Tag: MtV (Page 4 of 10)

Entente Turn

Whatever the state of the Germans, as July 1915 opened the Entente armies drank deeply in relief as gushes of manpower and equipment reached the front. French fortress artillery mobilization continues to provide extensive resources for the front, though the flow is soon to be cut off, and both Italian and especially French fortresses this month spewed forth a bounty of poor units and good ammunition. Factories too, and neutral countries, contributed some of their bounty to the effort – and industry is beginning to be a serious player in the equipment game. For the third time in the war, the Entente allocated substantial industrial capability to transferring rail capacity from Britain to France as French, Italian and German rail networks continued their slow march toward oblivion.

Depressingly for the Entente, the United States continued its balanced diplomatic status for the second time.

Portugal is on the clock and will declare war in October 1915, a long while after which it will eventually field a small force in France. They might be holding an entire hex in the Vosges Mountains by late 1916, if the Entente continues to dribble equipment into Lisbon in the meantime.

The Prussian depot in Austria sent manpower to bring a 5*-7-6 mtn rifle cadre back to full divisional size.

In France and Belgium, German activity was more varied on the same theme. Prussian manpower rejuvenated a pair of 4*-6-5 rifle cadres into divisions. Wurtembourgers flooded into a 5*-6-5 rifle cadre and Bavarians into a 6*-7-5 cadre, strengthening the German front by two more divisions.

Italian men brought a 1*-7 remnant back to full brigade size while others met at the artillery park to bring a 3-7 mtn field [III] back to life.

British youth pushed a pair of 4*-6-5 cadres back to the full-strength roll.

French men and guns did the most work during the initial phase. Algerians drew guns and mules sufficient to re-field a 5*-7-6 light cadre while metropolitan men met other equipment to raise 2x 1-5 eng III’s, 2x 2-4-7 mot mg III’s and a 7-5-4 hvy art III from the destroyed roster. Three field artillery battalions near the front received new regimental headquarters and more men and guns, to bring them back to full size after the previous- and in time for the next- wave of French reorganizations. More normally, colonial troops finished bringing a 13*-16-7 light mtn XX back from cadre status and metropolitan men did the same with 3x 10-13-5, 2x 8*-11-5 and 2x 9*-12-5 rifle XX’s.

The resurgent Entente then commenced attempting some serious battery of their Central Powers opponents, with the usual mixed success. Not far from the English Channel, the full-but-fragile British, without superiority of national will and beneath failed aerial reconnaissance, declined to squander insufficient men and never ample powder in a possibly disastrous attack. The Belgians, secure in their small but heavily defended sector and utterly unable to replace the slightest losses likewise declined combat. Not so the French, however, who struck in both the central and southern Ardennes in order to draw down multiple German munitions stockpiles besides maximizing chances for battlefield success.

The central Ardennes focus shifted slightly, as it has repeatedly over the past few months, this time settling at sector 1219. Woodlands and entrenchments shielded the well-stacked Germans, but morale, one of two aerial spies and none of one multi-brigade engineer escalades exactly balanced the scales. Odds of 2.3:1 rolled upward as usual and it mattered not at all – as usual – when a BX would have resulted either way.
French losses: RP, 3 1/3 morale, and 2-4-7 mot mg III eliminated; 2x 10*-13-5 and 9*-12-5 colonial rifle XX’s to 4*-6-5 and 4*-5-5 cadres
German losses: RP and 2 1/3 morale eliminated; 12-14-5 and 16-18-5 Bavarian rifle XX’s to 5*-6-5 and 7*-8-5 cadres

In southernmost Belgium, artists began painting authentic moonscapes as battle raged across the area for the umpteenth time this campaign season. Entrenchments and woodlands protected the German defenders while morale and a pair of paired engineer brigades contributed more than counterbalancing effects. General Falkenhayn failed to intervene and three air groups of French pilots managed to find only old craters. 3.3:1 odds rolled downward in a rare show but normality returned when the result would have been a BX in any case.
French losses: RP, 3 1/3 morale and 0-1-4 eng III eliminated; 2x 9*-12-5 and 10*-13-5 colonial rifle XX’s to 4*-5-5 and 4*-6-5 cadres
German losses: RP, 3 2/3 morale and 3*-4-5 Wurtembourg rifle [X] eliminated; 6*-8-5 Saxon rifle [XX] to 2*-3-5 cadre; 12-14-5 and 13-15-5 Bavarian rifle XX’s to 5*-6-5 and 6*-7-5 cadres

It is worthy of note that the Germans are currently about half way between their February 1915 and 1916 morale markers, with about half of the good weather of 1915 gone past. The Entente is making progress, no doubt, but the Germans are hardly shrinking at a catastrophic rate after having lost six morale points during one “best” Entente combat phase. On the other hand, the Germans are bleeding themselves now against the Italians and the British are becoming increasingly capable of landing hard blows. Italian morale is itself a brittle thing, especially as they must inflict about 100 morale points of damage to Austria before autumn 1918 and they look to pay at least 150 morale points to do the job at the current rate. French morale, on the other hand, soared in February 1915 to such an extent that it is difficult to imagine the French mutiny ever happening in this game.

Interestingly, the morale and national will situations are only one measure of the war and may be, in this case, a delayed indicator. Our current thinking about the Germans is that it might be a very good operational plan to withdraw from France and Belgium almost entirely, in favor of dramatically shorter and stronger positions closer to Germany. The Entente might then be actually unable to put together an attack with any chance of a DX and with every chance of an AX or AL, thus effectively ending the game in a Central Powers victory with Germany able to protect the Austrians and run out the clock after the Entente is utterly unable to sustain combat. This is the thinking because while the British are still fragile and the French are hardly deep, the German armies are noticeably wasting away due to lack of manpower and equipment. This may be magnified over Summer 1915 by a German munitions shortage after the Entente suffered the same in Spring and managed nonetheless to continue hammering away. German production, four RP in July that did not transfer, is hopelessly inadequate when Germanic consumption during the Entente combat phase of the turn alone was three RP; the stockpile in the rear areas will not long sustain the deficit. Meanwhile, as the French wear down the British armies are starting to deepen their capabilities and sustainability, particularly with additional corps and divisional artillery and combat engineers.

The Central Powers reacted defensively almost everywhere to Entente attacks in early July 1915, but pressed their advantage in the high Alps where the Italian defenders are every bit as passive. Along the lower Isonzo River, the Austrians shifted a few units to cover for losses in the continuing battle across the valley. The German army nearest the mouth of the Rhine also reacted, likewise by shifting a few units to cover weak points, but also to allow a bit of conversion and reorganization within units. With the exception of the German army near the fortress at Trient, every other Austrian and German army in the west failed to move as the war ground toward the second week of July.

In the Trient Salient, the Germans were poised to take good advantage of any opportunity and attempted to force the pass toward Switzerland at 3914. A solid attack here could be followed by another that might isolate the Italian force along the Swiss-Austrian border and then might even lead to movement that could outflank the Italians northwest of Lake Garda. The two-stage attack began in the face of mountains that negated German morale superiority and the first-ever (partially) successful German gas attack. Two groups of aerial spies failed to see many camouflaged Italians in their fieldworks, Italian reserves likewise failed to react in time and only one of three zeppelin groups attempting to reach the battle from the North Sea coast succeeded in buffeting through mountain winds to contribute successfully. Odds of 2.7:1 rolled up and a solid ‘both exchange’ met German hopes adequately. Italian losses: RP eliminated; 6*-9-5 rifle XX to 2*-4-5 cadre German losses: RP eliminated; 12-15-6 mtn rfl XX to 5*-7-6 cadre The result could have felt like an Italian victory, but for the upcoming second phase.

In exploitation, while the Entente continued its endless shuffle all along the front, in one place the move really showed strongly. A weak corps of Italians in danger of being cut-off by the latest German attack slipped southwestward toward but not to safety. The rifle cadre trooped gratefully away from the line as the other half of their small corps continued to try to staunch the German flood.

Central Powers Turn

The Central Powers initial phase of the first half of July 1915 passed in a flash as men and material rushed to the front. From cadre, many divisions were rebuilt: French: 2x 9*-12-5 rifle, 3x 10*-13-5 rifle and 13*-16-7 mtn chasseur Austro-Hungarian: 4*-6-4 rifle, plus a 3*-7-2 fortress brigade from remnant Prussian: 3x 12-14-5 rifle and 13-15-5 rifle; plus 2-3-7 jgr, 1-2-5 rifle, and 1-2-4 rifle III’s replaced Wurtemburger: 8-11-4 rifle Saxon: 15-17-5 rifle Bavarian: 16-18-5 rifle

In the Italian Theater, the Germans continued their assault toward Switzerland while the Austrians contented themselves with further stiffening of their front along the Isonzo River. The last trickle of Austrians also began to move out of the Trient Salient, the stationary artillery of the fortress being mobilized and the final static brigade marching slowly northward. In sector 3914, the few Italians in their mountain rifle pits faced elite Germans who struck with morale superiority, partially effective gas, successful aerial reconnaissance, and three groups of zeppelin air support. The Italians lacked even ammunition and in their dismay failed both to retreat their cavalry division before combat and to commit the tiny reserve. Odds of 8.5:1 rolled downward but a clean breakthrough was thwarted largely by German tactical overconfidence (roll 1) and a defender exchange turned what should have been a notable victory into a significant disappointment. Italian losses: 6*-4-7 hvy cav XX to 2*-1-7 cadre; 2-3-5 fld art III eliminated German losses: RP, 2x 1-7 mtn fld art II, and 2-4-7 mtn mg [III] eliminated

Along the real Western Front, German forces acted without any trace of aggression in early July. As many German fixed wing and rigid aircraft as possible flew over the Alps against the Italians and the tiny remainder stayed unemployed while the absence of gas engineers and much in the way of ammunition stayed any offensive impulse. In most placed, in fact, the majority of German attention was on solidifying defensive positions while maximizing throughput in the infuriatingly endless stream of conversions and reorganizations to which the German military is subject. The one exception to the general activity was in southernmost Belgium, which the Germans evacuated. The withdrawal was from a salient, thereby effectively shortening both sides’ front lines, but the main attraction of the move was to remove a common battlefield from the French menu – one upon which they had regularly feasted with odds approaching 4:1 and therefore with potentially grievous and endlessly expensive consequences.

The Entente reacted sluggishly to Germanic moves in early July. Eight of nine Entente armies in France and Belgium failed to budge; the exception merely slid a few heavy artillery units either out of the line or along it. Two Italian armies failed to react too, while the British and Italian armies in Italy that did react merely shifted a couple of formations each slightly forward and rearward, respectively.

The only notable activity of the Central Powers’ exploitation phase of early July 1915 was the first-ever Austro-Hungarian bombing raid against a non-unit target: the ammunition stockpile along the Po River remained undamaged.

Entente Turn

Initial phase activities during the second half of June proved intensive for the French and Italians. A vast array of independent French infantry formations combined with a small array of good field artillery to form some second-rate divisions. The best and worst of the French army remained largely untouched by this reorganization, but four divisions at the top of the “abysmal” quality list did disband into merely second-rate infantry brigades and some second-rate field artillery. The Entente equipment pool suffered a huge hit in order to field a second rate French heavy artillery brigade. A brigade of Canadian mounted riflemen arrived and went immediately to full effectiveness because they did not want to miss the imminent victory parade through Berlin (they also began selling seeds for a strange new form of tobacco to local peasants). French depots sent men to flesh out seven cadres of 8*-11-5 rfl XX’s and a 10*-13-5 rfl XX. Italian depots were much busier, replacing three 5-7-5 fld art X’s, two 1-2-7 bers III’s, 1-3-4 eng [X], 3-4-7 mtn lt [X], two 1-2-5 rfl X’s and 0*-1-2 frtrs [III] besides rebuilding a 4*-5-7 mtn lt X from remnant and upgrading the last weak rifle division to 6*-9-5 standard.

Germanic depot commanders stayed busy at a lower rate. Saxon men refilled a 15-17-5 rfl XX. Bavarian recruits did the same for a 13-15-5 rfl XX. Prussian schoolboys flooded to meet veterans in 16-18-5 rfl XX and 7-10-4 rfl XX. Austro-Hungarians from Vienna colleges rejuvenated both 4-6-4 rfl XX’s near the Isonzo.

