Europa Games and Military History

Tag: World War Two (Page 1 of 2)

The Official Italian History of the Second World War

The History Office of the General Staff of the Italian Army (Stato Maggiore dell’esercito – Ufficio Storico) is responsible for official military history, and thus has published a series of monographs, illustrating various aspects of military history from Italy’s unification to the present. Of course the Second World War makes up a significant part of the available volumes. No official, complete italian history of the Second World War was ever written, but it is well possible to piece together a nearly complete picture from the monographies at hand.

In the Nineties,  fifty years after the war, a series of volumes reflected on the North African campaign, and these four books are probably as close to an official history as we will ever get. The author, Mario Montanari, is a respected historian better known for his mor general work on the Italian “Risorgimento”, the national unification moevement that resulted in the foundation of an Italian nation state in 1849 from various independent fiefdoms that had endured since the collapse of the western Roman Empire.

Translations of large parts of the Italian official histories have been uploaded to and will be linked here. This is even more laudable as the original works do not seem to be available in digital form. The quality of the translation is questionable in parts, which adds another reason to take the contents of the books with a grain of salt (the other one, of course, being that its an official history). Then again, undertaking the translation of what to the rest of the world must be an obscure topic indeed is imminently a work of love, and we are deeply grateful to Robert Denny II.
Thanks to Jim Broshot for finding and sharing those links with us.

L’Esercito Italiano Nella Campagna die Greca

Mario Montanari, Rome 1999.
Translation by Robert Denny II: Italian Army Official History The Greek Campaign

Le Operazioni Della Unita Italiane Al Fronte Russo (1941-1943)

Rome 1977
Translation by Robert Denny II: Italian Army Offical History Operations On The Russian Front

Le Operazioni in Africa Settentrionale

Volume I: Sidi Barani – November 1940 – März 1941; by Mario Montanari, edited by Edizione Ufficio Storico SME, 1989; 720 pages, 29 maps.
Translation by Robert Denny II.

Volume II: Tobruk  – March 1941 – May 1942; by Mario Montanari, edited by Edizione Ufficio Storico SME, 1990;709 pages, 88 maps.
Translation by Rober Denny II

Volume III:  El Alamein – May – November 1942; by Mario Montanari, edited by Edizione Ufficio Storico SME, 1992; 1036 pages.
Translation by Rober Denny II.

Volume IV: Enfiddaville- November 1942 – March 1943. by Mario Montanari, edited by Edizione Ufficio Storico SME, 1993; 820 pages, 90 maps.
Translation by Robert Denny II

Le Operazioni in Siculia e in Calabria, Luglio – Settembre 1943

written by Alberto Santoni, published by Stato Maggiore Dell’Esercito – Ufficio Storico, Roma 1989.
Translation by Robert Denny II: Italian Army Offical History Operations In Sciliy & Cambera, 2017

La Marina Italiana Nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale

The contribution of the Italian navy has often been belittled, ignored or played down. One of the worlds strongest Navy, the Marina Militare suffered from similar problems as the Army and Air force, namely the call to fullfil ambitions which were way beyond the the industrial and technical capabilities of italy’s industry, and therefor its quipment and weaponry. The Navy did its best with the ressources available, but modernization was slow. Italy could not react to the revolutionary impact of the airplane, which was theorized early on and clearly recognized by its brightest thinkers, to their deep and lasting frustration.

Thanks to the work of Robert Denny II a complete translation of the official work is available on archive org. Errors in the numbering of the volumes have not been corrected yet.

La Regia Aeronautica 1939-1945

Written by Nino Arena, published by Stato Maggiore Aeronautica

Volume 1: 1939-1940: Dalle Non Belligeranza All’Intervento. Roma 1981

Translated by Robert Denny II as: The Royal Air Force. Volume 1: From Non Belligerence to Participation, 2021


Since 2003 RKKA provides a host of information on the Soviet Forces in World War Two: Formations, Force Structure, uniforms, Losses, Weapons and Maps. The Design hasn’t changed much since then, and the site hasn’t really been updated since 2010, so the website structure belies the sheer amount of information available, which definitly could use a more accessible navigation, and a lot of the maps and individual documents would profit from context.  But the amount of material presented makes RKKA one of the reference points for the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War. Since Alex, the site’s webmaster, is russian, many items are based on original research and russian sources.

Date: April 6th, 2018



The British Official History of the Second World War

The History of the Second World War is the official history of Britain’s contribution to the Second World War and was published by Her Majesty’s Stationery Office (HMSO). The immense project was sub-divided into areas to ease publication. Military operations are covered in the United Kingdom Military Series, the United Kingdom Civil Series covers aspects of the civilian war effort and the Foreign Policy series; the Intelligence series and the Medical series are eponymous. There are other volumes not under the aegis of the series but were published by HMSO and may be read as adjuncts, as they cover matters not considered in great detail or in one case at all in the main series. Further volumes, published after the privatisation of HMSO or in the series about the Special Operations Executive, are also useful.

The original works lacked references to unpublished sources when published before 1970. Government archives were opened to an extent by the Public Records Act 1958 and the Public Records Act 1967. The works were published with only references to published sources.

