Europa Games and Military History

Category: Military History (Page 1 of 5)

Folders, Shelves, Libraries

The US Army Field Manual Collection has grown again, and is slowly being enlarged into an Online Doctrine Library . which means other documents than field manuals are being prepared for this year. For now, we had to split the collection into three parts:

US Army Field Manuals 1930 (the year they started being numbered) to 1946
US Army Cold War Field Manuals (1947-2000, the year the numbering system saw massive changes)
This is the main site, which also contains updates and a missing list.
Recent US Army Field Manuals (since 2001, covering the war on terror)

In preparation are sites on US Air Force manuals, US Navy Manuals, and Ukrainian Army Manuals. No fixed timeline for publication, though, as usually. Plus there are a couple of game reports in our inbox, we hope to be able to put those up, too, at some point.

Publications by the Austro-Hungarian Kriegsarchiv

The Austro-Hungarian Kriegsarchiv in Vienna traces its roots back to the foundation of the “Ständiger Kriegs-Rath” by German Emperor Maximilian II. With the advent of historism and mass printing, the Kriegsarchiv started to produce a remarkable amount of publications about the military history of Austria-Hungary. These volumes, while certainly biased and not up to modern scientific standards, contain a wealth of information dug from the imperial archives, and will continue to searve as valuable sources for German military history.

Das Kriegsjahr 1683

nach Acten und anderen authentischen Quellen dargestellt in der Abteilung für Kriegsgeschichte des K. K. Kriegs-Archivs, 1883

Feldzüge des Prinzen Eugen von Savoyen

1. (I. Serie I. Band) Einleitung zur Darstellung der Feldzüge des Prinzen Eugen von Savoyen, Wien 1876
2. (I. Serie II. Band) Feldzüge gegen die Türken 1697-1698. Karlowitzer Friede 1699,  Wien 1876
3. (I. Serie III. Band) Band Spanischer Successions-Krieg. Feldzug 1701, Wien 1878
4. (I. Serie IV. Band) Band Spanischer Successions-Krieg. Feldzug 1702, Wien 1877,
5. (I. Serie V. Band) Band Spanischer Successions-Krieg. Feldzug 1703, Wien 1878
6. (I. Serie VI. Band) Spanischer Successions-Krieg. Feldzug 1704, Wien 1879
7. (I. Serie VII. Band) Spanischer Successions-Krieg. Feldzug 1705, Wien 1879
8. (I. Serie VIII. Band) Spanischer Successions-Krieg. Feldzug 1706, Wien 1879
9. (I. Serie IX. Band) Spanischer Successions-Krieg. Feldzug 1707, Wien 1883
10. (II. Serie I. Band) Spanischer Successions-Krieg. Feldzug 1708, Wien 1885
11. (II. Serie II. Band) Spanischer Successions-Krieg. Feldzug 1709
12. (II. Serie III. Band) Spanischer Successions-Krieg. Feldzug 1710, Wien 1887
13. (II. Serie IV. Band) Spanischer Successions-Krieg. Feldzug 1711, Wien 1887
14. (II. Serie V. Band) Spanischer Successions-Krieg. Feldzug 1712, Wien 1889
15. (II. Serie VI. Band) Spanischer Successions-Krieg. Feldzug 1713, Wien 1892
16. (II. Serie VII. Band) Spanischer Successions-Krieg. Feldzug 1716, Wien 1891
17. (II. Serie VIII. Band) Der Türken-Krieg 1716-1718. Feldzug 1718, Wien 1891
18. (II. Serie IX. Band) Kämpfe der Kaiserlichen in Sizilien und Korsica 1717-1720 und 1730-1732
19. (II. Serie X. Band) Polnischer Throhnfolge-Krieg. Feldzüge 1733 und 1734, Wien 1891
20. (II. Serie XI. Band) Polnischer Throhnfolge-Krieg. Feldzug 1735
Orts- Namen- und Sach-Register, Wien 1892

Österreichischer Erbfolge-Krieg 1740-1748

Nach Feldakten und anderen authentischen Quellen bearbeitet in der kriegsgeschichtlichen Abteilung des k.u.k Kriegsarchivs von Aurel von le Beau und Rudolf von Hödl