If attrition is the name of the game, all that activity might indicate something. French depots still contain enough infantry to reform another division, but at least four chasseur divisions remain at cadre strength – so the French are losing steam. British depots continue to swell at only the very slowest rate and would shrink if the army even involved itself in serious combat. Italy enjoyed a one-off rush of manpower during a period of minimal losses and is still enjoying the fruits of mobilized fortress artillery, but neither will last long and every attack drains the friendly pool more than those of the enemies. Austro-Hungarian forces are still finding their feet in this theater; whether their loss rates will continue to be sustainable remains to be seen, as will whether the Italians can continue to inflict losses at all as the Isonzo Front stiffens. Wurtemburger and Bavarian contingents maintain their depots at marginal levels primarily through managing to only rarely be in major battles. Saxon and Prussian contingents, much more involved in battles, are once again gazing wistfully at empty depots, a sprawl of weakened divisions and a scattering of eliminated supporting formations. Given that the latest drafts will refill all depots in the very near future, it is difficult to draw conclusions from this situation, except perhaps that if munitions were not so scarce all armies would probably be shrinking at least as fast as the Prussians and Saxons seem to be now and the French did in 1914.

Entente forces in Italy shifted their focus during later June 1915. British rifle and cavalry units relieved Italian forces in several Alpine passes east of Trient and dragged their army headquarters northward with them. Most of the fast or mountain units of the Italian army not already deployed west of Trient shifted in that direction. Aided by those moves, Italian corps commanders along the Alpine battlefront rationalized and strengthened their positions, examining and discarding as flatly impossible several schemes for attacking German forces that would barely be considered a morsel on the front in France but are behemoths in this theater. On the north flank of the Isonzo River line, Italian forces voluntarily relinquished fifteen miles of trackless mountain, into which no supply line could run in poor weather, in favor of a stronger, shorter position; no offensive into the mountains in this area was remotely plausible either. Finally, along the Isonzo, Italian forces continued for a third week their cross-river effort even while continuing to bring up more artillery.

Along the main Western Front in late June 1915, Entente forces conducted no movement of great interest. The fruits of French reorganization continued to slide north or south according to quality while a few key units shifted to replace lost comrades in sectors of offensive activity. A couple of divisions of British infantry pulled out of the line to meet their newly completed artillery components for unified transport to the Middle East; other British formations relieved the French of a considerable stretch of the second line behind the Belgians and the extreme northern French front line. Army headquarters and transportation battalions moved few ammunition dumps from less- to more- active sectors. Broadly speaking, the Entente was poised for attacks and little remained before pushing forward.

The Italian command continued to hurl good men and faulty shells from obsolete guns across the Isonzo River during the third week of June 1915. Historians would later refer to more than a dozen Battles of the Isonzo – and this first one looks to rage continuously for several months – because the Italian and Austro-Hungarian force structures make the Isonzo the only place where a major Italian offensive could be waged with any prospect of avoiding catastrophe. Mountains along the entire remainder of the front lines make an Italian attack anywhere else a nearly guaranteed disaster (1.5:1 with a net -2 DRM is a short path to defeat) and the Austro-Hungarian military had to be bled before it could grow stronger. Italian forces assaulted Gorz under a strengthening hail of shells as their artillery became more comfortable in its positions, providing half of Italian combat power. A pair of Italian engineer regiments came to the fore with successful sapper escapades and the Italian air arm contributed useful intelligence that counter-balanced the rough and entrenched ground. Generals Cadorna and Eugene both remained too far north, near what had almost been a mobile operational area, to interfere in the battle. Odds of 2.7:1 rolled up to 3:1 and a roll of 1, with a net +1, achieved the usual BX even though both AX and DX had been plausible results.
Italian losses: 6*-9-5 rfl XX to 2*-4-5 cadre; 1-5 eng III and RP eliminated
Austro-Hungarian losses: 2x 4*-5-7 mtn X to 1*-7 remnant; RP eliminated
Italian elite brigades made the morale cost probably almost equal in effective terms and seem likely to save the Italians at least ten morale points over the course of the war.

In a long-expected twist, after an entire season of trying, the British air forces found some targets and the long-prepared Commonwealth ground offensive ground ponderously forward against stiff opposition. Flanders provided little terrain to speak of, while air activity countered entrenchments and two engineer regiments made successful holes in the front German positions. A German jaeger regiment pushed the odds down to 2.4:1 by entering via reserve commitment, but when the odds rolled upward anyway the chief effect was to make more dead Germans.
British losses: RP and 1-5 eng III eliminated; 3x 10-13-15 rfl and 10-13-5 IND rfl XX’s to 4*-6-5 cadres
German losses: RP eliminated; 12-14-5 WUR rfl and 2x 10-13-5 rfl XX’s to 4*-6-5 cadres
Rebuilding from this battle will essentially empty the British and Indian depots, but the core of the old British Expeditionary Force remains at original, full strength. Enough supported divisions remain in Flanders that the British might be able to attack again in this sector with an increased effective strength (these cadres replacing poor infantry and cavalry brigades among the non-divisional units in the corps areas) before having truly “shot their bolt.”

French forces struck again into furthest southeastern Belgium in one of two battles in the French sector of the Western Front. Woods and entrenchments protected Falkenhayn’s cleverly controlled defenders while gas, aerial spotting and national will aided the French. A two-brigade engineer attack managed to fail, but not horribly and 2.8:1 odds rolled upward whereupon a 5 resulted in the usual BX result.
French losses: RP eliminated; 3x 10*-13-5 and 2x 9*-12-5 rfl XXs to 4*-6-5 and 4*-5-5 cadres
German losses: RP eliminated; 16-18-5 rfl XX, 13-15-5 rfl XX and 13-15-5 BAV rfl XX to 7*-8-5 and 6*-7-5 cadres
The French inability to rebuild more than two chasseur division cadres to full strength per month is constraining the possibility of using the elite bonus in many attacks, the maximum strength of each French corps and the choice of units among which to take casualties because much, nearly too much, of the French first line is light.

The other French offensive was the routine attack into some sector of the central Ardennes – this time along both banks of the Maas River, across which half of the French force deployed itself. Aside from the river, woodlands and entrenchments aided the defenders. National will and a two-brigade engineer attack with flame support balanced the scales. Aerial reconnaissance failed to matter much but a battalion of long-range artillery and a group of bombers strengthened the assault ever so slightly, including by deterring potential reserve formations from entering the battle. Of course, 2.5:1 odds rolled upward and a roll of 3 resulted in the normal BX.
French losses: RP and 0-1-4 eng [III] eliminated; 3x 8*-11-5 rfl XX’s to cadre
German losses: RP and 7*-8-5 rfl cadre eliminated; 14-16-5 SAX XX to 6*-7-5 cadre
The Germans lost much less morale than the French in this battle, but the cadre seems unlikely to return from the destroyed anytime soon and the non-Prussian contingents are chronically short of replacement manpower. Equipment is the most serious Germanic shortage – for the Entente the most critical problem is shortage of explosives – so that the French consider the result to be something approaching even in longer-term effect.

The replacement situation of Britain, France and Germany magnifies the impact of battles north of the Alps, while flush depots south of the mountains make the much smaller struggle there into a merely attritional event. With this one strike, the Commonwealth reduced its striking power by a small amount in the near term and its sustainability by a large amount in the medium term. The French command will be able to rebuild a single division and is thus potentially vulnerable during both reaction and the next German turn, but has considerable ability to sustain the offensive over the medium term. Had they munitions, the French and British could do more; one attack would have been a DX had a siege engineer operation been attempted and even slightly successful. The Germans will not be able to rebuild any divisions in the immediate future and will doubtless suffer slightly stronger hammer blows from the more resilient French over the next reaction and complete turns. In the longer-term the German replacement pool and cadre supply continue to slowly expand with no respite in sight before winter, and maybe no respite in equipment forever.

he Central Powers reaction phase of the second Entente turn of June 1915 passed astoundingly uneventfully. All three Germanic headquarters in Austria and all except one north of the Alps failed to react. Seventh Army, on the upper Rhine River, reacted by forwarding three engineer regiments northward toward sectors where a huge river and vicious terrain have not largely squeezed decent units out of the order of battle.

Entente exploitation at the end of June was inevitably unexciting. A few Italians closed the front while cadres pulled back from it and a few shifts of units from sector to sector continued slowly. The French slightly adjusted in order to balance corps that in several cases found themselves suddenly flush with cadres rather than divisions.

Central Powers Turn

During the Germanic initial phase at the end of June 1915, depots on all sides flushed their contents as much as possible toward the front. Italian conscripts fleshed the only two 2*-4-5 rifle cadres into full-bodied divisions. British and Indian volunteers did the same with one of each ethnicity’s 4*-6-5 rifle cadres while Frenchmen rejuvenated a single 3*-5-5 rifle cadre; both British and French forces retained cadres on the front, more than a dozen in the case of the French. Austrian conscripts rebuilt a pair of 1*-7 remnants into mountain brigades while another rifle division and an artillery brigade arrived from Galicia to reinforce the Isonzo River front. Excited German volunteers brought a 6*7-5 Saxon cadre back to divisional strength in Belgium while others replaced a 3-4-7 jager regiment and a 1-7 mountain field artillery battalion. An elite division of Bavarians assembled in the Austrian Alps as the final act of the German preparation for Italian defeat.

At the end of June 1915, Austrian forces remained reactive on the Italian Front while the Germans there finally shifted from the defense to the attack. The new Austrian formations moved to the front and higher quality mountain units shifted slightly southward along the east bank of the Isonzo, to help their hard-pressed lowland comrades defend the line against what has been an incessant series of Italian attacks across that river. A couple of non-divisional formations continued to drift out of the Trient salient while the Germans there cast about for likely victims and settled upon the Italian defenders of the pass at 3911.

Given its location, the attack on pass 3911 could only be considered an attritional effort preparatory to more decisive actions later and elsewhere. The pass leads eastward, further into the Austrian Alps, where the thin Austrians declined even to defend in May rather than waste men holding roads to nowhere. The roads do eventually lead to Italy, however, and the Italians defended the region in late June with marginal forces, a crust slightly hardened by the elite half of the quarter-corps. Fieldworks hindered the Germans in theory while German morale and elite status counteracted the mountains. German aerial spotting balanced Italian elite status and German gas troops retained their perfect record of failure to matter, setting a notable record of improbable consistency so that the attack went in with a slight Italian advantage. Odds of 2.6:1 rolled upward and the standard BX caused the Germans to heave a sigh of relief; taking the position through an AX would have been too bloody a victory by far.
German losses: RP eliminated; 12-15-5 Prussian mtn rifle XX to 5*-7-6 cadre
Italian losses: RP, 2-7 mtn fld art III and 2-3-7 mtn lt [X] eliminated; 4*-5-7 mtn lt X to 1*-7 remnant

In France and Belgium, German armies moved only to shore up their positions in the wake of two months of incessant French and a rare British attack. The Prussians had only two divisions and about a dozen regiments in the replacement pool, but the supply of cadres active in the front lines was ample; they no longer merely stacked as non-divisional units for added punch, rather a pair of full divisions backed by cadres and artillery was often the defense even in sectors where French attacks are routine. Being at the end of a production cycle, the Germans had no good options and resorted to mere shuffling of weakness to non-critical sectors and hoping for bad French reaction rolls.

Germanic hope for Entente inebriation came to be justified as Entente commanders all along the front sensed German weakness and celebrated victory rather than attempting to make it reality. British forces in the Alps consolidated their hold on the fifty miles of front east of Trient, and Italian forces to their east shuffled units here and there, but in every sector where Entente forces might have attacked the armies failed to act. Given the temporarily anemic German situation and the upcoming Entente production and refreshment, a couple of stiff attacks by the French and British here might have actually forced the Germans to backpedal in Belgium in July – but it was not to be. Italian pressure on the Austrians would have been merely attritional, but even that longer-term progress was too much to ask for.

Entente Turn

The opening days of June 1915 brought some standard and some new-ish activities. Among the usual activities were dispatching German replacement drafts so as to bring the depots near to empty: 15-17-5 WUR XX and 14-16-5 BAV XX were rebuilt from cadres. A few French replacements and rebuilds are certainly normal, but the scale of activity after the immediately prior heavy losses in rifle divisions was utterly abnormal – and cut the metropolitan replacement pool in half. 8*-5-7 cav XX, 13-16-7 lt mtn XX and 12x 8*-11-5 rifle XX’s were rebuilt from cadre by the French. New equipment and personnel also flowed to replace a variety of units: 2x 1-5 eng III, 6*-7-7 lt mtn cadre, 4-5-5 fld art III, 2-7 FFL III and 4*-6-5 rifle cadre. The French elite units will be back in action – and again devastated – in June. In Italy, the burst of re-equipping of Italian infantry units continued but is essentially now burned out: 3x 0-1-6 bers III and 9x 4-7-5 rifle XXs received additional machineguns. As usual, no Belgian, British or Austro-Hungarian formations transformed during the first days of June. Oddly, the second Canadian rifle division finally reached full effectiveness: the Canadians might now hold a sector by themselves if it were on a narrow front, behind a river and in nasty terrain.