United Kingdom Military Series

  • Grand Strategy
  • The War at Sea
  • The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany
    • Volume I: Preparation, Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, 1961
    • Volume II: Endeavour, Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, 1961
    • Volume III: Victory, Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, 1961
    • Volume IV: Annexes and Appendices, Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, 1961
  • Defence of the United Kingdom, Collier, Basil, London: HMSO, 1957
  • The Campaign in Norway, Derry, T. K. London: HMSO, 1952
  • The War in France and Flanders, 1939-1940, Ellis, L.F. London: HMSO, 1953
  • Victory in the West
    • Volume I: Battle of Normandy, Major L. F. Ellis et al., 1962
    • Volume II: Defeat of Germany, Major L. F. Ellis et al., 1968
  • War against Japan
    • Volume I: The Loss of Singapore, Major-General Stanley Woodburn Kirby et al., 1957
    • Volume II: India’s Most Dangerous Hour, Major-General Stanley Woodburn Kirby et al., 1958
    • Volume III: The Decisive Battles, Major-General Stanley Woodburn Kirby et al., 1961
    • Volume IV: The Reconquest of Burma, Major-General Stanley Woodburn Kirby et al., 1965
    • Volume V: The Surrender of Japan, Major-General Stanley Woodburn Kirby et al., 1969
  • The Mediterranean and Middle East
    • Volume I: The Early Successes Against Italy, to May 1941,
      Playfair, I.S.O. et al. London: HMSO, 1954
    • Volume II: The Germans Come to the Help of Their Ally, 1941,
      Playfair, I.S.O. et al. London: HMSO, 1956
    • Volume III: British Fortunes Reach Their Lowest Ebb, Major-General I. S. O. Playfair et al., 1960
    • Volume IV: The Destruction of the Axis Forces in Africa, Major-General I. S. O. Playfair, Brigadier C. J. C. Molony et al., 1966
    • Volume V: The Campaign in Sicily, 1943 and the Campaign in Italy, 3 September 1943 to 31 March 1944, Brigadier C. J. C. Molony et al., 1973
    • Volume VI, Part 1: Victory in the Mediterranean: 1 April to 4 June 1944, General Sir William Jackson et al., 1984
    • Volume VI, Part 2: Victory in the Mediterranean: June to October 1944, General Sir William Jackson et al., 1987
    • Volume VI, Part 3: Victory in the Mediterranean: November 1944 to May 1945, General Sir William Jackson et al., 1988
  • Civil Affairs and Military Government
    • Central Organisation and Planning, Frank Donnison, 1966
    • North-West Europe, 1944–46, Frank Donnison, 1961
    • Allied Administration of Italy, Charles Harris, 1957
    • British Military Administration in the Far East, 1943–46, Frank Donnison, 1956

United Kingdom Civil Series

  • Introductory
    • British War Economy, Hancock, W. K. & Gowing, M. M. London: HMSO and Longmans, Green, 1949
    • Statistical Digest of the War, Central Statistical Office, 1949
    • Problems of Social Policy, Richard M. Titmuss, 1950
    • British War Production, Postan, Michael M. London: HMSO, 1952
  • General Series
    • Coal, William B. Court, 1951
    • Oil: A Study of Wartime Policy and Administration, D. J. Payton-Smith, 1971
    • Studies in the Social Services, Sheila Ferguson, 1978
    • Civil Defence, T. H. O’Brien, 1955
    • Works and Buildings, C. M. Kohan, 1952
    • Food
      • Volume I: The Growth of Policy, R. J. Hammond, 1951
      • Volume II: Studies in Administration and Control, R. J. Hammond, 1956
      • Volume III: Studies in Administration and Control, R. J. Hammond, 1962
    • Agriculture, Keith A. H. Murray, 1955
    • The Economic Blockade
      • Volume I, William N. Medlicott, 1952
      • Volume II, William N. Medlicott, 1957
    • Inland Transport, Christopher I. Savage, 1957
    • Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War, C. B. A. Behrens, 1955
    • North American Supply, H. Duncan Hall, 1955
    • Manpower: Study of War-Time Policy and Administration, H. M. D. Parker, 1957
    • Civil Industry and Trade, Eric L. Hargreaves, 1952
    • Financial Policy, 1939–45, Richard S. Sayers, 1956
  • War Production
    • Labour in the Munitions Industries, P. Inman, 1957
    • The Control of Raw Materials, Joel Hurstfield, 1953
    • The Administration of War Production, J. D. Scott, 1955
    • Design and Development of Weapons: Studies in Government and Industrial Organisation, M. M. Postan, 1964
    • Factories and Plant, William Hornby, 1958
    • Contracts and Finance, William Ashworth, 1953
    • Studies of Overseas Supply, H. Duncan Hall, 1956

British Foreign Policy in the Second World War

  • Volume I, Sir Llewellyn Woodward, 1970
  • Volume II, Sir Llewellyn Woodward, 1971
  • Volume III, Sir Llewellyn Woodward, 1971
  • Volume IV, Sir Llewellyn Woodward, 1975
  • Volume V, Sir Llewellyn Woodward, 1976
  • Abridged Version, Sir Llewellyn Woodward, 1962

British Intelligence in the Second World War

  • Volume I: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, F. H. Hinsley et al., 1979
  • Volume II: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, F. H. Hinsley et al., 1981
  • Volume III, Part 1: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, F. H. Hinsley et al., 1984
  • Volume III, Part 2: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, F. H. Hinsley et al., 1988
  • Volume IV: Security and Counter-Intelligence, F. H. Hinsley et al., 1990
  • Volume V: Strategic Deception, Michael Howard, 1990
  • Abridged Version, F. H. Hinsley, 1993
  • SOE in France, Michael R. D. Foot, 1966 and 2004

Medical Volumes

  • The Emergency Medical Services
    • Volume I: England and Wales, edited by Cuthbert L. Dunn, 1952
    • Volume II: Scotland, Northern Ireland and Principal Air Raids on Industrial Centres in Great Britain, edited by Cuthbert L. Dunn, 1953
  • The Royal Air Force Medical Services
    • Volume I: Administration, edited by S. C. Rexford-Welch, 1954
    • Volume II: Command, edited by S. C. Rexford-Welch, 1955
    • Volume III: Campaigns, edited by S. C. Rexford-Welch, 1958
  • The Royal Naval Medical Service
    • Volume I: Administration, Jack L. S. Coulter, 1953
    • Volume II: Operations, Jack L. S. Coulter, 1955
  • The Army Medical Services
    • Administration
      • Volume I, Francis A. E. Crew, 1953
      • Volume II, Francis A. E. Crew, 1955
    • Campaigns
      • Volume I: France and Belgium, 1939–40, Norway, Battle of Britain, Libya, 1940–42, East Africa, Greece, 1941, Crete, Iraq, Syria, Persia, Madagascar, Malta, Francis A. E. Crew, 1956
      • Volume II: Hong Kong, Malaya, Iceland and the Faroes, Libya, 1942–43, North-West Africa, Francis A. E. Crew, 1957
      • Volume III: Sicily, Italy, Greece (1944–45), Francis A. E. Crew, 1959
      • Volume IV: North-West Europe, Francis A. E. Crew, 1962
      • Volume V: Burma, Francis A. E. Crew, 1966
  • The Civilian Health and Medical Services
    • Volume I: The Civilian Health Services; Other Civilian Health and Medical Services: The Colonies, the Medical Services of the Ministry of Pensions, Sir Arthur A. MacNalty, 1953
    • Volume II: Public Health in Scotland, Public Health in Northern Ireland, Sir Arthur A. MacNalty, 1955
  • Medical Services at War: The Principal Lessons of the Second World War, Sir Arthur A. MacNalty, 1968
  • Cope, Sir Zachary, ed. (1952). Medicine and Pathology. History of the Second World War United Kingdom Medical Series. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. LCCN 53017268. OCLC 458306589.
  • Cope, Sir Zachary, ed. (1953). Surgery. History of the Second World War United Kingdom medical series. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. LCCN 54001119. OCLC 459817464.
  • Medical Research, edited by F. H. K. Green and Major-General Sir Gordon Covell, 1953
  • Casualties and Medical Statistics, edited by William M. Franklin, 1972
  • Medical Research, edited by F. H. K. Green and Major-General Sir Gordon Covell, 1953
  • Casualties and Medical Statistics, edited by William M. Franklin, 1972

