Question:
Why do British infantry divisions form stronger cadres than divisions of equivalent strength from other nations?

Answer:

When the SF OB was almost finished it became clear that the US and British counters were very similar – too much so considering their differing characteristics. I suggested the change in cadre values in the British – not because of the ‘thin red line’ and all that rubbish, but rather that:

1. British infantry divisions had a formidable defensive capability that is not really reflected in their attack value (and simply splitting their attack/defense ratings did not work either) since they possessed:

a. very powerful anti-tank strength (at least twice that of an US division) especially after the introduction of towed and self-propelled 17 pounder; b. a strong MG battalion – the Vickers MMG being best in set piece attack and defense situations; c. a full ‘combat-motorized’ recon II – most useful as a last string emergency reserve (apart from its recon role).

2. British infantry formalized a ‘left out of battle’ structure in which at least 25% of men and almost all second in commands were not used in an attack. In Europa terms this meant that strong cadres remained in the division even after horrid losses.

Note that only British and Commonwealth infantry divisions get this benefit, and only after they convert to their highest rating, after getting machinegun, recon and AT assets.

Source:
[TEM 59/60]