The players of this war then undertook a casual exploration of probabilities inherent in the game situation. British, Belgian, German and Austro-Hungarian morale is broadly in line with historical expectations, but the French appear to have an insurmountable morale advantage. To accompany that problem, for the Germans, the Italians and British seem likely to whittle more seriously than their historical counterparts on the relatively weak and hapless Austro-Hungarians (A later note is that from the CP half of I JUN 15, the problem of A-H being weak and hapless is dramatically less real). To balance the problem, the Germans committed to the Italian front what are surely powerful forces that can expect to use DRMs and column shifts to pound the Italians far more than the Germans did in 1915 and 1916. And that shift naturally will help the French maintain their morale superiority – which is fortunate for Paris as the French military is manifestly incapable of waging any offensive action with probable results as good as an even exchange of morale, replacement or resource points. It appears in this game as though the French can only be defeated on the field of battle, battered to pieces so that they cannot rebuild their army, whereas all of the other powers may suffer on the field but will win or lose based upon morale considerations. These calculations lend the French hope for ultimate victory, which a simple review of military power, morale point expenses and national will would otherwise make seem like fanciful dreaming.

Entente forces shuffled about the Western and Italian Fronts with aggressive intent and nearly complete ineptitude over the next couple of weeks. British Imperial land forces spearheaded the pathetic performance in their fifty-mile sector adjacent to the Belgian coast. The Imperials slightly adjusted their long-running attempt to get an offensive moving – and failed again when both British air groups failed to advance the cause through aerial reconnaissance for the umpteenth fortnight in a row. Given anemic British replacement rates, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff has dictated that his most potent of all Entente armies only strike under cover of omnipotent air cover. There was no chance the Belgians would act any more aggressively; their strong but fragile force continues to hold only fifteen miles of front line and to contribute to holding two separate sectors of the Entente second line.

The French command shifted again its focus as “weak spots” continued to appear fleetingly in the German front. This time, the furthest southeastern point of Belgium attracted French attention, to the exclusion of any other sector. Three groups of aircraft failed signally to observe and report movement in the German defenses and the French consequently failed ever to leave their trenches. Entente munitions shortages make attacking a sometime thing, and surely those times must be when events are trending positively.

Less optimistic Italian forces made more dramatic moves with similarly anemic results in and south of the Alps. Strong German reinforcement of the Austrians made a mockery of previous Italian efforts to encircle the mountain fortress of Trient, so that the Italians pulled back slightly and began to consolidate positions facing the salient. In the central Alps too, the Italian forces that could not advance (due to geography – high mountains and impossible supply lines – as well as German forces toward Switzerland) faced northwest and southeast to hold positions from which they might at least defend with more prospect of success than the pre-war boundary on the plains. Ironically, along the Isonzo River, where the Italians had foreseen disaster and hoped not to go, some chance of a meaningful advance remained and the Italians massed and struck at their enemies. The Italians deemed the upper reaches of the Isonzo to be critical; if the river could be passed or flanked, a critical rail junction would open supply lines into the central Alps and the Austrian front along the Isonzo might be rolled up or driven away.

The first Italian attack was a bludgeon, designed to bleed the Austrians and draw off their reserves while conceivably pushing straight down the railroad around the north end of the Isonzo River, and it failed utterly. Aerial reconnaissance, by the only Italian group of fixed-wing craft, missed its mark. Eugene declined to intervene, leaving his mountain troops to fight a mobile battle that could have thus gone either way rather than committing reserves and turning the event into a guaranteed meat-grinder. Cadorna succumbed to the allure of prostitutes hired by a staff fearful that he would make a critical situation worse rather than better. Both sides spent munitions prolifically and the Italians fled the field as four-to-one odds with morale superiority resulted in an attacker retreat result.

The second Italian attack, designed as a rapier thrust with elite troops against what might have been a vulnerable and important Austrian salient north of the rail junction near the headwaters of the Isonzo River instead did not happen at all. The previous battle having not absorbed Austrian reserves, the Italians would probably have achieved an attacker exchange result, though worse would have been likely enough. Such a result would have been much worse than none at all, given the flight of the mass of Italian infantry from nearby, and the elite troops instead hoped merely to be able to fall back safely from their own salient.

Across the river rather than around it, Italian and British forces combined to pound on the defenders in what had been hopes of significantly weakening the Austrio-Hungarian defenders in combination with other attrition elsewhere. Relatively strong British infantry and very strong Italian artillery provided the main events, except that the river robbed the British of half their power and Italian heavy artillery in the early war is quartered for open combat – and most was also disrupted from moving – so that what could have been devastating instead proceeded at a stately four-to-one ratio and achieved only a both exchange result. Entente morale and Italian engineers contributed positively, but rough and entrenched terrain cancelled the bonuses and language problems left the allies entangled as much with each other as their enemies.
Austrian losses: 3*-7-2 fort X to 0*-2-2 remnant; AS
British losses: 7*-10-5 rfl XX to 3*-4-5 cadre; AS
Italian losses: AS

After the long string of Entente silliness, Austrian generals might be forgiven for partying in their headquarters instead of pushing their forces as fast as did their German counterparts, but their failures would probably cost the Central Powers dearly. Both Austro-Hungarian armies, as well as the German army in the high Alps, failed to react, leaving scattered Italian forces to converge again into their mountain positions. German armies on both wings of the Western Front reacted almost uniformly, though the central armies failed, and masses of German units shifted off of the front for imminent reorganization.

During the ensuing days, reinforcements and replacements considerably changed the armies of the British and both Germanic allies in Belgium, France, and Austria. British replacements rejuvenated their cadre along the Isonzo River. Massive Austro-Hungarian reinforcements of mountain brigades and divisions arrived in theater in a change almost certain to completely stop all Italian offensive activity. Prussian replacements rebuilt one division in Belgium, nearly emptying that manpower pool, while all across the fronts the German armies organized strong divisions and various brigades into a larger number of divisions that still put almost every Entente formation to shame. Of especial note, the monstrously power Bavarian mountain division reorganized out of existence.

Central Powers Turn

In a continuing trend, the reorganization and redeployment of the fielded forces of the Central Powers dictated the actions of those forces far more than did any considerations of attacking, or even defending against, relatively anemic Entente armies. The Central Powers, during the first half of June 1915, would not be making headlines on the Western Front.

Facing Italy, the Central Powers ended the last chance for Italy to wage a war of maneuver and continued to build up for a counter-offensive. Two corps of Austro-Hungarian reinforcements moved from Galicia to secure the Isonzo River front. The almost completely mountain-trained army should have no trouble holding the lowland Italians both behind the river and off of the line’s mountainous northern flank. If the Italians want to hurt Austro-Hungary, they will have to do it across the Isonzo. Weak Austro-Hungarian and German forces, overwhelmingly strong compared to what the Italians could send to starve against them, moved from Poland, Galicia and Bavaria to finally plug the Alpine pass that could have led the Italians to Salzburg. German forces totaling about a weak army, but continuing to drag in all the best offensive units from France and Belgium, continued to filter into Trient and the valleys north and west of the fortress, both to relieve Austro-Hungarian units and to prepare for an offensive that the Italians have no real hope of standing against.

In Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Germany, German army staffs spent the vast bulk of their time arranging for specific units to move into rest camps in preparation for re-orderings of their tables of organization and equipment. Beyond this, German forces merely shifted to bolster sectors weakened or vacated by reorganizational moves.

Across Germany and Austria, railway officials and logistics officers worked feverishly to clear a continuing backlog of munitions stockpiles and reserve formations much more needed at the front than in the warehouses of the Ruhr, the beer halls of Munich, or on the beaches around Hanover.

In no sector of the Western Front did the Central Powers act aggressively during early June, though a few Entente corps reported some patrol activity as the Germans explored and discarded possibilities.

Entente reaction to Germanic quiet – and to the calendar, long-term frustration, and an amazing quantity of army headquarters, was broadly aggressive and equally disappointing. First, along the Belgian coast, the British continued their policy of avoiding combat: there is always either the excuse of having failed to react or of having failed aerial reconnaissance to prevent the emptying of very thin depots. With the British to their seaward and the French to their landward having both failed to react, the Belgians in the middle had no useful reason to do otherwise. Disappointment along the road through Flanders was the result, though at least it was a relatively harmless disappointment.

Between Maubeuge and Metz, on the other hand, disappointment came in bloodier form. A couple of French armies in this region failed to react, costing little, but a couple of French armies that did react cost considerably more. Along the western fringe of the Ardennes forces, sector 1020, French forces pushed for a quick strike of attritional nature and mostly ended by smashing their own thumbs with their hammer. Aerial reconnaissance and an engineer brigade, with morale superiority, more than counteracted woodlands and entrenchments, but another engineer brigade immolated itself and the resulting 2.2:1 engagement rolled downward and pushed six weeks of engineer replacements out of circulation in a BX result.
French losses: AS, 0-1-4 eng [III], 2x 1-5 eng III, and 2-4-7 mot mg III eliminated; 4x 8*-11-5 rfl XX to 3*-5-5 cadre; 5 1/3 morale points lost
German losses: AS and 3-4-7 jgr III eliminated; 14-16-5 Saxon rfl XX to 6*-7-5 cadre; 15-17-5 Saxon rfl XX to 7*-8-5 cadre; 3 morale points lost

The French attacked into southern-most Belgium simultaneously and with similar results despite much more favorable conditions. Aerial reconnaissance, morale superiority and two successful attacks by multiple engineer brigades each helped the effort dramatically – prevailing favorable winds continued to hinder Entente gas attacks – but Falkenhayn intervened in person for the Germans and entrenched woodlands protected the defenders to a large degree. The resulting 3.4:1 engagement rolled upward but became the usual BX in any case.
French losses: AS and 1-5 eng III eliminated; 3x 8*-11-5 rfl XX to 3*-5-5 cadre; 12-15-6 African chasseur XX to 5*-7-6 cadre; 4 1/3 morale points lost
German losses: AS eliminated; 8*-11-4 Wurtembourg XX to 3*-5-4 cadre; 9*-11-5 rfl XX to 4*-5-5 cadre; 13-15-5 Bavarian rfl XX to 7*-8-5 cadre; 3 morale points lost

Three French armies between Metz and the Alps failed to react, preventing possible continued attrition. The army near Belfort, despite reacting successfully, controlled far too few and too pathetic units to consider attacking in that backwater sector.

On the southern side of the Alps, the Entente reacted uniformly but with further disappointing results.

The British army along the lower Isonzo River, without a plausible Austro-Hungarian target and in view of the looming German menace nearer Switzerland, pushed its two corps northwestward across toward or into the Alps.

The Italian army on the lower Isonzo, with many more forces on hand than their allies, continued its attempts to punch a hole across the river, though in reality that cannot happen unless the defenders simply run out of manpower with which to defend the position. On a fifteen mile front, with locally massive and utterly inept artillery support, the Italians struck to continue the First Battle of the Isonzo (it having begun in the exact same location only days earlier). Aerial reconnaissance failed to assist the attack and the defending General Eugene intervened successfully while entrenched, wooded and rough terrain channeled the attackers and more than counterbalanced Italian morale superiority and a successful engineering brigade attack. 2.7:1 odds rolled upward and the usual BX nibbled away at both sides.
Italian losses: AS and 0-1-4 eng [III] eliminated; 6*-9-5 rfl XX to 2*-4-5 cadre; 1 1/3 morale lost
Austro-Hungarian losses: AS eliminated; 4*-6-4 rfl XX to 1*-2-4 cadre; 1 morale lost

On the northern flank of the Isonzo line too, the Italian army reacted. The attackers hoped to mass an elite, mountain-trained force for a coup against the northern-most flank, but aerial reconnaissance failed, Eugene and local reserve units loomed large, and the field-worked mountainsides would have formed the glacis for what would probably have been an AX result. The Italians kissed their last conceivable chance to dislodge the Isonzo line through mobile warfare goodbye rather than squander elite units that will be the only chance for holding back the Germans in the Alps over summer.