Volume  I. Part1, Wien 1896
Volume I, Part 2, Wien 1896
Volume  II, Wien 1897
Volume III, Wien 1898
Volume IV, Wien 1914
Volume V, Wien 1904
Volume VI, Wien 1905
Volume VII, Wien 1905
Volume VIII, Wien 1905

Geschichte der Kämpfe Österreichs. Kriege unter der Regierung des Kaisers Franz

Im Auftrag des K. und K. Chefs des Generalstabes herausgegeben von der Direktion des K. und K. Kriegsarchivs ·

Teil 1: Der Krieg gegen die Französische Revolution, 1792-1797
Band 1: Einleitung, Wien 1905
Band 2: Der Feldzug 1792, Wien 1905

Teil 2: Der Krieg 1809
Band I: Regensburg, Wien 1905
Band II: Italien, Wien 1905
Band III:

Kriegs-Chronik Österreich-Ungarns

Militärischer Führer auf den Kriegsschauplätzen der Monarchie (all volumes have been scanned into one file)

I. Theil : Der (nordwestliche) Kriegsschauplatz : Böhmen, Mähren, Schlesien. Wien 1885
II. Theil: Der südwestliche Kriegsschauplatz im Donauthale und in den österreichischen Alpenländern. Wien 1886
III. Theil: Der südöstliche Kriegsschauplatz in den Ländern der ungarischen Krone, in Dalmatien und Bosnien. Wien 1887
IV. Theil: Der nordöstliche Kriegsschauplatz in Galizien und der Bukowina. Wien 1891

Österreichs Kämpfe im Jahre 1866

1. Band. Die Kriegsvorbereitungen, Wien 1869, 352 pages
2. Band. Der Krieg in Italien. Wien 1869,
3. Band, Der Krieg in Böhmen 1: Vom Beginn der Feindseligkeiten bis nach der Schlacht von Königgrätz. Wien 1869,
4. Band. Der Krieg in Böhmen 2: Vom 4. Juli bis zum Friedenschluss im Norden und Süden. Wien 1869, 294 pages
5. Band. Der Krieg auf dem Adriatischen Meere. Wien 1869, 426 pages

Various

Biografien K.K. Heerführer und Generale, Wien 1888

Der Krieg in Italien, Nach den Feld-Acten und anderen authentischen Quellen bearbeitet durch die Abtheilung für Kriegsgeschichte des K.K. Kriegsarchivs
3 Band: 1876, 490 pages

Die Occupation Bosniens und der Hercegovina durch K. K. Truppen im Jahre 1878, Wien 1879
Der Aufstand in der Hercegovina, Süd-Bosnien und SüdDalmatien 1881-1882, Wien 1883

Mitteilungen des K und K. Kriegsarchivs

Mittheilungen des K.K. Kriegs-Archivs 1. (1876)
Mittheilungen des K.K. Kriegs-Archivs 2. (1877)
Mittheilungen des K.K. Kriegs-Archivs 3. (1878)
Mittheilungen des K.K. Kriegs-Archivs – Österreichs Kriege seit 1495 (1878)
Mittheilungen des K.K. Kriegs-Archivs – Die Occupation Bosniens und der Herzegovina (1879)
Mittheilungen des K.K. Kriegs-Archivs – Beigabe (1879)
Mittheilungen des K.K. Kriegs-Archivs (1881)
Mittheilungen des K.K. Kriegs-Archivs (1882)
Mittheilungen des K.K. Kriegs-Archivs (1883)
Mittheilungen des K.K. Kriegs-Archivs (1884)
Mittheilungen des K.K. Kriegs-Archivs (1885)
Mittheilungen des K.K. Kriegs-Archivs (1886)

Mittheilungen des K.K. Kriegs-Archivs 1. (Neue Folge, 1887)
Mittheilungen des K.K. Kriegs-Archivs 2. (Neue Folge, 1888)
Mittheilungen des K.K. Kriegs-Archivs 3. (Neue Folge, 1889)
Mittheilungen des k.u.k. Kriegs-Archivs 4. (Neue Folge, 1889)
Mittheilungen des k.u.k. Kriegs-Archivs 5. (Neue Folge, 1891)
Mittheilungen des k.u.k. Kriegs-Archivs 6. (Neue Folge, 1892)
Mittheilungen des k.u.k. Kriegs-Archivs – Supplement (1892)
Mittheilungen des k.u.k. Kriegs-Archivs 7. (Neue Folge, 1893)
Mittheilungen des k.u.k. Kriegs-Archivs 8. (Neue Folge, 1894)
Mittheilungen des k.u.k. Kriegs-Archivs 9. (Neue Folge, 1895)
Mittheilungen des k.u.k. Kriegs-Archivs 10. (Neue Folge, 1898)

