual and the unusual. German forces rebuilt two cadres; British Indians and French Africans and Metropolitans rebuilt one each. French forces replaced one field artillery regiment. The Canadian heavy cavalry brigade again refused to leave its reduced effectiveness status. Far more importantly, an unexpected thaw transformed plastic mud into liquid mud and opened the way for a potential Entente attack against weakly-held, newly entrenched German positions at several salient in the front lines.

In late February 1915, for only the second time in the war to date, the Entente conducted major offensive activity. In order to free up an increasing quantity and quality of French formations, the Belgians shifted their frontline position to 0723, a hex with thirty-miles of river in front of it, while slightly buffing up their share of the second-line trenches. British forces took total ownership of the section of the front running Oostende through 0622 and also occupied forty miles of second line trenches. French forces broadly completed their reordering of the extreme southern sector of the line and managed to mass enough elite forces to go on the attack in the far southwestern fringes of the Ardennes Forest.

The freshly entrenched German salient at 1121 provided the target for the historic change of offensive tide on the Western Front (for “The Great World War One, 1914-1917”). Two German divisions, 33 points, defended wooded entrenchments facing fifteen miles of river and thirty-five miles of distant French trenches. French forces, with significant heavy artillery already in place along this sector of the front and powerful forces moving up rapidly, assumed a sudden offensive posture when they sensed the change in weather. Good French divisions and various moderate quality brigades and regiments exchanged positions with the crème de la crème of French formations: 10*-13-5 divisions and various elite divisions, brigades, and regiments. Eight regiments of field artillery slipped into firing positions under cover of woods to join the party.

In the face of such quality, what could even the liberally equipped, stronger German divisions do to defend themselves? 132.5 attack strength of French enjoyed +1’s for national will and elite status while facing -1’s for woods, entrenchment, and positional mud. Two groups of reconnaissance aircraft provided a +1 to the French and eight regiments of engineers combined into two, two brigade successful engineering attempts for +2 more. 4:1 with a combat roll of 6 resulted in DL and a forced change in the front line!

A Saxon 15-17-5 division dropped to cadre in trade for the French loss of 1-5 engineer regiment and the reduction of 4*-5-7 light brigade to remnant. Each side spent RP, Germans lost 1 1/3 and French 5/6 morale points.

Large French forces advanced after combat into the contested hex and suffered right about 50% disruption for their troubles. It would take a very bold German to counterattack this hex on the mobile table, with the French enjoying -5 protection from woods, elite, national will, and mud.

In reaction, only one German army activated to conduct a few, unimportant shifts.

Exploitation, in this unusual turn, kept to the unusual pattern. Several disrupted formations moved out of the contested hex. To replace them, undisrupted formations moved into the hex and again managed to find significant safe, clear locations to assemble a defense. By the end of the turn, three of four French divisions and two of four regiments or brigades in the embattled forest were not disrupted and German chances of a successful counterattack had dropped to nearly nil.

Central Powers Turn

The Central Powers initial phase of February II 1915 passed with little activity to note: German forces rebuilt one cadre.

Central Powers movement in late February 1915 was a real reaction to newly exhibited Entente strength. Many previously ‘safe’ positions received reinforcements to counteract Entente prowess. Several brand-new entrenchments underwent renovation, resulting in handsome new fieldworks that would keep the Entente on the mobile table where the -2 for mud would make 3 and 4:1 attacks unsafe. Too, the Germans continued to conform in their tactics and operations to their attritional strategy, this time by massing against the French in 2520.

25 defense points in 2520 stood in fieldworks amid muddy mountains, semi-confident that their national will advantage would keep them safe from German attack. Three corps of Germans proved them wrong in a small but hard fought battle in which the Germans, but not the French, spent an RP. The French decision sent 6:1 odds spiraling up to 9:1 and transformed a sure BX into a likely DX, as indeed turned out to be the case. French forces reduced 6*-9-5 division to cadre and suffered 4-5-5 field artillery regiment destroyed for 1 1/3 morale points lost. German forces suffered 7*-8-5 cadre destroyed for 1/3 morale point lost.

It may be worth noting that with most 0-move artillery and the German siege train now disbanded the stockpiles of equipment points on both sides will no longer be quite so flush and that artillery and cadre losses may start to hurt more than has been the case in the past four months.