Supplementary HMSO works

Other official departmental histories

A number of official histories were produced by government departments. The authors worked under the same conditions and had the same access to official files but their works did not appear in the History of the Second World War.

  • Britain and Atomic Energy 1939–1945 Margaret Gowing, 1964.

Supplementary works from other publishers

  • SOE Histories
    • SOE in the Far East, Charles Cruikshank, 1983
    • SOE in Scandinavia, Charles Cruikshank, 1986
    • SOE in the Low Countries, M. R. D. Foot, 2001
  • Secret Flotillas
    • Volume I: Clandestine Sea Operations to Brittany 1940–44, Sir Brooks Richards, 2004
    • Volume II: Clandestine Sea Operations in the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Adriatic 1940–44, Sir Brooks Richards, 2004
  • Army Series, printed by the War Office, 30 volumes
    • Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
      • Volume I Organisation and Operations, Rowcroft, E. Bertram (1951)
      • Volume II Technical, Bloor, F. R. (1951)
    • Supplies and Transport 2 volumes, Boileau, D. W. (1954)
    • Works service and Engineer stores, Buchanan, A. G. B. (1953)
    • Fighting, support and transport vehicles and the War Office provision for their provision
      • Part 1 Common Problems, Campagnac R. & Hayman P. E. G. (1951)
      • Part 2 Unarmoured Vehicles, Campagnac R. & Hayman P. E. G. (1951)
    • Maintenance in the field 2 volumes, Carter, J. A. H. (1952)
    • Maps and Survey, Clough, A. B. (1952)
    • The Auxiliary Territorial Service, Cowper, J. M. (1949)
    • Movements, Higham, J. B. & Knighton, E. A. (1955)
    • Signal Communications, Gravely, T. B. (1950)
    • Quartering, Magnay, A. D. (1949)
    • Miscellaneous Q services, Magnay, A. D. (1954)
    • Mobilization, McPherson, A. B. (1950)
    • Discipline, McPherson, A. B. (1950)
    • Transportation, Micklem, R. (1950)
    • Army welfare, Morgan, M. C. (1953)
    • Ordnance services, Officers of the directorate (1950)
    • Airborne Forces, Oatway, T. B. H. (1951)
    • The development of artillery, tactics and equipment, Pemberton, A. L. (1950)
    • Manpower problems, Pigott, A. J. K. (1949)
    • Army Radar, Sayer, A. P. (1950)
    • Morale, Sparrow, J. H. A. (1949)
    • Personnel selection, Ungerson, B. (1952)
    • Military Engineering (field), Pakenham-Walsh, R. P. (1952)
    • Administrative planning, Wilson, H. W. (1952)
    • Special Weapons and types of warfare 3 volumes, Wiseman, D. J. C. (1951–53)
      • Volume I Gas Warfare
      • Volume II Screening smoke, signal smoke, flame warfare insecticide & insect repellent & special common use equipment
      • Volume III Visual & Sonic warfare
  • Royal Air Force Series, printed by the Air Ministry
    • Airborne Forces (1951)
    • Air/Sea Rescue (1952)
    • Air Support (1956)
    • Armament
      • Volume I Bombs & Bombing Equipment (1952)
      • Volume II Guns, Gunsights, Turrets, Ammunition and Pyrotechnics (1954)
    • Maintenance (1954)
    • Signals
      • Volume I Organisation and Development (1958)
      • Volume II Telecommunications (1958)
      • Volume III Aircraft Radio (1956)
      • Volume IV Radar in Raid Reporting (1950)
      • Volume V Fighter Control and Interception (1952)
      • Volume VI Radio in Maritime Warfare (1954)
      • Volume VII Radio Counter-Measures (1950)
    • Works (1956)

The Official History of the US Military in the Second World War

The number of studies and books published by the US military on the Second World War alone fills a small library. Official histories do not only exist for the Army and the Navy, then the two arms of the US military, but also for the nascent forces of the Air Force and the Marines, and of course for countless other organisations like the Corps of Engineers or the Coast Guard. For brevitys sake, we will limit this bibliography to the classic trio of Army, Navy and Air Force. For further research have a look at hyperwar, the not always up-to-date, but always useful collection of links about military history.

The US Army in World War II

Better known as “The Green Books,” The U.S. Army in World War II consists of 79 volumes plus a reader’s guide. Unlike the official histories of some countries, these volumes were often written by professional historians, such as Robert R. Palmer, Forrest Pogue, or Bell I. Wiley, rather than staff officers.

As with official histories, every campaign is covered in great detail, often starting with descriptions from the front lines rather than with strategic plannings and the big picture. But the really valuable volumes are the ones dealing with what usually only gets experts exited.  That is to say, the volumes on to/e, logistics, medical service, and more.  The detail in these is often extraordinary, as  they delve into matters that, although largely invisible in most histories, were essential to shaping an army that could fight and win.