Mittheilungen des k.u.k. Kriegs-Archivs – Supplement. Geschichte K. und K. Wehrmacht 1. (1898)
Mittheilungen des k.u.k. Kriegs-Archivs – Supplement. Geschichte K. und K. Wehrmacht 2. (1898)

Mittheilungen des k.u.k. Kriegs-Archivs 11. (Neue Folge, 1899)
Mittheilungen des k.u.k. Kriegs-Archivs 12. (Neue Folge, 1900)
Mittheilungen des k.u.k. Kriegs-Archivs – Supplement. Geschichte K. und K. Wehrmacht 3/1. (1901)
Mittheilungen des k.u.k. Kriegs-Archivs – Supplement. Geschichte K. und K. Wehrmacht 3/2. (1901)

Mittheilungen des k.u.k. Kriegs-Archivs 1. (Dritte Folge, 1902)
Mittheilungen des k.u.k. Kriegs-Archivs 2. (Dritte Folge, 1903)
Mittheilungen des k.u.k. Kriegs-Archivs – Supplement. Geschichte K. und K. Wehrmacht 5. (1903)
Mitteilungen des k.u.k. Kriegs-Archivs 3. (Dritte Folge, 1904)
Mitteilungen des k.u.k. Kriegs-Archivs – Supplement. Geschichte der K. und K. Wehrmacht 4. (1905)
Mitteilungen des k.u.k. Kriegs-Archivs 4. (Dritte Folge, 1906)
Mitteilungen des k.u.k. Kriegs-Archivs 5. (Dritte Folge, 1907)
Mitteilungen des k.u.k. Kriegs-Archivs 6. (Dritte Folge, 1909)
Mitteilungen des k.u.k. Kriegs-Archivs – Supplement. Erzherzog Johanns „Feldzugserzählung” 1809 (1909)
Mitteilungen des k.u.k. Kriegs-Archivs 7. (Dritte Folge, 1911)
Mitteilungen des k.u.k. Kriegs-Archivs 8. (Dritte Folge, 1914)

Catalogues and Bibliographies

Katalog der Bibliothek-Abteilung des K und K. Kriegsarchivs

Band I, Erster Teil, Wien 1896 – Kriegswissenschaften und Heerwesen im Allgemeinen, Truppenkunde, Heeresorganisation ; Heeres-Ergänzung und Verwaltung, Personalvorschriften ; Truppenausbildung, Dienst und Exercieren ; Kriegskunst ; Waffenwesen und Artillerie

Band II, Zweiter Teil, Wien 1896 – Kriegs- und allgemeine Baukunst ; Technologie und Verkehrswesen, Militär-, Train- und Pferdewesen ; Terrainkunde ; Seewesen ; Mathematik ; Naturwissenschaften ; Sanitätswesen ; Geographie, Statistik, Volkswirtschaft, Reisen

Band II, Erster Teil, Wien 1897 – Kriegsgeschichte ; Heeres- und Truppen-Geschichte ; Militär-Schemata

Band II, Zweiter Teil, Wien 1897 – Allgemeine und Staatengeschichte

Band II, Dritter Teil, Wien 1897 – Biographien, Mémoires und Correspondenzen ; Staats- und Rechtswissenschaft, Culturgeschichte und Religionswesen ; Philosophie, Unterrichtswesen ; Sprachwissenschaft, Literatur und Kunst ; Encyklopädie ; Bibliothekswissenschaft, Bücherkunde und Archivwesen