At the end of February 1915, Entente forces roused themselves to action in hopes of keeping the pressure on in their successful February offensive in the Ardennes. Three French armies activated for the purposes of shifting ever more of the best units of the French Army into the Ardennes sector and pulling increasing numbers of lower-rated formations southward out of that portion of the front. One British army likewise activated, pulling all but a non-overrunnable crust of forces from the frontline British trenches. Boringly, the offensively-poised French armies did not activate, so the phase passed without combat.

German exploitation at the end of February 1915 proved utterly unremarkable, with only the usual minor shifting of details.

Entente Turn

The Entente initial phase of February 1915 was certainly the most important and eventful such phase of the game, almost totally because of the first annual morale check. Three German cadres received replacements for rebuilding. French forces replaced two cadres and three field artillery regiments besides rebuilding one cadre. British forces replaced their motorized machinegun brigade and reduced the second Indian cavalry division to cadre. Canadian forces finally began to abandon their long intransigence as their rifle division went to full effectiveness though their heavy cavalry brigade did not. British national will swelled back to category five as the empire gained 16 1/3 morale points (1/3 point below pre-war levels); they may gain another point once the undersea cables to South Africa are repaired and news arrives regarding the final extinction of the Boer revolt. French forces gathered in an astounding 51 1/3 morale points due to their almost total lack of geographic
losses; the French now rest solidly above their pre-war morale point totals. Austrian forces, due to their almost complete absence from the war in the west, could not better their historical performance in the war and that empire neither gained nor lost any morale points. For German forces, by contrast, the realization of the utter failure of the Schlieffen Plan (perhaps more properly the Moltke the Younger variant of the Schlieffen Plan) sent morale tumbling in a fashion (the 100 morale point penalty down to national will four) that the near-total lack of progress into France could not begin to offset; Germany gained no morale during the morale check. Belgium, as a minor power, did not undergo the annual morale check.

During early February 1915, the Entente did not press their national will advantage but did begin to shift their forces to enable future offensives. With a new national will penalty of -1 against near-future German attacks, French and British forces thinned their front line positions slightly. British forces took up second line positions behind another twenty-five miles of the front in addition to their current fifty miles of front and twenty-five miles of second line. French forces removed most of their elite units from the front line in the south and began to shift them into the sectors of the front between Epinal and the Ardennes. Belgian forces sat tight in their fifteen miles of frontline and twenty-five miles of second line trenches but did rejoice at a brand new machinegun brigade joining the army.

Central Powers reaction to Entente moves in early February 1915 was as muted as the morale checks indicated might be the case. Two armies, both poorly positioned for offensive actions, activated with minor benefits for the continuous German reorganization. Several armies with plausible attack forces in position for action failed their activation checks.

Central Powers Turn

In their own February I 1915, the Central Powers acted no more forcefully. While the French rebuilt one cadre to a division the Germans replaced two 1-2-5 engineer and one 3-4-7 mountain regiments besides a 7*-8-5 cadre and conducted many reorganizations and conversions. During their movement the Germans contented themselves with a massive organizational shift, both to mass forces to overcome the debilitating effects of several AX combat results and to prepare for yet another wave of reorganizations and conversions of units. The combination of national will, winter, fieldworks or entrenchments, and either poor terrain or massive Entente strength left the Germans unable to attack the British or French with any positional chance at better than BX or any mobile chance at better than EX; chances for AL, AX, AQ, AH, and AE abounded. The Germans could, as frequently, have hit the Belgians, but even the total extermination of the Belgian Army would little change the situation on th
e front while corresponding losses of Germans might seem to be of larger importance in the face of an imminent Franco-British offensive.

Entente reaction to German passivity was correspondingly unexciting. British and Belgian headquarters failed their reaction chances while three French armies continued the gradual shuffle of elite or strong formations northward and lower-grade units southward.