The US Army in WW 2 – Reader’s Guide

The War Department

Chief of Staff- Prewar Plans and Preparations, Mark Skinner Watson
Washington Command Post – The Operations Division. Ray S. Cline
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare – 1941-1942, Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare – 1943-1944. Maurice Matloff
Global Logistics and Strategy 1940 – 1943, Richard M. Leighton
Global Logistics and Strategy 1943 – 1945, Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton
The Army and Economic Mobilization
, R. Elberton Smith
The Army and Industrial Manpower, Byron Fairchild and Jonathan Grossman

The Army Ground Forces

The Organization of Ground Combat Troops, Ken Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer and Bell I. Wiley
The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops, Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley and William R. Keast

The Army Service Forces

The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces, John D. Millett

The Western Hemisphere

The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild
Guarding the United States and Its Outposts. Stetson Conn. Rose C. Engelman and Byron Fairchild

The War in the Pacific

Strategy and Command- The First Two Years, Louis Morton
The Fall of the Philippines, Louis Morton
Guadalcanal- The First Offensive, John Miller, jr.
Cartwheel – The Reduction of Rabaul, John Miller, jr.
Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, Philip A. Crowl and Edmund G. Love
Campaign in the Marianas, Philip A. Crowl
The Approach to the Philippines, Robert Ross Smith
Leyte: The Return to the Phillippines, M. Hamlin Cannon
Triumph in the Philippines, Robert Ross Smith
Okinawa: The Last Battle, Roy E. Appleman, James M. Burns, Russell A. Gugeler, John Stevens

The Mediterranean Theater of Operations

Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, LTC Albert N. Garland and Howard McGaw Smyth. Assisted by Martin Blumenson
Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, George F. Howe
Salerno to Cassino, Martin Blumenson
Cassino to the Alps, Ernest F. Fisher, Jr.

The European Theater of Operations

The Supreme Command, Forest C. Pogue
Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol I, May 1941 – September 1941, Roland G. Ruppenthal
Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol. 2, Roland G. Ruppenthal
Cross Channel Attack, Gordon A. Harrison
Breakout and Pursuit, Martin Blumenson
The Lorraine Campaign, Hugh M. Cole
The Siegfried Line Campaign, Charles B. MacDonald
The Ardennes – Battle of the Bulge, Hugh M. Cole
The Last Offensive, Charles B. MacDonald
Riviera to the Rhine, Jeffrey J. Clarke, Robert Ross Smith

The Middle East Theater

The China-Burma-India Theater

Special Studies

Pictorial Record

The US Navy in World War II

Immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Morison, already convinced of the value of personal involvement as a result of sailing experience while writing his biography of Christopher Columbus, wrote to President Roosevelt suggesting the preparation of an official history of the Navy in the war, and volunteering for the task. Both President Roosevelt and the Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox agreed, and in May 1942 Morison was commissioned as a Lieutenant Commander in the United States Naval Reserve, and assigned a staff of assistants, with permission to go anywhere and to see all official records. Morison’s reputation as a knowledgeable sailor (based on his analysis in the biography of Christopher Columbus) preceded him, and he was welcomed on a number of ships, eleven of them in all by the end of the war.

The result was a normal historical work, not a prescribed official history. Limitations of the History of U.S. Naval Operations are mostly due to its shortened period of publication. Some material, especially related to codebreaking, was still classified, and later in-depth research into particular occurrences in the war did clarify points that had been passed over rather lightly. Some rewriting was incorporated in the later printings of this series. This History of U.S. Naval Operations also intentionally avoided a certain amount of analysis, for instance deferring to other works for the causes of the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor. The intended audience for the work, to quote from the preface, was “the general reader rather than the professional sailor.”

The books can be downloaded free of charge for 14 days at

Vol. I: The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939–May 1943
Vol. II: Operations in North African Waters, October 1942–June 1943
Vol. III: The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931–April 1942
Vol. IV: Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions, May–August, 1942
Vol. V: The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942–February 1943
Vol. VI: Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, 22 July 1942–1 May 1944
Vol. VII: Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, June 1942–April 1944
Vol. VIII: New Guinea and the Marianas, 1944
Vol. IX: Sicily, Salerno and Anzio, 1943–1944
Vol. X: The Battle of the Atlantic Won, May 1943–May 1945
Vol. XI: The Invasion of France and Germany, 1944–1945
Vol. XII: Leyte, June 1944–January 1945
Vol. XIII: The Liberation of the Philippines, 1944–1945
Vol. XIV: Victory in the Pacific
Vol. XV: Supplement and General Index

The US Airforce in World War II

The US Airforce became an independent combat arm in 1947. Prior to 1947, the responsibility for military aviation was divided between the Army (for land-based operations) and the Navy, and Marine Corps, for sea-based operations from aircraft carrier and amphibious aircraft.

In March 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget ordering each war agency to prepare “an accurate and objective account”of that agency’s war experience. Soon after, the Army Air Forces began hiring professional historians so that its history could be recorded. An Historical Division was established in Headquarters Army Air Forces under Air Intelligence, in September 1942, and the modern Air Force historical program began. With the end of the war, Headquarters approved a plan for writing and publishing a seven-volume history. In December 1945, Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, Deputy Commander of Army Air Forces, asked the Chancellor of the University of Chicago to assume the responsibility for the publication of the history. Lieutenant Colonel Wesley Frank Craven of New York University and Major James Lea Cate of the University of Chicago, both of whom had been assigned to the historical program, were selected to be editors of the volumes. Between 1948 and 1958 seven were published.

Volume One: Plans and Early Operations January 1939 to August 1942
Volume Two: Europe: Torch to Pointblank August 1942 to December 1943
Volume Three: Europe: Argument to V-E Day January 1944 to May 1945
Volume Four: The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan August 1942 to July 1944
Volume Five: The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki June 1944 to August 1945
Volume Six: Men and Planes
Volume Seven: Services Around the World

Further Reading:

United States Army Air Force (“Craven and Cate”)


The Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War

This fifty volume series covers all areas of New Zealand’s involvement in the Second World War, from detailed accounts of particular battalions, to the political and economic background and consequences, to full accounts of particular episodes and campaigns. This series was first published as part of the Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War, produced under the auspices of the War History Branch of the Department of Internal Affairs.

Unit Histories

Campaign Histories

Air Force and Navy

Medical Service


The Official Australian History of the Second World War

Not to be outdone by the detailed and sprawling history of New Zealands involvement in the Second World War, the Australian military undertook one of the longest and largest historical endeavours the nation has ever seen. The enterprise began in January 1943 with the appointment of Gavin Long as General Editor. The 22 volumes, written by 14 authors, were published by the Australian War Memorial over a 25-year period between 1952 and 1977.