I recognition of the apparent hopelessness of any continued Italian offensive activity in the Trient region, the westernmost Italian army also activated and pulled a variety of units off of the front in preparation for whatever plan the butcher Cadorna might dream up next.

The dynamics of the war as a whole continue to evolve in interesting ways as June 1915 passes by. The apparently incredible Italian success of May availed them nothing against Austria-Hungary. The Italian gain of the southernmost edge of the Alps will provide a considerable shield in the face of German forces, but when the Germans open up with gas and a mountain corps the Italians will wilt rapidly and flee to plains that regular German infantry will walk over with ease. Meanwhile, north of Switzerland, the Germans do seem to be wearing slowly down, both in damaged units and in the full-strengths of intact units, and the French are finding it possible to make as many halfway decent attacks as they can sustain with available ammunition – a pace to allow the Germans to remain strong into the 1930s. The British are getting stronger too, but their morale is much more fragile than that of the French and their replacement rate is not going to support any sustained combat until sometime next year. If the Germans can pound – destroy – the Italians while holding off the French and British, as seems likely, the Austro-Hungarians might not end up surrendering in 1918 and the British and French might run out of soldiers before the Germans run out of morale. This war is very much undecided.

Germanic exploitation in the last days of the first half of June 1915 moved in completely routine directions. Upcoming organizational shifts pulled units from the battle line all along the front through Germany, France and Belgium. Optimization of positions along the Isonzo River and through the Alps minimized Italian prospects even more thoroughly. Positions left battered by French reaction combat received some stiffening and notification of the imminent arrival of replacement personnel.

Entente Turn

The second fortnight of May opened with both sides rejuvenating their forces and the Entente upgrading Italian formations. German replacements filled one cadre while Frenchmen did likewise to two divisions. Many Italian divisions and regiments procured emergency shipments of French artillery and machineguns, dramatically increasing the combat strength of the Italian Army even though much remains to be done in that regard. Finally, in keeping with Canadian tradition, the recently arrived rifle division from that Dominion remains at reduced effectiveness.

As if cued to the clearing weather, in late May the Italian Army leapt to grapple with its Austro-Hungarian foes amidst the suddenly dry Alpine passes while British and French forces shifted to support the first geographically significant Entente offensive of the war in the West. Nearest the English Channel, the British again massed forces for an attempt against German forces somewhere inland of Oostende. French forces further nudged their huge yet relatively weak force facing Maubeuge toward a possible attack. In the Ardennes, the French contemplated a probable failure into the contested field in the region and instead opted to strike further south. Between the Ardennes and Switzerland, the French maintained fairly strong positions facing equally quiet Germans. A British cavalry corps moved over the Franco-Italian border on hoof, to support a rifle corps already backstopping the Italians west of Venice. Italians over a division in total slipped into Austria near the Swiss border while strong forces moved toward the fortress as Trient on a thirty mile front. Other Italian corps occupied various passes leading into the tallest portion of the Alps, of little immediate value but potentially positions from which to make flank attacks against more valuable passes to the north and south. Two Italian corps occupied clear terrain up to the Isonzo River along the Adriatic Sea coast. In all Italian cases, the advance continued until encountering Austro-Hungarian border fortress formations, in most cases consolidated in key passes fifteen miles or further from the border.

In the event, British and French support for the Italian offensive was more moral than physical. The French offensive in the Ardennes, with already battered forces, non-conducted after three air groups failed to usefully observe the German defenders. Not far from the coast, the potential British offensive simply did not happen; apparently the top generals were simply too discouraged by the French failure to overcome their own lethargy – and relative lack of replacements – simply in order to order their forces into an attack that might reasonably achieve a disastrous AX result. In between, French forces facing Maubeuge, without fixed wing air support to spot fall of shot for the massed French heavy artillery arm, never seriously considered attempting what would probably end up costing the French double any German morale loss from even a probable BX result.

Blissfully ignorant, the Italians rolled over Austrian fortress units in mountain passes throughout the southern Austrian Alps.

At 3714, with no extra ammunition on either side, elite Italians achieved a DL on the 9:1 positional chart. The fractional combat strength rule helped the Italians resolve this fight.
Italian loss: 0*-1-2 fort III
Austrian loss: 0*-1-2 fort III

At 3915, with no extra ammunition on either side, much less adept Italians did almost as well and seized the position.
Italian loss: 1-2-5 rifle X
Austrian loss: 0*-2-2 fort III

At 4015, again with no extra ammunition on either side, battle raged on the north shore of Lake Garda and the “rampage” continued.
Italian loss: 1-2-7 lt III
Austrian loss: 0*-2-2 fort III

At 4115, with both sides spending extra ammunition, the Italians attacked up both banks of the Adige River and forced the position in a BX.
Italian loss: 2-3-5 fld art III
Austrian loss: 1*-3-2 fort X

At 4113, some Italians and all Austrians enjoyed stockpiled ammunition, but the results were the same as everywhere else: weak, destroyed Austrians and strong, weakened Italians.
Italian loss: 1-2-5 rifle X
Austrian loss: 0*-1-2 fort III and 1*-3-2 fort X

At 3910 the Italians continued their ammunition-free assault and victorious ways.
Italian loss: 1-2-7 lt III
Austrian loss: 1*-3-2 fort X

At 4008, across the high mountain pass against Austrians enjoying plentiful ammunition, the Italians worked further into the alpine wilderness with elite troops. Austrian mountain troops would have liked to shift combat to a mobile format, but Italian mountain troops pinned them to their positions.
Italian loss: 2-3-7 lt mtn X
Austrian loss: 2*-6 mtn III

At 4307, the head of the Isonzo River, the full force of Italian (pre-mobilization) might struck a serious Austro-Hungarian defense with mixed results. Austro-Hungary’s Eugene provided a penalty for the attackers, reconnaissance aircraft failed to find targets, and the Italian Zeppelin successfully provided a bit of ground support in this interesting encounter. Austro-Hungarian construction troops could have been a tasty treat for the Italians had the battle gone much better, but in the mountains and with the mandatory Italian penalty to combat rolls on their first offensive things became unpleasant rather quickly in a BX result.
Italian loss: 6-4-7 hvy cav XX to 2-1-7 cadre
Austro-Hungarian loss: 6-4-6 rifle XX to 1-2-4 cadre

During the entire Italian wave, Italy suffered -4 1/3 morale points as against Austro-Hungary suffering -4 2/3. Each side expended a resource point. Italian forces suffered 16 manpower and inflicted 15.5 Austro-Hungarian manpower of losses. Italian forces expended 3 equipment points and destroyed 5.5 Austro-Hungarian equipment points. All in all, the Italian offensive was an economic success in its first phase besides gaining ground on a wide front.

Central Powers reaction during the Entente II MAY 1915 turn was very limited. Eugene activated his army, shifted his forces, and planned a counterattack on the Isonzo River for later in the month when the Austro-Hungarian Navy could provide naval gunfire support. Germany’s Fourth Army activated, speeding various light, mountain, ski and engineer units from the southern Ardennes Forest toward the Alps Mountains. The remaining German armies remained quiet, digesting news from Austria and wondering why the French had not struck for the first time since the ground dried out.

Aside from the effective entry of Italy into the war, the third week of May 1915 contained two other firsts for the war: a danger zone sinking and a resource point bombing. The French bomber group, CauG3’s, left off attacking infantry and in company with numerous bomb-laden fighters, successfully hunted an ammunition dump. The success doubled when the explosions cascaded into another dump nearby and the Germans watched two prospective forts go up in smoke. Italian morale suffered half a hit when the Italian mine warfare task force swept some torpedoes the hard way as Italian and French dreadnought and destroyer squadrons moved to Venice to protect the seaward flank of the Isonzo River line from the larger, less modern Austro-Hungarian fleet. Italian and French pre-dreadnoughts and cruisers moved to Malta for contingencies that will, with the Balkans out of play, never arise. By comparison, the British covering fifty miles of the Italian second line and the Italians shifting a few formations rearward to add equipment were tame events. Italian forward exploitation in the Alps, however, was much more significant; Trient is now the tip of an eighty mile long, one valley wide salient and the Italians are also working on sweeping around the inland end of the Isonzo River line. Four fingers of Italian troops reach north and east through the Alps, including a mountain brigade cutting a rail line in the northern foothills of the range near Switzerland, and the imminent Central Powers counteroffensive is guaranteed to consume all available rail capacity during the second half of May.

Central Powers Turn

For the Central Powers, the second half of May 1915 began mostly with heavy activity in the newly active, Austro-Hungarian command. Austro-Hungarian depot officers forwarded to two mountain brigades replacements even as Italian forces hammered at the customers. Bavarians in useful quantity departed depots in Alsace with civilian train tickets in hand and reported after leave to newly established depots in Austria. Closer to the North Sea, German replacements fleshed out an engineer regiment and two machinegun regiments while the French upgraded a field artillery battalion to a regiment. Bavarian replacements brought one of the best standard German rifle divisions back to full strength. The only substantial new forces to arrive on the Western Front(s) were a short corps of Austro-Hungarians.

On the ground too, the main action of the fortnight happened in and about the Italian Front. The newly arrived Austro-Hungarian corps greatly strengthened the Isonzo River line after moving up by strategic rail, a slight complication to hopes for combat and exploitation. In the Alps Mountains, Austro-Hungarian forces either concentrated at the fortress of Trient or edged northward, either decision being made to clear the field for German forces with superior morale.

German forces in and for Austria grew tremendously in size and aggressiveness in late May. The short corps, previously forwarded and moving along the Swiss border on foot, continued its march until running into patrols and then the main body of the Italian mountain brigade pushing down out of the passes along the Swiss border. Italian aggressiveness here threw other German moves off schedule by blocking the shortest railroad connection between Austria and Alsace, so that German forces moving up to protect the eastern flank of the Trient salient could only move to confront, rather than force back, Italian spearheads in that area.

Along the original Western Front, German forces moved conservatively during late May 1915. Having sent a corps toward Austria in early May, amidst the dispatch of another corps thence – including an artillery division and the theater’s only gas engineers – the front required significant reorganization. Too, the rebuilding of numerous divisions from cadre, reinforcement of sectors of the front threatened and/or being punished by the French and the recently taken decision to upgrade fortifications as far as possible wherever possible all pushed the Germans toward rationalizing rather than attacking. Finally, stockpiles of ammunition and construction materials both began to seem just a bit thin due to recent losses in Aachen and the dispatch of four dumps worth of material to Austria.

Half of German reconnaissance aircraft departed the French border region for bases in Austria while others attacked French bombers on the ground at Verdun. The former moved too far to involve themselves in active operations before June. The counter-air effort braved relevant flak, which missed, before missing the bombers in turn.

In Austria, German attacks against Italian forces ended up being both less devastating and less widespread than either side had expected only days earlier. The first action, predicted by both sides and ordained by Italian aggressiveness was against alpini come down the passes near Switzerland at grid 3613. German forces faced elite Italians in mountainous terrain, enjoyed neither reconnaissance aircraft support nor notable operational leadership. On the other hand, German forces maintain the superior morale that will probably forever make them superior on the battlefield to Italians and, in this rare case, enough German mountain troops could involve themselves to overcome the less skillful presence of regular rifle formations and the Germans too claimed the elite bonus. German forces did not spend ammunition prolifically against a mere brigade and the Italian “lines” lay well beyond the reach of pack mule-borne artillery ammunition. In the end, 5.5:1 odds rolled up to 6:1 but overconfident attackers still managed only a both exchange result, suffering disproportionately heavy losses.
Italian loss: 4*-5-7 alpini X to 1*-7 remnant and retreat
German loss: 3-4-7 mtn III and 3-6-5 mg III eliminated without follow-up

The second and last German attack of late May came to widen the corridor into Trient, specifically against Italian forces at grid 3913. Here, Italian forces partly intentionally laid a clever defense where they could not have massed one of straightforward potency. In the mountains and without aerial support, German rifle forces faced significant problems that superior morale could not fully overcome. Gas engineer support was expected to provide significant advantage to the attack, but vastly superior numbers and firepower provided the truly important advantage. Against this, Italian cavalry and artillery could not hope to hold and attempted rather to finesse the situation to advantage. When the magnitude of the attack became clear, with Italian forces in several other grids then safe from assault, the local cavalry division successfully retreated before combat, leaving a lone artillery regiment to face the German horde. The Germans then faced the cruel decision whether to expend significant ammunition in a very small cause, or to risk the Italians doing the same unanswered before successfully attempting to commit reserves that might change a sure victory into a stalemate or even a pyrrhic attacker exchange. In the event, the Germans chose the safe course, spending ammunition in quantity while the Italians then happily avoided a significant battle and large expense of forces. Finally, even a 9:1 German attack with successful gas effects managed an inept defender exchange result that still seized the field.
Italian loss: 3-7 mtn fld art III
German loss: RP, 1-7 mtn fld art II

During Central Powers combat phase of II MAY 1915, Italian forces thus suffered 5/6 morale points, 4.5 manpower and 2.5 equipment points of losses. German forces suffered 5/6 morale points, 3.75 equipment points and 7.25 Prussian manpower points of losses.

fter new, widespread excitement south of the Alps and unusual quiet north of the mountains, during most of May 1915, the trend reversed itself radically late in the month. Italian forces became suddenly quiet, as if unable to believe their good fortune in the war to date. Belgian and British forces bucked the trend by simply remaining quiet as they have for months, the former for lack of possibilities (the Belgians almost always activate and rarely redeploy a unit) and the latter through simple lethargy (the British almost never activate). The French, however, made up for their allies with a series of attacks in the Ardennes Forest during the last week of the month – renewing what had been ferocious activity in the sector throughout April.