1. Nachtrag, Erster Teil, Wien 1905 – 1, Nachtr. 1 / Von 1897 bis Ende 1904

1. Nachtrag, Zweiter Teil, Wien 1905, 2, Nachtr. 1 / Von 1897 bis Ende 1904

1. Nachtrag, Autorenverzeichnis, Wien 1905, Nachtr. 1 / Von 1897 bis Ende 1904

Hungarian Weapons Statistics

1941 Hungarian Unit Manpower and Weapon Totals

Bdr XMtn XSec XCav XMot Inf X
Men700067005300?70008500
Officers250250200?350375
LMG180159few228192
HMG4538few8270
20mm ATR1512none5133
37mm AT2020none2020
40mm AA66666
51mm Mtr30241432
81mm Mtr2016none2824
75mm Guns2024none8none
76.5mm Gunsnonenonenone8none
105mm Hownonenonenone1624
149mm How22nonenonenone
Arm Carsnone5none1212
Tankettesnonenonenone3030
Lt Tanksnonenonenone2020

Abbreviations:
LMG-Light Machinegun; SMG-Submachinegun; MMG-Medium Machinegun; ATR-Anti-tank Rifle; AT-Anti-tank; AA-Anti-aircraft; XX-Division; II-Battalion; Bttys-Batteries; Eng-Engineer; Art-Artillery; Arm-Armor; Cav-Cavalry; Chem-Chemical

Sources:
Dombrády, Lóránd and Tóth, Sándor. A Magyar Királyi Honvédség 1919-1945; Zrínyi Katonai, 1987
Szabo, Peter. “A 2. Magyar Hadsereg Feszerelése és Fegyverzete a Frontra Kivonulása Idején: 1942 Aprilis-Május”; Hadtörténelmi Közlemények, 1985/3
Szabo, Peter. “A 2. Magyar Hadsereg Kiszállítása Ukrajnába és Elonyomulása a Donhoz: 1942 Aprilis-Augusztus”; Hadtörténelmi Közlemények, 1986/3
Tóth, Sándor. Magyarország Hadtörténete; A Kiegyezéstol Napjainkig, 1985

Hungarian-built AFV Specifications

NameTurán ITurán IITurán IIIToldi IToldi IIToldi III
Typetanktanktanklt. tanklt. tanklt. tank
Weight (mt)18.219.223.38.79.39.4
Armor, in mm8-608-5035-95?-13?-2323-35
Main gun, in mm40L5175L2575L4320L6540L5140L51
muzzle velocity (m/sec)812400550735812812
ammunition carried1015632?54?
Machine-guns2x 8mm2x 8mm2x 8mm1x 8mm1x 8mm1x 8mm
Max road speed (kph)47.24340504848
Range, road (km)165150120220220220
Ground pressure (kg/sq cm)0.780.830.880.62?0.68??
Number built285139None???
NameZrínyi IZrínyi IINimrodCsaba
Typeassault gunassault gunSP AA gunarmored car
Weight (mt)22.021.510.55.9
Armor, in mm25-10025-75?-137-13
Main gun, in mm75L43105L20.540L6020L65
muzzle velocity (m/sec)?448850735
ammunition carried7052148200
Machine-guns1x 8mm1x 8mmnone1x 8mm
Max road speed (kph)40406065
Range, road (km)220220250150
Ground pressure (kg/sq cm)0.930.91??
Number built466??

Note: Prototypes are not included in the numbers built.

Turán I deliveries commenced June 1942 and were completed in late 1943. By 30 October 1943 242 had been delivered.

Turán II deliveries began 15 May 1943 and were slow to increase. By the end of September, only 49 had been delivered, but a month later numbers had increased to 74. Production ceased after the German occupation in mid-1944.

Only one prototype was completed of the Turán III.

Sources:
Dunigan, Paul. Letter
Kliment, Charles K., and Francev, Vladimír. Czechoslovak Armored Fighting Vehicles 1918-1948; Atglen, PA: Schiffer, 1997
Niehorster, Dr. Leo. Personal communication.
Probst, J.C.M. “The Hungarian Turan Tank and its Variations”; AFV News, Jan, 1977

The Hungarian 2. Army in Russia

The Germans began negotiations during the winter of 1942 to secure more troops from their allies to complete the conquest of the Soviet Union. The Hungarians were persuaded to send some 200,000 troops in their Second Army for front-line duties to supplement the troops on occupation duties, but the Germans would have to replace the equipment lost during fall campaign by the Mobile Corps (Gyorhadtest). Former Belgian and Czech equipment, as well some of German manufacture, was transferred during the early winter of 1942 to the 1 armored and 9 light divisions that comprised the Second Army.