Series 1 – Army

Series 2 – Navy

Series 3 – Air

Series 4 – Civil

Series 5 – Medical

Selected Bibliography

Ambrose, Stephen E.: Citizen Soldier: The U.S. Army from the Nomandy Beaches to the Bulge to
the Surrender of Germany. New York: Touchstone, 1997.

Badsey, Stephen.  Arnhem 1944: Operation ‘Market Garden’. London: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1993.

Chapman, Guy. Why France Collapsed: The Defeat of the French Army in 1940. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969.

Farrar-Hockley, Anthony H. Airborne Carpet: Operation Market Garden. New York: Ballantine Books, 1969.

Fuller, J. F. C. The Second World War, 1939-45: A Strategic and Tactical History. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949.

Goralski, Robert. World War II Almanac 1931-1945: A Political and Military Record. 1984 ed. n.p.: Perigee, 1982. New York: Bonanza Books, 1984.

Greiss, Thomas E., ed. The Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean. The West Point Military History Series. Wayne, N.J.: Avery Publishing Group, 1984.

Horne, Alistair. To Lose a Battle: France 1940. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969.

Hubatsch, Walter ed. Blitzkrieg to Defeat, Hitler’s War Directives, 1939-1945. Edited by H. R. Trevor-Roper. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965.

Kleffens, Eelco Nicolaas van. Juggernaut Over Holland: The Dutch          Foreign Minister’s Personal Story of the Invasion of The Netherlands. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941.

Liddell-Hart, B. H. The German Generals Talk.New York: William Morrow and Company, 1948.

Lucas, James. Hitler’s Enforcers: Leaders of the German War Machine 1939-1945. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1997.

Mason, Henry L. “War Comes to The Netherlands: September 1939-May 1940”, Political Science Quarterly 78, no. 4 1963): 548-580.

McDonald, John. Grea tBattlefields of the World.  New York: Collier Books, 1984.

Pearson, Frederick S. The Weak State in International Crises: The Case of The Netherlands in the German Invasion Crises of 1939-40.         Washington: University Press of America, 1981.

Perrett, Bryan. Knights of the Black Cross: Hitler’s Panzerwaffe and Its Leaders. Book Club ed. n.p.: Robert Hale, 1986. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986.

Ryan, Cornelius. A Bridge TooFar. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974

Steenbeek, Wilhelmina. Rotterdam: Invasion of Holland. New York, Ballantine Books, 1973.

Taylor, Telford.  The March of Conquest: The German Victories in Western Europe, 1940. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958.

Whitting, Charles. Hunters from the Sky: The German Parachute Corps 1949-1945. New York: Stein and Day, 1974.

A Bridge To Far

Weather began to lift on September 22, but no supply flights were flown.  Allied fighters dominated the skies everywhere except Arnhem and Nijmegen, where the Germans continued to get Luftwaffe ground support.[109]

The attack organized by Student hit a weak section of the allied line between Grave and Uden. KG Walther, attacking westward, and KG Huber, attacking eastward, cut Hell’s Highway between 101stand 82ndAirborne. KG Huber placed the bridge at Veghel under fire and German tanks nearly took Uden.  By the end of the day eight allied battalions were drawn into the battle at Uden, fighting under Brigadier General McAuliffe.  Hell’s Highway north of Veghel was closed to traffic for a crucial day.[110]

The attempt to reach 1stAirborne was taken up by 43rdDivision at dawn, supported by the Irish Guards from Guards Armoured.  Armored cars, once again leading the way, reached the Poles at Driel by 0800.  It had taken four days and eighteen hours since Market-Garden to establish what was technically a link with 1stAirborne.[111] That night Sosabowski crossed 50 men with the four rubber dinghies available to him.  DUKWs and heavier boats were held up by Student’s attacks.  German pressure along Urquhart’s perimeter increased, and the British General signaled Browning that relief was necessary within 24 hours.[112]

September 23 was a clear day, and Allied fighters provided copious close air support to both XXX Corps and 1stAirborne Division.  German units threatening Veghel were driven off by noon, and Hell’s Highway was reopened.  The last elements of 82ndand 101stAirborne and Polish Brigade were lifted in, and river crossing equipment finally reached the Poles at Driel.  That night 200 of Sosabowski’s men ferried across the Rhine to reinforce Urquhart.  [113]

By September 24 British 1stAirborne was down to about 1800 effectives.  These men had been fighting constantly for a week, they were exhausted and running short on ammunition.  Fire support from XXX Corps and fighter-bombers kept the Germans from overrunning the small perimeter, but it was obvious that the bridgehead would eventually suffer the same fate as Frost’s command.  A truce allowed 700 wounded to be transferred to German captivity where they could receive medical attention.[114]  That afternoon General Dempsey made the decision to withdraw.[115]

KG Chill reached Hell’s Highway south of Veghel near dusk. Owing to these attacks, supply vehicles were unable to use the road for most of the day.[116] The road was finally cleared of Germans late on September 25 by 101st Airborne, with assistance from British 50thInfantry and 7th Armoured Divisions.  Due to mines Hell’s Highway didn’t reopen until early the 26th, but after that it stayed open.[117]

SS KG von Allworden, with King Tiger tanks from 506th Heavy Tank Battalion, attacked Urquhart’s perimeter on September 25, nearly cutting him off from the Rhine.  A crossing attempt by 43rdDivision resulted in heavy British losses, with no appreciable gain and Urquhart set the withdrawal for that night.[118]

British artillery opened up an eleven-hour bombardment by at 2100. Crossing operations began at 2140 and continued until dawn, passing 2,587 men to safety through the 700-meter gap left open to 1stAirborne. Market-Garden ended at 0550 on September 26. Including wounded, the Germans took 6,450 prisoners. Approximate 1,300 members of 1stAirborne Division were killed during the battle.[119]

Propagandists claimed victory and defeat for both sides.  Brereton classified Market a success.  Montgomery blamed Eisenhower for failing to provide resources, yet claimed the operation was 90 percent successful.[120]  Sober assessment indicates the only strategic use of Allied airborne forces in Europe ended in defeat, but Market-Garden was no great victory for the Germans.  Blame is shared by most of the Allied commanders. Montgomery was in overall command but failed to pay close attention. Brereton made several mistakes including: his insistence on a single sortie per transport per day, unworkable landing zones, and choice of British I Airborne Corps over US Airborne XVIII Corps to command Market. Urquhart must shoulder responsibility for failing to stay in place to command his division. For his part, Horrocks was unable to keep Garden on schedule or get his subordinates to move at night.  The failure of Market-Garden forced the Allies to winter in Holland where their advantage in mobility was wasted.  Stretching to cover the extended frontage forced compromises leading to a weak front in the Ardennes, and facilitated Hitler’s attack there.