From Verdun, General Foch spurred three corps into quickly massing against and attacking the German-held salient and iron mines around Briey. In theory, the location’s immense economic value should have held the attention of an insurmountable German garrison, but disorganization inherent in the immense shifting of German forces left the region temporarily vulnerable. Three corps, almost entirely of first-line (though not elite) French units spent munitions prolifically but otherwise lacked much in the way of assistance from army-level. Falkenhayn failed to impact the battle but the Germans did make skillful use of the tailing piles and entrenchments. Foch maintained his excitement in positive fashion, as did his countrymen their high morale, and the first successful use of gas on the Western Front helped the otherwise hapless French, who rolled a 3.6:1 down to 3:1 and achieved a BX result.
French losses: 4x 8*-11-5 rfl XX to 3*-5-5 cadre and 1x RP
German losses: 14*-16-5 BAV XX to 6*-7-5 cadre, 9*-12-5 PR XX to 4*-5-4 cadre and 3*-4-4 rfl X and RP eliminated

French activity along the western edge of the Ardennes Forest continued with high intensity and the usual decreasing success as May wore toward its end. The worst-waged battle of the war for the French to date came, appropriately, in a narrow-front coup de main attempt against the German siege train at Charleroi. The German artillery lay there, awaiting its chance to counterattack what may eventually become contested Maubeuge, and the train guard consisted primarily of weak brigades that appeared almost as tasty to the French as the huge tubes themselves. In the event, everything except for the observation balloon corps worked against the French: two engineer brigades made no impact, a siege engineer regiment failed despite expending massive quantities of explosives, entrenchments and mine shafts provided Germans excellent cover, and 1.2:1 odds and a roll of 2 revealed basic tactical incompetence to top things off as the French procured an AL result.
French losses: 4x 8*-11-5 rfl XX to 3*-5-5 cadre and 4-5-5 fld art III and 2x RP eliminated
German losses: 15-17-5 WUR XX to 7*-8-5 cadre and 1-2-5 eng III and RP eliminated

Events went better southwest of Namur in an attack of simple attrition. German defenders used woods and entrenchments skillfully, besides drawing upon ammunition stockpiles also used by the siege train while the standard fire brigade, a lonely mounted rifle formation, reacted into the hex and shifted the odds by a decimal. French morale was their only advantage and the usually better skill of 1st Colonial and 1st Cavalry Corps held strong as 2.4:1 rolled upward and a BX resulted.
French losses: 8*-5-7 cav XX to 3*-2-7 cadre, 2x 8*-11-5 rfl XX to 3*-5-5 cadre and 2-4-7 mot mg III eliminated
German losses: 16-18-5 rfl XX to 7*-8-5 cadre and 4-8-5 BAV MG [X] eliminated

During exploitation, German forces shuffled as much as limited speed made possible. A German division joined the garrison of Trient at the tip of the Germanic salient pointed toward Lake Garda; the fortress is radically stronger now but resident Austrians will drag down morale if the Italians attack. Other Germans pushed deeper into the Alps to consolidate the defense of many passes against Italian aggression. In France and Belgium, German forces shifted to cover the various new weak spots and to prepare conversions.

Entente Turn

May 1915 dawned with mud still prevalent in the Alps and Italy entering the war on the side of the Entente while economies on both sides chugged along. Both the Entente and Central Powers economies produced equipment and munitions at historical rates, despite the considerably less than historical German advance into France in this war. The equipment stockpiles of both sides are inadequate, but the Entente enjoys a much more dramatic deficit between reality and potential – especially given Italy’s pathetic state – and unlike the Central Powers the Entente is seriously short of munitions too. Coal mines at Leige and Namur began producing coal in useful quantities in May, which will buff the Central Powers economic strength during upcoming production cycles. The Entente also cannot match the tremendous flow of German manpower to the front and has only managed to survive so far by expending field artillery units and suffering casualties preferentially in French elite units, the on-map availability of both of which is suffering noticeably and loss rates of which cannot be sustained for long.

Concrete measures on both sides revitalized the field armies for an active beginning to a long, bloody summer. German forces refilled two Prussian cadres, a Bavarian cadre, and a Prussian remnant to full strength. French forces refilled two cadres, increased an artillery battalion to regimental size, and replaced two artillery regiments, consuming almost the entire limit for monthly artillery and light troops. The Italian Army drew upon Entente equipment stockpiles for numerous upgrades to rifle divisions as well as a scattering of rifle brigades and Bersagliari regiments and the lone rail engineer regiment.

Early May in Flanders brought another abortive British offensive, as the British Expeditionary Force felt its growing power. Various unsupported divisions moved to backstop another thirty miles of the French front line, leaving the British in charge of fifty miles of front and easily double that of rear. London directed a reversal of its previous reversal of the plan to form an army in Italy, moving a headquarters, three rifle divisions, and a couple of regiments almost to Venice by rail and sending all three British cavalry divisions that way by hoof. This would not be enough for a British offensive out of Italy, but it would certainly free Italian forces from second-line duties. More immediately, the British once again poised for an attack in Belgium; this time they cancelled it after both recon aircraft failed their missions: munitions and replacements are too scarce to commit to a mere 2.9:1 without the verifiable benefit of aerial observation.

Italian forces, in early May, acted as if frozen in place by the immensity of their mobilization, but plans grew swiftly back in Rome for a sweeping offensive through the Alps. The Austro-Hungarian Army is grossly insufficient to even screen the long frontier, though it is as good unit-for-unit as the French and thus considerably better than the Italians. Starting A-H forces are barely noticeable, regular reinforcements are thin, and conditional reinforcement for when Italy goes to war do not begin to make up the difference. It is difficult to imagine how the A-H’s can avoid a calamitous defeat, albeit one delivered in slow motion, as the Italians ooze through the mountains and eventually go around the flank of the Isonzo River line without ever having to bother attacking across the river the hard way. It may be fortunate for the Central Powers that the vast bulk of Austro-Hungary is off-map and invulnerable and that any Italian army debauching into Bavaria through the Alps would be easy prey for the unimaginably superior German military.

Of course, the Germans can hold back the Italians another way – and they exercise their option to immediately declare war as a prelude to the arrival of German forces in Austria. The Italians will be able to ooze into the mountains, but they will never ooze out the other end of the passes if the Germans commit even a couple of corps against them. If the Germans forgo some offensive potential against the French, they might clear the north bank of the Po River by autumn.

The French Army continued in early May its manful effort to exhaust the Germans in a series of pounding matches in the Ardennes Forest. This time the blow fell in the previously “safe” sector of the forest line, where hills made the woodlands even less attractive to an attacker. The French actually botched a good bit of the attack, immolating a pair of engineer regiments and having another pair, flame reinforced, fail in their attacks. Observation planes contributed well, however, as did the brand-new gas engineers, so that the morale advantage carried through the 4.7:1 attack as a defender loss result. German forces completely eliminated 12-14-5 rifle divisions to cover the retreat of specialist units, including the so far useless gas engineers, who failed their craft yet again. French forces eliminated 5*-7-6 African cadre and 2x 1-5 eng regiments A variety of French units then advanced into the hex, almost all to become disorganized in the still contested hex.

German reaction to this unexpected breach in their line was disappointing, to Berlin. Both armies nearest Switzerland activated, shifting a few forces toward Austria and more forces toward the Ardennes. An army in northern Belgium also activated, doing the same. Armies aimed toward Paris failed to activate and, most disappointingly, so did a pair of armies that attempted to coordinate a counterattack against the new French salient.

Entente exploitation came and went with little fanfare, except around the new French salient into German lines in the Ardennes. There, almost all of the French units pulled back out of the position, leaving only a mountain division, a disorganized rifle division, and a field artillery regiment to defend the very solid position. The Germans, with four hexes around the salient, could mass 6:1 against any possible French force, so the French opted to attempt to hold the hex through finesse rather than mass.

Central Powers Turn

The Central Powers’ half of early May began with a huge effort to prepare for imminent carnage. German depots dispatched replacements to rebuild six cadres into divisions and to replace three jaeger regiments, an engineer regiment, a Saxon cadre, and two field artillery regiments. This colossal effort accomplished three things, each of them potentially more important than it might appear at first glance. First, this quantity of rejuvenation greatly strengthened the German armies on the front, enabling a counterattack in the Ardennes that could easily result in an attacker quartered result without consequently opening the way for an actual, clean French break through the resulting German weakness. Second, in refilling so many cadres with riflemen the Germans both decreased their own striking power by removing a great deal of divisional artillery from the non-divisional unit lists and increased their own defensive power by placing many of their best remaining divisions – which had made the best cadres – back onto divisional duty alongside the many lesser-quality formations that sprang from the April reorganization of many divisions to a four regiment structure. Third, perhaps most important but certainly most nebulous, seeing the Germans plump 80 percent of their Prussian infantry replacements in one phase gave the Entente dramatic evidence that their offensives actually were making a difference. If the Prussians burned through a hundred infantry in one phase, their savings plus two-thirds of new production, and the other states and the general equipment pool both made large proportional expenditures at the same time, and if the effort could not be afforded again – which it could not before July – then the Entente might really be able to exhaust the German armies at the front through a continuous series of attritional attacks over the course of the summer.

The idea that Entente offensives might bleed the Germans to death without winning a geographic victory seems obvious from a historical viewpoint, but is by no means so clear when immersed in the game experience for the first time. Given relatively anemic Entente replacement rates, it is hard to see how the Entente can actually accomplish that goal, especially when most battles result in larger Entente than German losses. Looking ahead, the French Army is going to get offensively weaker without much regard to events at the front, though its defensive strength per regiment should get better. The British still cannot form even half a corps of elite troops and have even worse replacement rates than the French, though at least the trickle of reinforcing divisions are, on a one-to-one bases, almost as good as German second-line units; the long-term prospect for the British seems dim. The Italians are a pathetic joke, stacking up evenly only against the absolute worst German formations. It seems most likely that if the Entente is going to win the war, it will be through hunger; the Germans did not secure the Gent granary and should thus go into starvation sooner than was historical. To that end, the Entente can probably best directly contribute by continuing to pound in well-chosen, advantageous attacks rather than on broader-front, less advantageous attacks that would bleed the Entente dramatically more severely than they would the Germans. The problem with that plan is that it might easily not inflict enough damage on the Germans by early 1918 to prevent a last-gasp German maneuver victory when infantry enter the battlefield. Without whole campaign experience to draw upon, we cannot predict how this will end – and that might be a good thing if we could not also look ahead and see mandatory evolutions in the strategic situation and battlefield tactics.

Be that as it may, the men in Berlin took the decision that the French salient in the Ardennes Forest had to be counterattacked immediately. If the French were allowed to hold the region uncontested, the German line would be made thirty miles longer and have the vulnerability of thirty more miles dramatically amplified. With the requirement for a German army in Austria, a failed counterattack would be cheaper than a permanent extension of the line. French weakness in the salient allowed the Germans to bring against it a force composed solely of divisions and of precisely the strength to achieve 6:1 odds, further minimizing the downside risk of the move.