Structure

Light Division

A light division had 2 infantry regiments and a field artillery regiment as well as a hussar squadron, a 40mm AA battery, and an AA machinegun company under command. Each infantry regiment had 3 infantry battalions as well as a company of 81mm mortars, an anti-tank company with a mix of 47mm and 50mm guns, a motorized machinegun company, an pioneer company and a battery of 80mm field guns. Curiously these latter units weren’t organized into a heavy weapons battalion like most other armies. Each rifle battalion had three rifle companies and a heavy weapons company equipped with platoons of medium machine-guns, 81mm mortars and 47mm AT guns. The field artillery regiment had 2 battalions, one with a battery of 76.5mm field guns and a battery of German leFH 105mm howitzers and the other with four batteries, two with 100mm Skoda Model 14 howitzers and two with 150mm modernized Skoda 14/39 M. howitzers. Each battery had four guns.

One source states that a reconnaissance battalion was added to the infantry divisions after November ’42. Due to the language difficulties, I’m not yet able to confirm this.

I’m not exactly sure why the Hungarians called their infantry divisions “light (könnyu)”, but it’s probably because they only had two regiments rather than the three found in most other army’s infantry divisions. The “light” name wasn’t used for the three regiment divisions organized from mid-1943.

Armored Division

The 1st Field Armored Division (1. tábori páncéloshadostzály) had the 30th Tank Regiment and the 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment as its primary components. The 30th Tank Regiment comprised a company of engineers and two tank battalions, each with one heavy tank company of 11 Pz IVs and two medium tank companies of Pz 38(t)s. The 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment consisted of three motorized rifle battalions and a motorcycle company. Each battalion consisted of three rifle companies and a motorized machinegun company with platoons of medium machineguns, 81mm mortars and 37mm AT guns. Divisional troops were the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, consisting of a light tank company of Toldi I tanks, a company of Csaba armored cars, a motorcycle infantry company, and a platoon of 50mm AT guns and the 51st Armored Anti-aircraft Battalion with 3 companies of Nimrod self-propelled AA guns. The divisional artillery consisted of the 1st and 5th Motorized Artillery Battalions, each with three four-gun batteries of 105mm leFH 18M howitzers and the 51st Anti-aircraft Battalion had two batteries of 80mm Bofors Model 29 AA guns. One source, however, gives the designation for this last unit as the IInd. As deployed it totaled 108 PzKw 38(t)s, 22 PzKw IV (kurz), 17 Toldi Is, 19 Nimrods, and 14 Csaba armored cars, though some sources claim tht it had only 89 Pz 38(t)s.

Corps Troops

Each corps was organized identically, I think, with a bicycle battalion of two bicycle companies, a hussar (cavalry) squadron with an organic battery of 80mm horse artillery, an anti-aircraft battalion with a company each of 40mm and 80mm AA guns, and an engineer battalion of two companies. Artillery support was provided by an artillery battalion of two four-gun batteries of 149mm Skoda M14 howitzers and a motorized heavy battalion with two four-gun batteries of 150mm Bofors Model 31 howitzers.

Army Troops

The 101st Towed Heavy Artillery Battalion initially had just one battery of Italian 210/22 modello 35 howitzers, but added another battery of 150mm Bofors Model 31 howitzers by the end of the year, possibly acquired from the 150th.

The 150th Motorized Heavy Artillery Battalion initially comprised 3 batteries of Bofors 150mm howitzers, but by 1943 had managed to acquire a battery of 305mm Skoda siege guns (German aid?), a battery of Soviet 203mm B-4 howitzers and a battery of 152mm Soviet howitzers.

The 101st Antiaircraft Battalion had three batteries of 80mm and one battery of 40mm AA guns. The 151st Motorized Engineer Battalion was only partially motorized as two companies of its engineers were motorized while the other two were mounted on bicycles. It also controlled two assault boat companies. There was also the 101st Motorized Chemical Battalion that had a company of 72 flame-throwers. The 106th and 107th Independent Automatic 40mm AA Batteries were also assigned to the 2. Army.