Field Marshall Model deserves praise for pulling together scattered German units, and quickly ascertaining the importance of Nijmegen and Arnhem.  Colonel-General Student skillfully handled both defense and offense along Hells’ Highway.  The recuperative powers of German units, and will of the common soldier to fight against great odds and under difficult conditions are trademarks of the Wehrmacht. British 1stAirborne proved they shared those traits.


[109]Badsey, 72.

[110]Ibid., 72-73, Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 147; Ryan, 534.

[111]Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 153; Ryan, 517-518; MacDonald, 182.

[112]Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 154; Ryan, 535-7; Badsey, 73.

[113]Ryan, 543; Badsey, 75-6.

[114]Badsey, 76; Ryan, 557-9.

[115]Ryan, 568.

[116]Badsey, 80; Farrar-Hockley, Student, 148.

[117]Badsey, 83; Farrar-Hockley, Student, 148.

[118]Badsey, 81; Ryan, 573.

[119]Badsey, 85, Ryan, 580.

[120]Ryan, 597; Badsey, 89.

Race to Nijmegen

Weather on the 19th was no better.  Due to ground fog and rain, only a few of the flights from England were able to take of, and those were late. 1stAllied Airborne Army failed to inform 2nd Tactical Air Force of the changes, and no close air support was flown for Browning’s forces in Holland.  The Germans continued to receive effective air support however. The Luftwaffewas so bold as to raid Eindhoven with 120 bombers, killing or wounding 1,000 civilians.[91]

At dawn (36 hours behind schedule) Guards Armoured Division crossed at Son on a Bailey Bridge erected the night before. Leading elements reached Grave by 0820.  It had taken 42 hours and cost 130 casualties for Guards Armoured to travel 53 miles.[92]  Elsewhere, another attack by Gavin’s men failed to take the Nijmegen bridge.  Assault boats were ordered forward for a crossing, but these were located in Belgium, behind XXX Corps start line. It would take some time for the boats to travel a very crowded road to Nijmegen.[93]

Student planned a pincer attack to split the Allied corridor using 59thInfantry Division from the west, and 107thPanzer Brigade from the east.  Before this could be executed, 101st Airborne and 8th Armoured Brigade routed 59th Division.  The Panthers and Grenadiers of 107th Panzer attacked later in the day, and nearly succeeded in reaching Son.  While this attack was occurring Taylor’s third lift arrived, with half the expected troops and guns, followed by a very inaccurate supply drop.  Weather in England was the cause of both delay and confusion.[94]

British 1st Airborne Brigade staged an early morning attack along the north bank of the Lower Rhine which made slow progress until the fog lifted.  By 1000, without the cover afforded by fog, and lacking any air support, the attack ground to a halt one mile from the bridge.  A second attack further to the north by 4th

Airborne Brigade cost the British heavy casualties, and gained little ground from KG Spindler.  General Urquhart was liberated from his attic by the attack at 0715, and he returned to the divisional headquarters in Oosterbeek after a 40-hour absence.[95]  After a quick analysis Urquhart sent reinforcements to the doomed 4thPara Brigade attack.  A signal was also sent to warn the Polish Brigade that the Germans controlled their landing zone.[96]  The Poles never received the message to abort their drop, and at 1600 their gliders landed in no-mans-land between 4th Parachute Brigade and KG Krafft.  Only a few men and two anti-tank guns survived.[97]

The Germans brought their full weight to bear on Frost’s position at the Arnhem bridge.  Daylong attacks began with an air raid, followed by shelling and ground attacks from SS KG Knaust in the north and SS KG Brinkmann from the east.  The British still controlled ten houses at the north end of the bridge, but had only 250 unwounded men to hold them with.[98]

September 20th was the last of the four days Browning had promised Montgomery.  It dawned to the same poor weather as the two previous days, allowing only supply missions to be flown.  Although 82ndAirborne received 80 percent of its supplies, the British recovered only 13 percent of 1st Airborne’s.[99]

Along what was now dubbed “Hells’ Highway” 107thPanzer Brigade staged another attack east of Son.  Once again, 101stand British armor beat them off.  Guards Armoured was broken up to stiffen the two American divisions, especially the position along the Groesbeek Heights.  British and American troops worked together to clear the suburbs near Nijmegen bridge while they waited for the assault boats to crawl their way forward.[100]

The boats finally arrived after noon, and the assault went in at 1500, with air and artillery support.  2ndand 3rd Battalions 504thParachute Infantry Regiment cleared the two bridges on the far shore. A coordinated attack by 505thParachute Regiment and Guards Grenadiers opened the south end of the bridge, and the first tanks crossed at 1910.  Much to the shock of the Americans, with Arnhem only 10 miles away the British tankers stopped for the night.[101]

General Horrocks explained it this way:
“This operation of Cook’s (American battalion commander) was the best and most gallant attack I have ever seen carried out in my life.  No wonder the leading paratroopers were furious that we did not push strait for Arnhem.  They felt they had risked their lives for nothing, but it was impossible, owing to the confusion which existed in Nijmegen, with houses burning and the British and U.S. forces all mixed up.”[102]

British 1stAirborne endured a day of uncoordinated German attacks on its Oosterbeek perimeter.  Both sides were exhausted, and neither had a significant advantage in strength. British battalions were down to 100-200 men each, and it was impossible to properly care for casualties.  An agreement was reached whereby the British pulled back slightly, giving the Germans control of several buildings containing British wounded.  Several such temporary tuces were called during the next days.[103]

At his bridge Lt. Col. Frost was short of all types of supplies and the Germans were now using flame-throwers and tanks to dig his remaining troops out of their buildings. Around noon Frost was wounded and turned control over to the commander of the reconnaissance squadron, Maj. Gough.  Four Tiger tanks forced a crossing of the bridge at about1600. Later that night Gough negotiated a truce allowing the Germans to collect 200 wounded from the cellars, including Lt. Col. Frost.[104]

Although the rain continued on September 21, German pressure along the corridor subsided.  Student was reorganizing another attack scheduled for the next day, and Model wanted to concentrate everything on Arnhem and against a breakout by XXX Corps from Nijmegen.