The German attack succeeded almost as well as possible despite formidable difficulties. Wooded rough terrain, the disputed nature of the hex, French morale superiority, and French elite troops began the competition with a negative five modifier to the German chance for success. Falkenhayn, from his headquarters facing Verdun, could not influence all sixty miles of frontage around the salient and was thus impotent. German gas engineers maintained their perfect record of failing to usefully impact battles. Engineer attacks were impossible, as the local entrenchments were not broadly controlled by either side. Only observation aircraft assisted the attack in useful fashion. The Germans having spent munitions to ensure good odds, the French did not, saving the stockpile at no measurable penalty in combat. The German roll of 4 resulted in a retreat result, which converted to a full exchange after which two French cadres were destroyed by zones of control. French losses: 10-13-5 rifle XX, 13-16-7 mtn lt XX, 4-5-5 fld art III German losses: 18-20-6 BAV XX and 16-18-5 PR XX reduced to cadres German forces advanced into the still disputed hex in great quantity, and most duly became disorganized in so doing, but their overall strength was so great that the Entente could not plausibly attack again into the region – the disputed hex and lack of ability to use engineers, or during reaction phase any aircraft ensured the absence of immediate French response.

In counterpoise to this affront against probability, the Entente was willing to attack in several locations during reaction phase, but only one of twelve armies activated successfully. Oddly, the lone activation among Entente armies was B8L, one of two armies poking busily at the German lines in the Ardennes. With the previous battlefield too unfavorable, and with German forces having been sucked toward the center, B8L directed an attack against the southernmost tip of Belgium as a way to further batter German defenses. French forces, including most of the higher quality formations sliding inland along the line, struck against a slight bulge in the German line along a forty mile front. Both sides spent munitions prolifically and Falkenhayn was active and effective, besides woodlands and entrenchments both hindering the attack and preventing reserve commitment. The French counter to all of this, ground support bombing, contributed little after the bombers went fleeing accurate German machinegun fire. French engineers, one brigade with flamethrowers, continued their dismal recent record with another failure. The odds, 5.8:1, rolled up to 6:1 – a truly fantastic Entente attack – but the muddled and hurried nature of the attack demonstrated itself again in the result of both exchange. French losses: 2x 10-13-5 rfl XX’s to cadre German losses: 7-10-4 and 9-11-5 rfl XX’s to cadre.

During exploitation, only Germans moved of the Central Powers in the West. Three more formations entered the contested zone of the Ardennes Forest, all becoming disrupted and making the hex even more formidable: fifty defense strength on wooded rough terrain. Otherwise, the Germans merely fixed a few soft spots in their line and continued marching a small corps toward the Austrian Alps.

Entente Turn

Entente II APR 1915 followed the same trajectory as did the previous version. French forces rebuilt a cadre and two engineer regiments. The Canadian heavy cavalry brigade finally, after close to six months, became fully capable – though a 2*-1-7 heavy cavalry brigade is useful on the Western Front only as one point of a non-overrunnable second line.

The French finally made “good” on their massing against Maubeuge, and it was a costly setback. After both observation missions failed, the Entente wasted a resource point bombarding with three fully-stacked hexes of heavy and field artillery to achieve three hits: the Germans lost 13 points of defense strength while the French lost 39.75 points of effective attack strength. The odds thus shifted such that a chance for 3:1 became just barely 2:1, making reserve commitment irrelevant (it would still have been just barely 2:1). The Germans used the ruined fortress as entrenchments while the French enjoyed morale superiority and a successful engineer attack to make the result the usual both exchange. The well stacked Germans thus made mincemeat out of the French combined arms attack.

German forces suffered: 16-18-5 Prussian, 13-15-5 Prussian, 8*-11-4 Prussian, and 7*-10-4 Bavarian XX’s all to cadre for -4 1/3 morale points.

French forces suffered: 2x 10*-13-5 Colonial, 10*-13-5 rifle, 2x 8*-11-5 rifle, and 6*-9-5 rifle XX’s to cadre plus 2x 1-5 eng III’s eliminated for -6 2/3 morale points.

Daunted but resigned, the French continued the offensive versus the now usual target, the east bank of the Maas River just inside Belgium. French forces brought superior morale, elite troops, a successful aerial observation mission, and a successful engineering attack against German defended entrenchments in woodlands. 1st and 2nd Cavalry Corps did their usual good job, rolling 2.5:1 up to 3:1 and achieved the usual both exchange result.

German forces suffered 16-18-5 Prussian XX reduced to cadre plus 7*-8-5 Saxon and 2*-4-4 Prussian cadres eliminated for -2 morale points.

French forces suffered 13*-16-7 alpine and 9*-12-5 rifle XX’s reduced to cadre plus 2-7 Foreign Legion III, 4-5-5 fld arty III, and 1-5 eng III eliminated for -3 morale points.

Cognizant that in May enough ships would sink to reduce the army’s morale, the British high command directed an attack in late April to enjoy their national will superiority in ground combat just this one time. The arrow straight German line in the sector offered little to choose, so the British went straight up the middle. The British brought morale and successful observation but their unpracticed engineering forces failed both attempts and the British lack enough elite troops to make even a non-overrunnable stack let alone to make a real attack. The Germans defended open ground with entrenchments and brought a 3-4-7 light III in reserve movement, but the massed British regular divisions, the best the Entente will see before 1918, pushed a 2.8:1 up to 3:1 and achieved the obligatory both exchange result.

German forces suffered 12*-14-5 Prussian and 12*-14-5 Wurtemburger XX’s reduced to cadre plus a 1-2-5 eng III eliminated for -2 1/3 morale points.

British forces suffered 11*-14-5, 12-15-5, and 7*-10-5 XX’s reduced to cadre for -3 morale points, a clear example of the effect of the combat superiority of German second line divisions over Entente first line stuff.

The Central Powers reaction phase of the Entente II APR 15 turn passed uneventfully. The armies where the Germans might have attacked did not activate. Only two armies did activate and both spent their effort organizing the German Army for a massive divisional reorganization.

Central Powers Turn

During the Central Powers II APR 15 initial phase, the British, French, and Germans all kept themselves busy. The Germans reorganized, converted, and/or withdrew about thirty formations, including removing about ten 16-18-5 and 18-20-5 divisions from their order of battle – replaced by substantial numbers of 13-15-5 and slightly weaker divisions. The Germans also prepared the some forces for transfer to Italy, in expectation that the country would attack Austria soon. British forces rebuilt four imperial cadres to divisions, French forces did the same with five metropolitan and two colonial cadres, and the Germans did the same with one each Prussian, Bavarian, and Wurtemburger cadres.

The major tactical move for the Germans in late April was a shifting of forces to attack a weak spot in the French line in the southern Ardennes Forest. Four divisions of French troops sat on the north-south railway, that otherwise runs along or behind much of the German front line, suddenly facing three corps of Germans where before the constricted terrain had kept the threat minimal. The French used entrenchments, national will, woodlands, and defensive air support to good effect in the battle. The Germans used Falkenhayn’s planning, two engineering exploits – including flamethrowers, and aerial reconnaissance to better effect. German gas engineers failed to alter the battle and French reserve commitment failed too. Five point three to one odds rolled down to 5:1 but could still have achieved a defender loss result; instead the attack went in botched and the roll of “1” resulted in a both exchange. French forces suffered 12-15-6 African and 8-11-5 rifle divisions reduced to cadre: -2 morale German forces suffered 1-2-5 eng III eliminated and 7-10-4 Prussian and 16-18-5 Bavarian rifle divisions reduced to cadre: -2 2/3 morale

The Entente largely failed to react to that affront, but the local French did strike back. Belgian and British headquarters remained quiet, though the British would have attacked had either army been alert. Almost all French armies remained equally quiet, but the staff in the southern Ardennes was already alert due to the give and take battles ongoing and put together another attack against on the same battlefield as had hosted a French attack the previous week: 1219. Two French corps mustered 2.4:1 odds, which rolled up to 3:1. German forces used entrenchments and woods to excellent effect. French forces used national will, elite troops, one of two engineering attempts – including flamethrowers, and aerial reconnaissance to better effect. German forces failed reserve commitment and the French put in a solid effort, rolling a “3” for a both exchange result. French forces suffered 1-5 eng III eliminated and 2x 13-16-7 light mountain divisions (one colonial) reduced to cadre: -2 1/3 morale German forces suffered 2x 3-6-5 mg III’s eliminated and 16-18-5 Prussian division reduced to cadre: -2 morale

The Germans focused their exploitation in late April on the entry of Italy into the war, pulling various forces, including the bulk of the mountain troops, off of the line for railing to the Alps in May. Naturally, the Germans also moved to cover weaknesses created by the latest in the series of punches in the Ardennes.

Entente Turn

The onset of clear weather across Western Europe shocked the high commands in Berlin, Paris, and London as April dawned and furry meteorologists backpedaled on predictions of six more weeks of mud. German forces, caught with incomplete entrenchments in many places, braced for the long expected offensive that Entente forces, with superior morale, seemed likely to mount as the ground dried out. The British Expeditionary Force, swelling with a constant influx of Territorial and New Army divisions, reversed its formation of an army on the Italian border and moved back to the front lines in Belgium. Some French forces took immediate advantage of their winter reorganization to mount a serious offensive for the first time in the war while others huddled in entrenchments awaiting the likely German storm.

The long winter build-up on both sides left relatively little work for logistical and personnel officers as April dawned. Prussian personnel flowed to one cadre, bringing it back to full strength. French replacements did the same with one cadre while three artillery regiments received drafts of unskilled personnel and recently mobilized tubes. Canadian heavy cavalrymen infuriated hometown reporters with polo games, supposedly injuring enough men and horses to make military training impossible – the unit remained at reduced effectiveness in the measure of their British corps commander.

British generals took a longer sector of the front in response to urgent French requests. Grumblers showed reinforcements around trenches and shell holes so familiar they’d begun to seem like fifty miles of home between Oostende to Kortrijk. Corps commanders worried vocally about the lack of artillery for seventeen unsupported rifle divisions and the host of independent regiments and brigades that clung to the older divisions – and their howitzers – like bits of wood on a storm tossed sea. A great many of those formations formed an idle second line, from the coast west of Oostende clear to the shipping canal at Cambrai, the only a break being the Franco-Belgian garrisoned fortress city and industrial center of Lille.

The King of Belgium, from his well protected army headquarters in Lille, disposed his field forces on each end of the British sector. Most of the Belgian artillery corps waited on the coast west of Oostende, prepared to backstop the British entrenchments but really aimed seaward lest the High Seas Fleet decide to support with naval gunfire a ground offensive to seize the vital port. The entire Belgian field army, except for most of the heavy and siege artillery units, assembled over the fortnight in the twenty mile salient on the northwest bank of the uppermost reaches of the Schelde River. The position is dangerous, particularly to hold with dispirited troops, but the river is as good a shield as any the Entente enjoys outside the Vosges and the massed firepower of the partially reorganized Belgian Army – well over six divisions strong – is nothing the Germans will lust to tangle with.

Marshall Foch greeted the arrival of sun and warm breezes with public confidence but private concern and his army’s stance conformed to those feelings. A winter-long reorganization of French deployments left the French primed for offensive activity between Lille and the southern Ardennes, with virtually all colonial, naval, French Foreign Legion, Army of Africa, heavy artillery, and light units, together with the best regular divisions, all the cavalry divisions, and most of the first line field artillery massed on and behind a meager hundred thirty miles of front. The reorganization that arranged the French for attack also dangerously weakened the remainder of the front, from northwest of Verdun all the way to Switzerland, both in frontline firepower and local reserves. The French rail network, rejuvanated by British equipment over the past months and nearly free of operational redeployments because of French readiness and the cancellation of the British move toward Italy, added unusual mobility to French tactical actions.

The bulk of French heavy artillery, massed in front of and near Maubeuge, had been scheduled for a massive bombardment, but the plan changed at the last moment. The Kaiser’s men had not strengthened their garrison at the captured fortress, and the French could have assaulted it frontally with a fair chance of giving as good as they got, but in a miracle of openmindedness a craftier plan was put forth by a division commander and adopted by two armies with next to no notice. German construction gangs had recently completed entrenching a lone section of the front in the Ardennes while other gangs worked dilatorily on most of the remainder of the line, including a suddenly interesting salient in the woodlands southeast of Maubeuge. If French forces could seize that salient, they could later attack the fortress from around half of its perimeter rather than only a third and prospects would become much brighter for taking the place without quite such a long and severe bloodletting. In the Ardennes, on the other hand, German forces tied more closely to fixed fortifications were suddenly ripe for a diversionary strike that might also bleed the Germans disproportionately.