Entente Turn

The Entente movement phase of II January 1915 was a response to the preceding German withdrawal from their salient at 0923 and strong attack against British forces south of Oostende. Sixty defense strength points of Belgians massed from several non-overrunnable positions in the second line into fifteen miles of fieldworks on the front line while other Belgians still retained the second line position on the coast. British forces also compacted, moving into only sixty-five miles of front and barely ten miles of second line positions while enthusiastically welcoming three divisions of fresh forces into their sector. French forces, as always, took up the slack on both the main and second lines. In many frontline sectors, the French grew usefully stronger while almost the entire front now enjoys a second line of French forces to backstop against any German attack.

German reaction to these moves came in several successful reaction rolls but no attacks. Odds of 2.5:1 seemed unwise against Belgians, British, and French in several places. Numerous forces did pull off the line to accept additional artillery fresh from the factories in the upcoming week and other forces moved to prepare attacks against the French between Metz and Epinal.

German Turn

The German initial phase of did not pass uneventfully. British forces rebuilt one of two Indian cadres to full strength, not even taking advantage of the opportunity to rebuild the formation to a weaker strength at lesser cost. German forces rebuilt four 7*-8-5 cadres from the replacement pool besides conducting about fifteen upgrades and conversions.

In keeping with their pattern in recent months, German forces in late January 1915 massed for and conducted one attack. In this pattern, our Germans are semi-consciously imitating Falkenhayn’s attrition strategy of 1915-1916. In our case, especially before February 1915, every Entente morale point loss will be matched by a corresponding point not gained as a bonus during the morale check; German points are simply a 1:1 loss. Falkenhayn was – and our Germans are – striking against the long-term will of the French to sustain the war effort.

This time the attrition fell at hex 2219. Defending French forces of 60 points enjoyed the protection of woods, entrenchments, and the -2 penalty for positional attacks in winter weather. The French also gathered in .5 points of defensive air support in a rare situation where that tiny amount actually mattered.

German forces in this battle did not enjoy so much support as had their colleagues further north in recent months. Falkenhayn’s headquarters lay too far away to allow his influence to be felt and the flame engineers likewise could not shift southward fast enough to participate. Several groups of reconnaissance planes surveyed the battlefield for the Germans, one group with great success, but the Taube group ran into a thunderstorm while staging at long range and self-aborted – no loss as the Germans held several ARPs in previously useless reserve. In an exceptional twist, four German engineer regiments in two attempts failed both to influence the battle and to get slaughtered.

As both sides expended a prodigious amount of ammunition, the attack went in. 3.8:1, rolled up to 4:1, and a solid 3 was rolled; with -3 in penalties that left the Germans more than slightly frustrated to have scored yet another AX.

29 regiments of Germans and 16 of French entered convalescence after this battle. Germans forces suffered four 12-14-5, two 13-15-5, and one each 16-18-5 and 10-14-5 rifle divisions reduced to cadre. German forces further suffered three 7-8-5 cadres and one 3-4-7 mountain regiment destroyed. French forces had 8*-11-5 and 6*-9-5 rifle divisions, 4-5-5 field artillery regiment, and 2-3-5 field artillery regiment destroyed besides 7*-10-5 rifle and 12-15-6 African divisions reduced to cadre. 5 1/3 French morale points of losses effectively exceeded 9 2/3 morale points of German losses.

Entente reaction to this bloodbath was limited: two French armies activated to adjust forces with a view to a possible February offensive in the vicinity of Nancy.

German exploitation saw the usual variety of cadres and divisions being pulled off of the line for rebuilding and upgrading.

Entente Turn

January 1915 initial phases came and went with the impact usual of a production phase. Both French and German rail nets deteriorated, with the French in the neighborhood of half as capable as the Germans in that arena. All armies continued their buildups. Both major Canadian formations remained at reduced effectiveness for what is fast becoming a statistically unlikely amount of time. Britain suffered two morale points of losses at sea while the Germans suffered no strategic loss.

Entente forces on the ground conducted a major reorganization in early January 1915. Belgian forces moved to the front line for the first time since October, massing nearly their whole army in 0723 under fieldworks. British forces reduced their holding to only fifty miles of front, though with some backstop forces, and entrenched the key position southwest of Oostende. One hundred two points of British forces sat confidently in the new entrenchments while proportionally equally strong forces crouched less happily in their fieldworks around Oostende and further southwest of the entrenched zone. French forces glumly took up most of the second line positions behind the Belgians and Britons while also entrenching further positions and thickening their frontline in several places.