Gough attempted a breakout from Arnhem to the north at 0900, which was not successful.  What was left of Frost’s men didn’t surrender as a group, some kept fighting for two more days.  With the major part of 2nd Parachute Battalion eliminated the Germans gained use of the bridge.  Frost’s small force had held out for 88 hours, with little support, and without relief. [105]

The defenses at Oosterbeek were reorganized, but remained frail.  The Heveadorp ferry was cut adrift after KG von Tettau took Westerbouwing hill on the southwestern edge of the division perimeter.  From there the Germans could observe any daylight river crossing by or in support of the British airborne division.[106]

The Irish Guards finally kicked of their advance from Nijmegen at around noon, just as the Germans were making their first unopposed crossing of the Arnhem bridge.  The Guards pushed halfway to Arnhem, but lacking air support and low on ammunition they were halted.  SS KG Knaust reached the same vicinity at 1600 and set up a strong defense.  Horrocks ordered 43rdInfantry Division forward to assume the lead from Guards Armoured and link up with 1st Airborne. With this last advance Urquhart was finally able to establish radio contact with XXX Corps artillery, and began to receive effective fire support.[107]

1st Polish Parachute Brigade’s main body finally got airborne, but bad weather forced 44 of the 114 Dakotas to turn back.  The Luftwaffemet the air caravan with more than 100 fighters, 25 of which got through the escort to claim thirteen transports.  Aircraft carrying Urquhart’s supplies also ran into German fighters, losing 23 planes to enemy fighters and flak, and delivering only 41 tons of supply to the British.  The Poles secured a small perimeter near Driel and along the south bank of the Rhine, opposite 1st Airborne.  They were unable, however, to conduct any crossing due to a lack of boats.[108] Had they landed just a day sooner they could’ve used the Heveadorp ferry.


[91]Badsey, 55, 58; Ryan, 457.

[92]Badsey, 56; Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 124; Ryan, 410.

[93]Badsey, 56.

[94]Badsey, p. 57; Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 127.

[95]John MacDonald, Great Battlefields of the World, (New York: Collier Books, 1984), 180.

[96]Badsey, 55-6; Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 135; Ryan, 410.

[97]Badsey, 57; Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 139.

[98]Badsey, 57-8.

[99]Ibid., 59.

[100]Ibid., 60, Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 127-8.

[101]Badsey,  60-1; Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers: The U.S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the Bulge to the Surrender of Germany(New York: Touchstone, 1997), 129; Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 129-130.

[102]Ambrose, 129.

[103]Badsey, 59-60.

[104]Ibid., 64; Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 139, 145, 147.

[105]Badsey, 68.

[106]Ibid., 69; Ryan, 501.

[107]Ryan, 495-503; Badsey, 69; Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 151.

[108]Badsey, 69-70; Ryan, 496.

September 16th-18th: The Landings

Beginning the night of September 16 and over the course of the next day over a thousand Allied planes attacked German airfields and antiaircraft positions. On September 17 the first Market transport departed at 945, the last of 1,051 transports and 516 gliders lifted off by 1135. Pathfinders jumped at 1240 and assault troops began landing by 1400.  By 1408 the Allies had landed some 20,000 men, 330 artillery pieces, 511 vehicles, and 490 tons of supplies.  The daylight drops were very accurate, and only 48 transport planes and 71 gliders were lost from all causes.[67]

Watching from his headquarters at Vught as Allied transports streamed overhead, Student remarked: “Oh, how I wish I had such powerful means at my disposal!”[68]  Before nightfall Student received a complete copy of the Market-Garden plans taken from a crashed glider, probably one from I Corps Headquarters. The plans included flight schedules, landing zones, unit lists, and mission taskings.[69]

At II SS Panzer Corps General Bittrich started receiving reports within minutes of the main drop.  By 1430 he issued orders to 9thSS Panzer to occupy the Arnhem bridge and immediately attack enemy forces near Oosterbeek.  10thSS Panzer was to move immediately to Nijmegen and “occupy the bridge in strength”.[70]  It would take some time to get units moving, among other things vehicles would have to be unloaded from rail cars and troops recalled from Sunday leave.

With British paras dropping practically in his lap, Field Marshall Model quickly left Oosterbeek. He headed east to co-locate with II SS Panzer Corps at Doetinchem, arriving there at 1600.  Before evacuating the area Model sent orders to II SS Panzer Corps and Armed Forces Command Netherlands.[71]

General Horrocks opened Garden at 1400 with a 35-minute bombardment by 408 guns.  The defending Kampfgruppe(battlegroup) was named after its commander, Colonel Walther, one of Student’sFallschrimjaeger.  This scratch formation consisted of two Luftwaffeparachute battalions, two SS infantry battalions, and 6thPenal Battalion.  Guards Armoured lost nine tanks to Kampfgruppe(KG) Walther, but by 1930 had advanced seven miles to Valkenswaard.  There the Guards stopped for the night. British commanders failed to initiate aggressive patrolling, leaving KG Walther free to regroup and dig itself in for the next day.[72]  Horrocks was behind schedule; he should have reached Eindhoven in three hours.[73]

Meanwhile, American paratroopers were having mixed luck.  Taylor’s “Screaming Eagles” quickly seized bridges at Veghel and St. Oedenrode against weak resistance. The Wilhelmina Canal bridge at Son was blown with the Americans a mere 50 yards away, and the alternate bridge at Best remained in German hands.  Divisional engineers erected a wooden footbridge at Son before nightfall, but until XXX Corps arrived with bridging equipment no vehicles large than a jeep would cross the canal.  Colonel Sink and the 506thParachute Regiment crossed at Son by midnight and headed for Eindhoven.[74]