The sector of the central Ardennes in Belgium, south of the Maas River, known to some later historians as grid 1219, hosted the French diversionary assault. The Prussian Tenth Corps, centerpieced by a first-line Saxon division and including a weak Prussian division plus a brigade and three regiments, with defensive power rated at 42, held the sector in entrenchments with additional protection from the woodlands and the generally unimportant geography of their position. Against this force, modest by German standards, French railways helped bring a suddenly formidable array commanded by First and Second Cavalry Corps: three first-line rifle, two light, and two African divisions together with six regiments of artillery, three light brigades, two motor machinegun regiments, and seven engineer regiments plus a flamethrower battalion. In response to this sudden concentration, German reserve commitment – a single mounted rifle brigade was available – failed to arrive in time to intervene effectively. The inability of French aerial observors to penetrate German woodland camouflage rendered almost irrelevant the potential French bombardment and boded ill for the attack but Frenchmen on the ground, daunted without doubt, were not dismayed. Adverse terrain capabilities of the numerous light units in the French array made the woodlands as helpful as they were a hindrance in the assault and two pairs of engineer brigades did stellar work in converting protective entrenchments into pre-dug mass graves for German defenders. 114 attack power, with a morale superiority, rolled fractional odds up to 3:1 and a roll of 6 with a net +2 modifier brought victory with a DX result, though the Germans held onto the hex. Saxon forces reduced 15-17-5 rifle division to cadre and eliminated 3-4-7 Prussian jager regiment (7 Saxon and 3 Prussian manpower plus 1 2/3 morale points lost). French forces reduced 9*-12-6 chasseur division to cadre and eliminated two 1-5 engineer regiments (6 metropolitan manpower plus 1 2/3 morale points lost). Both sides in this combat drew upon ammunition stockpiles that also supplied by next described battle. Given the higher German morale point total this battle could be considered a German victory, but given the superiority of French morale relative to historical patterns the reverse could also be true; relative manpower losses seem concretely in the French favor though German replacement rates again seem higher.

The geographically important battle of early April appears now to have been the one begun by the French in grid 1022, the woodlands immediately east of Maubeuge that shielded the fortress from a three sided French attack. Prussian arms defended the sector in fieldworks with two second-line rifle divisions, a rifle brigade, four rifle regiments, an artillery division of two regiments, and a construction brigade. French plans for Maubeuge, a massive artillery barrage followed by an assault of elite rifle units, formed the basis for this attack instead, though the artillery barrage did not much resemble what could have been fired against the fortress. Nine French divisions, including all the elite divisions of the French army in Europe, together with six elite brigades, two Foreign Legion regiments, two motor machinegun regiments, eleven field and two heavy artillery regiments, and a field and two heavy artillery brigades combined for the attack. Balloon reconnaissance failed to contribute much intelligence but fleeter fixed wing aircraft usefully spotted fall of shot and French artillery roared forth in the second bombardment of the war: five disruption hits did not meet the average expected but still badly disrupted all three components of the Prussian artillery division and reduced German defensive power by about a quarter. French adverse terrain expertise, the bombardment, a morale superiority, aerial reconnaissance, and the elite nature of most of the assault troops far overmatched the defensive advantages of fieldworks and woodlands, so that despite odds rolling down to 3:1 the roll of 2 resulted in an DR result that converted, almost automatically in this war to date, to an HX. Prussian forces suffered 13-15-5 and 12-14-5 rifle divisions reduced to cadre; 4*-5-5 rifle brigade reduced to remnant; and artillery headquarters, 7-8-5 and 5-7-5 foot regiments, two 3-4-7 jager regiments, 1-2-5 and 1-2-4 rifle regiments, and 0-4 construction brigade eliminated as they were cleared from the sector. French forces did not accomplish this lightly, suffering both 13*-16-7 mountain and an 8*-11-5 rifle divisions reduced to cadre in the effort. Prussian losses amounted to 34 manpower, 15 equipment, and 5 2/3 morale points; the aborted observation balloon is completely irrelevant in the face of numerous German air replacements that will go unused. French losses amounted to 24 manpower and 3 morale points. French forces deemed sufficient to garrison the sector advanced in good order, organized to enjoy the advantages of eliteness and the woodland against any mobile German counterattack. The French high command set forth with enthusiasm to plan the use of this new position in the struggle to force the Germans out of Flanders.

The German high command did not neglect to react to these unusually but expectedly aggressive French attacks, but could not quite manage to coordinate any immediate counterstrokes. First and Second Armies, around Maubeuge, busily dealing with the immediate defeats, could not organize effective redeployments under stress – the French had gotten inside the decision loops of staffs and commanders accustomed only to calling the tune. Sixth and Seventh Armies, near Switzerland, saw little need for immediate action in the face of the broad Rhine and looming Vosges. Third Army, in the southern Ardennes, was content to sit in its impregnable defenses facing the French, in their own maximized arrangements. Fifth Army, just northwest of the Vosges, was not so timid and reacted to the clear weather by pulling many units off of the front line so that they could shift as necessary for an imminent offensive. Fourth Army, near Metz, alertly shifted an engineer regiment to continue upgrading frontline defenses. FAL/A, in the northwestern Ardennes, reacted to the French attack against it by shifting static and artillery units to backstop the line and cadres to positions where they could receive fresh drafts from the replacement depots. FAL/B eventually made the most dramatic reaction to the weather and the French by ordering the siege train, in all its massed glory, away from its position against Oostende toward Maubeuge.

The Entente exploitation passed quickly, with the French cleaning up the debris of their attacks and nothing of particular note happening elsewhere.

Central Powers Turn

The predominant activities during the Central Powers I APR 15 turn were German reorganization and French aggression. German replacements flowed to two cadres while the French brought both of their best light alpine divisions and one standard division back to full strength. The French know already that they will soon have too few elite divisions to make elite-bonus attacks because the replacement rate for light troops is so low. The Germans also looked forward to a late-April mass reorganization and significant withdrawal of forces, so that they spent most of their effort in withdrawing and co-locating various specific types of units. German forces also completed entrenching the remainder of their front line, excepting two locations with particularly severe terrain and constricted-access.

Entente reaction to the German shifts was of an unusually high significance. Many Entente armies activated, apparently spurred by the dried-out roads and apparent imminence of Italian entry into the war. A moderate quantity of British and French units shifted out of the line, so that later in the month they could choose from many possible locations to re-enter it for attacks. French 10th Army took the opportunity more seriously by attacking German entrenchments on the east bank of the Maas River just inside Belgium. German 10th Corps deployed Saxon, Prussian, and Prussian Landwehr divisions in the sector, together with various supporting elements. French 1st and 2nd Cavalry Corps, noted for their aggressiveness in this sector only the previous week, again pulled the Army into attacking, this time too with an elite force of mountain, African, and light units, a mass of field artillery, and significant engineers and motorized machine gunners. German forces enjoyed the protection of the woodlands and entrenchments. French forces enjoyed their elite status, superior morale, and the success of one of two engineering adventures, while the French air forces failed to adequately observe for the unexpected offensive. In the end, the odds rolled up to 3:1, a fantastic Entente attack, and the attack went in with skill (roll 5), but the event remained the very usual both exchange result.

German forces suffered 15-17-5 Saxon XX to cadre, 6*-9-4 Landwehr Prussian XX to cadre, and 2*-3-4 static X eliminated, for -3 morale.

French forces suffered 12*-15-6 African XX to cadre, 10*-13-7 mtn XX to cadre, 4-5-6 Colonial X to remnant, and 1-5 eng III eliminated. The French are also piling up engineer casualties far faster than fresh engineer troops are being produced at schools. -3 morale.

The constant question is, “was it worth it?” For the Entente, a 3:1 attack is excellent and a BX result therefore as good as it almost ever gets. By picking a German hex not optimally stacked, the Entente managed to generate equal morale point losses, but such hexes are rare – the usual BX has the Entente losing morale points at about a 6:5 ratio due to higher German strengths per RE. The Germans, for example, have machinegun regiments that are more than twice as strong per RE as French machinegun brigades, and the French units are among the best French non-divisional units and suffer from lesser granularity besides. As German divisions reorganize into 4 RE structure divisions, they will lose no strength per RE but will gain greater granularity at the top end of the loss-taking spectrum – and the Germans still have plenty of divisions to ensure that the Entente will be happy to be able to make a 2.5:1 attack.

To amplify this problem, the Entente is perpetually in worse condition for resource points. The Entente powers cannot share the same point, of course, which is a minor trouble. More serious, if the Entente wants to take the chance that a bombardment will achieve anything worthwhile – and the best one has done for us to date is to ALMOST break even – then it spends a resource point for that and another for a combat in which the Germans spend only one. If the Entente full stacks three hexes of troops for an attack the next attack down the line cannot use the same resource point because the 150RE limit will be breached – but the Germans can almost always use the same resource point for two defensive battle. The Entente has siege engineer units that can consume further resource points in exchange for a 50% chance of self-eliminating with the added bonus of dragging down the strength per RE of the attack and a grand 1-in-6 chance of achieving a +1 on a die roll that will almost certainly only shift the BX result to another BX result. All this means that the Entente has siege engineers that it will not pay to use and cannot risk using while still paying usually three resource points to conduct two battles in which the Germans consume only one. Given a historical shell shortage, one also must consider that the Entente did eventually grind down the Germans over the course of years.

In our game, the Entente could at the rate so far achieved under optimum conditions, easily inflict fewer than 300 morale points of losses on the Germans before autumn 1918. And the Entente will not always enjoy optimal conditions: French light troop replacement rates will bite and engineer replacement rates are already biting, resource points will be a problem – worse when better siege engineers become available, German gas engineers will proliferate and always be better than their Entente counterparts, the air situation will intermittently be unfavorable, the Germans will get serious bombers and long-range artillery to attack Entente cities while the Entente will be feeble in comparison, the British morale advantage will disappear no later than the beginning of May 1915 and may never reappear, the French are wearing down their morale advantage with each attack, and if the Entente steps up the offensive by conducting 2:1 attacks with fewer advantages then it will suffer disastrous AX results.

German exploitation in early April 1915 was to insert reserves into the line and shift forces to cover locations newly under potential threat.

Entente Turn

Note: Errata from game report 14 reveals that the British are in fact at a National Will of 5 – by about two morale points.

The Entente side of the front line during the second half of March 1915 was a seething mass of slow shifts of forces. Pervasive mud prevented any excitement.

Logistical and administrative officers received chief mention during the period. German depots released personnel to rebuild another division from its cadre. French personnel and equipment officers released stocks sufficient to empty the French replacement pool of its lone occupants: one each field artillery regiment and brigade. Petulant Canadian heavy cavalrymen continued to refuse to conduct serious training, thus remaining at reduced effectiveness.

In the trenches, British movements might have overshadowed those of their allies and enemies, but did not for reasons to be revealed later. French forces continued shifting light and mountain infantry and field artillery, any heavy artillery, and most of the especially strong first line regular units toward the sector of the front from Maubeuge through the central Ardennes. Second and third line French forces meanwhile shifted generally southward. Belgian forces joined some French troops to relieve a sector of the British line in front of Lille. Indian and Canadian forces, within the British sector, together with the pre-war British regulars massed from Oostende toward Lille on a fifty mile front. A succession of second line British divisions, all self-supported, correspondingly pulled out of the front line to fill those sectors of the second along major railroads while a couple of British cavalry divisions left the second line and moved southward at best overland speed. One British territorial division, just arrived from England, boarded trains in Caen for a quick trip to Nice, where the troops were issued tourist maps and Italian language primers. The British gunboat flotilla similarly left the misty rivers of northern France for a sojourn in sunny Toulon.

Entente forces deliberately stood sedately on the defensive, avoiding ammunition expenditures in order to retain stocks for operations in better weather.

German reaction to these events might not have been so sedate, had an attempted double-activation not failed, but it did and a plotted second attack against the French salient at 2520 did not go off. Scattered activations did allow some construction units to shift positions preparatory to entrenching further sectors of the German front line.

Central Powers Turn

In keeping with the weather and their continuing plans, German forces roused themselves for some offensive activity during the second half of March 1915.

Logistical and administrative officers once again acted importantly during the period. French depots sent personnel to rebuild one cadre into a division. German staff officers were busier, rebuilding an eliminated cadre together with a field artillery brigade and two mountain jager brigades to clear the German replacement pool.