Gavin’s 82nd held the Groesbeck heights and critical bridges at Grave and across the Maas-Waal Canal southwest of Nijmegen. They also had part of a battalion in Nijmegen, which destroyed what were thought to be the detonating device. Grenadiers from 10thSS Panzer Division had arrived to defend the bridge however, and Gavin’s weak battalion was pinned down in the city streets near the bridge.[75]

Urquhart’s troops dropped as accurately as the Americans, but immediately experienced problems.  It took longer than expected to organize after the drop, especially for the recon squadron.  It wasn’t until about 1530 that Lieutenant Colonel John Frost’s 2nd Parachute Battalion headed out for Arnhem supported by a few recon jeeps.  1stand 3rdParachute battalions also advanced on Arnhem, each by a separate route.[76]  Crowds of enthusiastic Dutch civilians met the Tommies, further slowing the advance.  German fire was first encountered at 1600 along the northern route near Wolfheze.  1stBattalion had run into SS Major Sepp Krafft’s 440 man training battalion.[77]

At Oosterbeek 3rdBattalion encountered hastily assembled German forces rallying around Model’s abandoned headquarters.  Only Frost’s 2nd Battalion found a clear road into Arnhem. They were in sight of the rail bridge when it was blown at 1830 and found the pontoon bridge had been removed.  Frost’s men observed 30 German vehicles head south across the Arnhem bridge.  By 2000 2ndParachute Battalion occupied buildings surrounding the north end of the Arnhem road bridge.[78]

Radio communications within 1stAirborne were not working well and General Urquhart left his headquarters to check on his division.  He lost his jeep to enemy fire and spent the first night with Brigadier Lathbury’s 1stParachute Brigade, out of contact with division headquarters.[79]

September 18th opened with heavy fog closing down airbases in England, France and Belgium, followed by rain lasting most of the afternoon and into the night.  This, combined with Brereton’s insistence that planes in Belgium remain on the ground while his transports were airborne, reduced Allied air support to a trickle. German airfields were clear however, and Luftwaffefighters flew 190 sorties.[80]

Guards Armoured started off at 0600, and by 1230 managed to sneak some armored cars into Eindhoven where they linked up with Col. Sink’s 506thParachute Regiment. Eindhoven had been liberated from the company size German defense force during the morning of September 18. Using bridges over the Dommel River taken by 101st, Guards Armoured passed east of Eindhoven and reached the destroyed bridge at Son by evening.[81]At 1300 two battalions of 327thGlider regiment along with divisional troops, 146 jeeps, and two bulldozers – 2,656 men – were added to Taylor’s force.[82]

At Best a strong force of American paratroopers from the 502ndRegiment was ordered to take the Wilhelmina Canal bridge.  Opposing them was a majority of the 59thInfantry Division, sent there the previous day by Student. German engineers blew the bridge at 1100, and fighting generally died down throughout the 101stDivision area.[83]

Further north in the 82nd Airborne sector Gavin was faced with capturing the Nijmegen bridge.  Lieutenant Colonel Warren’s battalion from 508thParachute Infantry Regiment got close to the southern end of the bridge, but was unable to capture it. Two later attacks by fresh troops also failed.  The Germans had been reinforced by part of 9thSS Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion.[84]

Germans troops were active elsewhere along the 82ndAirborne perimeter. At dawn small units began attacking the Americans holding Groesbeek Heights, eventually threatening the southern landing zone. Lt. Col. Warren’s battalion, recently withdrawn from Nijmegen, charged across the LZ and cleared it just before the 1300 glider landing took place. Arriving were 385 gliders with 1,782 men and the remainder of General Gavin’s artillery.  To the north, a German probe was driven off at Veghel.[85]

Day long attacks from Kampfgruppevon Tettau, which included a company of captured French Renault tanks, tied down 1stAirlanding Brigade positioned west of the British landing zones. [86]  SS Kampfgruppe Spindler, an amalgamation of several German units arriving over the night, engaged Lathbury’s Parachute Brigade west of Arnhem.  Lathbury was wounded, and Urquhart forced to hide in an attic. Brigadier Hicks of the Airlanding Brigade took command of 1st Airborne Division.[87]

In Arnhem itself Lt. Col. Frost had about 600 men, mortars and four 6-pounder (57mm) anti-tank guns ensconced in houses covering the north end of the bridge.  Frost also had radio contact with division headquarters and support from four 75mm guns. German infantry, unsupported by artillery or tanks, failed to dislodge Frost’s men, and a 0930 charge across the bridge from the south by 9thSS Recon Battalion was routed. [88]

At 1500 Urquhart’s second wave arrived to a greeting from the Luftwaffe.  In addition to heavy flak, 90 German fighters attempted to intercept the transports and gliders.  Allied fighters managed to hold off the German planes, but lost 20 of their number.  Some 2,100 men arrived on 124 Dakotas and 296 gliders.  The following supply lift dropped 87 tons of cargo, mostly into German laps, with only 12 tons reaching 1st Airborne.[89]

Radio communications within 1stAirborne were almost non-existent. Pressured from the east and west, with its commander missing, the Red Devils were in serious trouble. It might have been possible for the division to salvage a bridgehead using the Heveadorp ferry, first reported on the day of the landing.  Instead Hicks sent the 1st Airborne after its original, and now unreachable, objective.[90]


[66]Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 34

[67]Badsey, 36-38, Ryan 180, 190,

[68]Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 78.

[69]Badsey, 41; Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 78.

[70]Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 80.

[71]Badsey, 41; Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 78.

[72]Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 104-5.

[73]Ryan, 251.

[74]Ryan, 252-3; Badsey, 41;
Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 110.

[75]Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 97-8; Badsey, 41; Ryan

[76]Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 87-90; Badsey, 43.

[77]Ryan, 260.

[78]Badsey, 44.

[79]Badsey, 43; Ryan, 233-4;
Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet,

[80]Badsey, 45.

[81]Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 110; Badsey, 46.

[82]Badsey, 52.

[83]Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 110-2.

[84]Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 112-6.

[85]Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet Airborne Carpet, 116-7;
Badsey, 52-3.

[86]Badsey, 49.

[87]Badsey, 49; Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 119, 121.

[88]Badsey, 49; Ryan, 350-3.

[89]Badsey, 53-54.

[90]Ryan, 339-41, 388-9;
Badsey,  44, 54.

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