German engineer officers, suddenly alive to the threat of Entente bombardments of sketchy fieldworks during upcoming clear weather, amplified previous desultory entrenching into a frenzy of widespread, far flying mud.

German forces conducted only minor shifts, retaining confidence in their nigh overwhelming front line strength and being already massed for the continuing attack against the Vosges Mountains in the 2520 region.

Three corps of Germans hurled themselves against the Vosges salient with considerably greater effect in late March than they had earlier in the month. French forces, previously a rifle division and three fortress brigades, were buffed with a further fortress brigade and a field artillery regiment before the German attack, but the battle was severe anyway. Falkenhayn’s previously miscarried plan worked far better this time, offsetting with reconnaissance aircraft the penalty of attacking into mountains. Gas effects failed for the second time running, leaving the mud, fieldworks, and superior French national will to operate against German success, but it was not enough. Odds in this attack, down from 8:1 previously, were only 5.9:1, and they stayed their as both sides opened the ammunition floodgates. The attack rolled up to 6:1 and the die roll, despite the net -3, resulted in a both exchange result. French forces suffered heavily in this, reducing their division to cadre besides eliminating the field artillery regiment: -1 1/3 morale, -4 inf, -3 equip. German forces came better prepared this time too, suffering only a 13*-15-5 rifle division reduced: -1 morale, -6 Prussian inf. The Germans definitely came out ahead in this battle, unlike the previous round where the results were decidedly mixed.

In response to this activity, British forces continued the rearward edging of territorial divisions while scattered French activations continued the shifting of forces preparatory to clear weather. Potentially of some interest, British port engineers arrived in Oostende and the press buzzed that a coastal flotilla might move into that advanced harbor.

Entente Turn

Being a production phase, the Entente initial phase of I MAR15 consumed considerable time and mattered a great deal to the course of the war. The contested hex at 1121 went Entente-owned, with the resident entrenchment downgrading to fieldworks and any tiny chance of German counterattack now gone unless the hex be upgraded back to entrenchment or the weather should turn clear. A new wave of Entente manpower, equipment, and ammunition production sent a wave of optimism through the ranks as the replacement depots filled to new highs and almost the last un-fielded or shattered formations received their human and artillery requirements. French forces rebuild one each cadre and remnant to full strength and replaced one engineer and three field artillery regiments. In the air events turned less well for the Entente, with superior aircraft in both French and British service withdrawing in favor of lesser models, though the French did also acquire their first observation balloon and
bomber aerial units. In another depressing situation, Canadian cavalrymen continue to refuse to go to full effectiveness. Finally, the British funded at cost of a valuable RP the transfer of three regiments’ worth of rail cars from Britain to the French rail system; continuing degradation is reducing the French net to dangerously low levels.

During Entente movement of early March 1915, the French continued to mass in the Ardennes Forest while the British and Belgians continued to try to help them do that. By mid-month, Belgian forces substantively occupied the first eighty miles of second line trenches, measured from the Channel coast southward. British forces replaced Belgian front line forces to occupy the first sixty-five miles of front running southward from the coast; another weak corps of British forces is en route to the front and should enable the British to relieve still more Frenchmen in the St. Niklaas sector. For their part, in the face of continued mud and reinforced German forces, the French shifted their aim to strike at the martyred fortress of Maubeuge.

As the month dawned, French artillery began to beat the drum of an abortive attack against Maubeuge. Eight brigades of heavy artillery, already in position, opened fire in a two week bombardment to soften the defense for the best non-salient attack the French Army could muster. Unfortunately, after the expenditure of a resource point and the massing of the best light and rifle forces of in the country, the attack failed to go off. The drum fell silent after German anti-aircraft aborted one French reconnaissance air unit and two others failed to usefully spot the fall of so much shot. After die roll modifiers for mud and fortress, eight brigades failed to roll even one hit and the French, unwilling to risk a 1.9:1 attack if German anti-aircraft should hit the unproven bomber air unit, cancelled the follow-up ground attack. In mud, at least, 55 defense factors of Germans – an easy feat at any point on the line – can be sufficient to prevent the French from conducting their b
es t possible two-hex, positional attack (far less than 55 will prevent any mobile attack).

In German reaction at the end of ENT IMAR15, Sixth and First Armies activated to conduct minor shifting. Fifth and Second Armies might have conducted attacks, had they activated, but the situation did not arise and calculation remained unnecessary.

Entente exploitation in mid-March 1915 proved likewise unexciting.

Interlude

After a 21 month delay, DJ05 is again rolling forward. In brief, the German advance into France stalled after a series of battles at the fortress of Maubeuge gradually inflicted serious damage on both French and Germans before finally taking the place on a brutal AX result. British forces currently hold Oostende and a front running about 80 miles southwest from there. Belgian and British forces backstop the British sector as well as a short segment of the French front. French forces hold the front from southwest of Maubeuge, a salient in the Belgian Ardennes, and all the way to Switzerland far enough forward that none of the French “border fortresses” are even on the front. The key German ore fields in Luxembourg and north of Metz, the fortress at Metz, and the fortress at Neu Breisach are all on the German front line. Casualties on both sides in 1914 were light enough, despite being brutal for a series of German attacks on Maubeuge during the autumn and winter, that the front is, in poor weather, almost unassailable almost everywhere to both sides (meaning that the likeliest combat results are AQ and AX when we compute odds, and that isn’t a recipe for winning wars). Belgium collapsed and then recovered with 50 morale points, so it can never be forced out of the war. Britain is not far below a national will of five; the Germans are substantially further but have a long way to go before reaching three. The French are solidly holding their national will of five. We look forward to Italian entry into the war and the return of clear weather, speculating that this may somehow make widespread attacking more plausible.

Central Powers Turn

In the Central Powers half of I MAR 15, the impenetrable front only became more pronounced, despite a modest battle in the southern mountains. With mud everywhere, German forces replaced a cadre and an engineer regiment, further plowing half of the huge wave of new soldiers (better than 100 assorted German infantry replacements arrived this month) into rebuilding five divisions; Entente forces found no cadres available. Falkenhayn, having returned from the front to Berlin for consultation in late February, brought to the West with him in March a plan to attack a weak French salient in the southern mountains near Neu Breisach. A trio of French fortress brigades and a solitary division held the low peaks, confident in their morale superiority, the terrain, the weather, and their fieldworks to beat off even the most serious German assault. With minor other shifting, largely to strengthen the front even further by pulling out the last cadres and inserting the newly rebuilt divisions, the Germans duly massed their mountain and Bavarian forces for their only plausible attack – on that same French salient. Three corps of attackers could not muster enough mountain troops for an elite bonus and Falkenhayn could not adequately control his forces in the mountains as mudslides repeatedly cut telegraph wires, but aerial reconnaissance did assist local commanders in a few instances. The liberal provision of ammunition to the attackers further assisted the effort, as French commanders deliberately starved their troops of shells, letting the odds move from 8:1 to 9:1. None of this mattered much, however, as the extremely difficult conditions brought the assault to an expensive, grinding halt with no permanent gains in geography. The DX result reduced the French 6*-9-5 division to cadre but also sent one each Bavarian and Prussian 3-4-7 mountain regiments into the replacement pool. French morale suffered more: one point as against two-thirds of a point lost for the Germans. The Entente came out ahead in other ways, losing three and a third infantry points as against six German infantry points and a resource point. It will be interesting to find out, in a couple of years of game time, which side regrets the battle more.

In the Entente reaction phase, three French armies in the central portion of the front activated, mounting no attacks but continuing the process of shifting higher quality forces toward Maubeuge and the Ardennes and lower quality forces southward. The French have to make a serious push somewhere in Spring 1915 and everything from Luxembourg southward is likely to remain impenetrable for reasons of garrison size, vertical terrain, and rivers.

Entente Turn

The second half of February 1915 began with the usual and the unusual. German forces rebuilt two cadres; British Indians and French Africans and Metropolitans rebuilt one each. French forces replaced one field artillery regiment. The Canadian heavy cavalry brigade again refused to leave its reduced effectiveness status. Far more importantly, an unexpected thaw transformed plastic mud into liquid mud and opened the way for a potential Entente attack against weakly-held, newly entrenched German positions at several salient in the front lines.

In late February 1915, for only the second time in the war to date, the Entente conducted major offensive activity. In order to free up an increasing quantity and quality of French formations, the Belgians shifted their frontline position to 0723, a hex with thirty-miles of river in front of it, while slightly buffing up their share of the second-line trenches. British forces took total ownership of the section of the front running Oostende through 0622 and also occupied forty miles of second line trenches. French forces broadly completed their reordering of the extreme southern sector of the line and managed to mass enough elite forces to go on the attack in the far southwestern fringes of the Ardennes Forest.

The freshly entrenched German salient at 1121 provided the target for the historic change of offensive tide on the Western Front (for “The Great World War One, 1914-1917”). Two German divisions, 33 points, defended wooded entrenchments facing fifteen miles of river and thirty-five miles of distant French trenches. French forces, with significant heavy artillery already in place along this sector of the front and powerful forces moving up rapidly, assumed a sudden offensive posture when they sensed the change in weather. Good French divisions and various moderate quality brigades and regiments exchanged positions with the crème de la crème of French formations: 10*-13-5 divisions and various elite divisions, brigades, and regiments. Eight regiments of field artillery slipped into firing positions under cover of woods to join the party.

In the face of such quality, what could even the liberally equipped, stronger German divisions do to defend themselves? 132.5 attack strength of French enjoyed +1’s for national will and elite status while facing -1’s for woods, entrenchment, and positional mud. Two groups of reconnaissance aircraft provided a +1 to the French and eight regiments of engineers combined into two, two brigade successful engineering attempts for +2 more. 4:1 with a combat roll of 6 resulted in DL and a forced change in the front line!

A Saxon 15-17-5 division dropped to cadre in trade for the French loss of 1-5 engineer regiment and the reduction of 4*-5-7 light brigade to remnant. Each side spent RP, Germans lost 1 1/3 and French 5/6 morale points.

Large French forces advanced after combat into the contested hex and suffered right about 50% disruption for their troubles. It would take a very bold German to counterattack this hex on the mobile table, with the French enjoying -5 protection from woods, elite, national will, and mud.

In reaction, only one German army activated to conduct a few, unimportant shifts.

Exploitation, in this unusual turn, kept to the unusual pattern. Several disrupted formations moved out of the contested hex. To replace them, undisrupted formations moved into the hex and again managed to find significant safe, clear locations to assemble a defense. By the end of the turn, three of four French divisions and two of four regiments or brigades in the embattled forest were not disrupted and German chances of a successful counterattack had dropped to nearly nil.

Central Powers Turn

The Central Powers initial phase of February II 1915 passed with little activity to note: German forces rebuilt one cadre.

Central Powers movement in late February 1915 was a real reaction to newly exhibited Entente strength. Many previously ‘safe’ positions received reinforcements to counteract Entente prowess. Several brand-new entrenchments underwent renovation, resulting in handsome new fieldworks that would keep the Entente on the mobile table where the -2 for mud would make 3 and 4:1 attacks unsafe. Too, the Germans continued to conform in their tactics and operations to their attritional strategy, this time by massing against the French in 2520.

25 defense points in 2520 stood in fieldworks amid muddy mountains, semi-confident that their national will advantage would keep them safe from German attack. Three corps of Germans proved them wrong in a small but hard fought battle in which the Germans, but not the French, spent an RP. The French decision sent 6:1 odds spiraling up to 9:1 and transformed a sure BX into a likely DX, as indeed turned out to be the case. French forces reduced 6*-9-5 division to cadre and suffered 4-5-5 field artillery regiment destroyed for 1 1/3 morale points lost. German forces suffered 7*-8-5 cadre destroyed for 1/3 morale point lost.

It may be worth noting that with most 0-move artillery and the German siege train now disbanded the stockpiles of equipment points on both sides will no longer be quite so flush and that artillery and cadre losses may start to hurt more than has been the case in the past four months.

At the end of February 1915, Entente forces roused themselves to action in hopes of keeping the pressure on in their successful February offensive in the Ardennes. Three French armies activated for the purposes of shifting ever more of the best units of the French Army into the Ardennes sector and pulling increasing numbers of lower-rated formations southward out of that portion of the front. One British army likewise activated, pulling all but a non-overrunnable crust of forces from the frontline British trenches. Boringly, the offensively-poised French armies did not activate, so the phase passed without combat.

German exploitation at the end of February 1915 proved utterly unremarkable, with only the usual minor shifting of details.