Equipment

The Hungarian Army used the progenitor of the MG 34 as their LMG and modernized Austro-Hungarian Schwarloze 07/12 machine guns were used in the medium/heavy MG role. Some engineer and signal units used ex-Yugoslav Bren guns. Mortars were a mix of German and Hungarian-manufactured 50mm and 81mm models. Company-level anti-tank defense was provided by two 20mm Solothurn s18-1100 anti-tank rifles. Anti-tank guns were a hodgepodge of Czech 37mm, Belgian 47mm and German 50mm guns. Artillery was a grab bag of partly modernized Austro-Hungarian weapons and modern Swedish, Italian and German guns. Sweden provided all of Hungary’s AA guns, including the famed 40mm Bofors.

Hungarian production of armored fighting vehicles was a relatively recent development with Swedish-designed Csaba armored cars and Toldi light tanks in service. The Csaba was an design of which little information has survived. The first versions of the Toldi were armed with a 20mm gun, probably adapted from the Madsen 20L65, but later models were armed with a cut-down Bofors 40mm. The evidence is uncertain, but most, if not all the Toldis in use in 1942-3 were early models with the 20mm gun.

Hungary requested a license for the PzKw III and IV, but was turned down to avoid upsetting the Romanians. A license was granted to build a Czech medium tank design, the Skoda T-22, as this was less provocative to the Romanians; and they had the oil.

Called Turans by the Hungarians, the first T-22s weren’t delivered until late ’42 and the Germans delivered 108 PzKw 38(t)s and 22 PzKw IVs to allow 1st Field Armored Division to deploy to the Eastern Front. The precise models of both tanks are unknown, but the PzKw IVs were definitely armed with short-barreled guns. Whether the PzKw 38(t)s were delivered fresh from the factory or refurbished is also unknown, but the Ausf G model was in production when they were transferred to the Hungarians. Photographic evidence indicates that at least some PzKw 38(t) Ausf Gs were in Hungarian service. The Nimrod was a Swedish-designed self-propelled 40mm AA gun that used the basic Toldi chassis. The Hungarians, desperate for anti-tank vehicles, used them as such.

41M Turán II – Hungarian Medium tank at Kubinka Museum. Credit: Alan Wilson, 2012

41M Turán II – Hungarian Medium tank at Kubinka Museum. Credit: Alan Wilson, 2012

The Hungarians called their ordinary infantry division-equivalent light brigades, but the units of the Second Army were heavily reinforced and termed light divisions with 14,000 men assigned. They seem to have been influenced by the Italian model as they were structured much like Italian binary divisions, as you can see from the unit organizations above, and normally totaled about 12,500 men without the reinforcements attached to the divisions of the Second Army.

The divisions of III Corps, being the first to arrive in theater, were less well equipped than the later arriving units. They had a 47mm AT gun rather than the 50mm in the regimental AT companies. Similarly the battalion level AT guns were 37mm rather than the usual 47mm. By November ’42 the Hungarians fielded 43 75mm Pak 97/38 (75L36) AT guns. My guess is that they were distributed pretty evenly between the divisions.

Unit Designations and Assignments:

Generally, only the infantry regiments had designations different from the parent brigade. Only non-divisional units corroborated by two sources are shown below. However I feel fairly confident that each corps did field a cavalry squadron.

III Corps

  • 6th Light Division; 22nd and 52nd Infantry Regiments
  • 7th Light Division; 4th and 35th Infantry Regiments
  • 9th Light Division; 17th and 47th Infantry Regiments
  • III Motorized Heavy Artillery Battalion
  • 5/II Artillery battalion
  • VI Bicycle Battalion
  • III Engineer Battalion
  • III AA Battalion
  • 1st Cavalry Squadron

IV Corps

  • 10th Light Division; 6th and 36th Infantry Regiments
  • 12th Light Division; 18th and 48th Infantry Regiments
  • 13th Light Division; 7th and 31st Infantry Regiments
  • IV Motorized Heavy Artillery Battalion
  • 24/III Artillery Battalion
  • VIII Bicycle Battalion
  • IV Engineer Battalion
  • IV AA Battalion

VII Corps

  • 19th Light Division; 13th and 43rd Infantry Regiments
  • 20th Light Division; 14th and 23rd Infantry Regiments
  • 23rd Light Division; 25th and 51st Infantry Regiments
  • VII Motorized Heavy Artillery Battalion
  • 21/II Artillery Battalion
  • IX Bicycle Battalion
  • VII Engineer Battalion
  • VII AA Battalion

Sources:

Abbot, Peter and Thomas, Nigel. Germany’s Eastern Front Allies, 1941-1945; Osprey, 1982
Dombrády, Lóránd and Tóth, Sándor. A Magyar Királyi Honvédség 1919-1945; Zrínyi Katonai, 1987
Szabo, Peter. “A 2. Magyar Hadsereg Feszerelése és Fegyverzete a Frontra Kivonulása Idején: 1942 Aprilis-Május”; Hadtörténelmi Közlemények, 1985/3
Szabo, Peter. “A 2. Magyar Hadsereg Kiszállítása Ukrajnába és Elonyomulása a Donhoz: 1942 Aprilis-Augusztus”; Hadtörténelmi Közlemények, 1986/3
Tóth, Sándor. Magyarország Hadtörténete; A Kiegyezéstol Napjainkig, 1985

Hungarian participation in Barbarossa

The Germans initially had no desire for Hungarian participation in Barbarossa which suited most of the Hungarian leadership quite well. But the Germans, meeting more resistance than they anticipated, said that they would welcome any voluntary contribution made by the Hungarians the day after Barbarossa began. This changed the situation radically and the Hungarians compromised by breaking relations with the USSR. This was hardly satisfactory to the pro-German faction within the Hungarian government and the Honved (military), but they weren’t able to do anything more until the Hungarian city of Kassa (Kosice) was bombed, reputedly by the Soviets, on the 26th of June.

The Hungarian Dictator Horthy Miklós and Adolf Hitler, 1938. Credit: Ladislav Luppa

The Hungarian Dictator Horthy Miklós and Adolf Hitler, 1938. Credit: Ladislav Luppa

A Soviet attack on neutral Hungary makes no sense unless it occurred by accident, but it could well have been a provocation staged by the Germans or Romanians to “encourage” Hungarian participation. One Hungarian fighter pilot reported engaging three German-manufactured He 111H bombers flying southeast after Kassa had been bombed. The He 111 was in both German and Romanian service at the time. Any number of theories have been advanced over the years, but nothing has been settled.

The attack enraged Adm. Horthy who decided upon an emphatic response. The pro-German faction got its wish; Hungary would join the attack on the USSR As the Honved was totally unprepared for war, mobilization of selected reservists and the impressment of civilian motor vehicles took several days more than anticipated even though only those forces designated to invade the Soviet Union were mobilized. These were the Carpathian Group which comprised VIII. Corps and the Gyorshadtest (Mobile Corps). VIII. Corps contributed the 1st Mountain and the 8th Border Guard Brigades as well as all of its corps troops. The Gyorshadtest comprised the 1st and 2nd Motorized Infantry Brigades as well as the 1st Cavalry Brigade and, some sources claim, the 15th Bicycle Battalion from 2nd Cavalry Brigade. Other corps contributed bicycle infantry and anti-aircraft battalions as well as two-gun batteries of 150mm artillery. These units were the best available to the Hungarians, even the Border Guards, and were definitely a cut above the rest of the Honved.

The 1st Mountain Brigade was organized into four mountain infantry battalions, plus an artillery battalion of two batteries, each with four 75mm pack or mountain guns. A platoon of two 149mm howitzers was attached for the duration of the campaign. Each mountain infantry battalion had three companies of mountain infantry, each with twelve LMGs, two 51mm mortars and a 20mm anti-tank rifle, a machine-gun company of nine HMGs, a battery of four 75mm pack or mountain guns, a platoon of four 81mm mortars, an anti-tank platoon of four guns, an engineer platoon as well as a reconnaissance detachment. Under the direct control of the brigade were a company of 6 motorized 40mm Bofors AA guns, an anti-tank company of four guns, a motorized anti-aircraft company of ten AAMGs, a cavalry company, an engineer company as well as a platoon each of motorcyclists and five Csaba armored cars.

8th Border Guards Brigade controlled far less at the brigade level than its compatriot in VIII. Corps, namely a motorized anti-aircraft company, an engineer company and a platoon of two 149mm howitzers. All units, even the five border guard battalions, were organized identically to the units in 1st Mountain Brigade.

The motorized infantry brigades were composed of an motorized infantry regiment, two bicycle infantry battalions, an armored reconnaissance battalion, a motorized artillery battalion, a motorized engineer battalion as well as the standard motorized flak and AAMG companies. The motorized infantry regiment had three battalions, each with three infantry companies, each with twelve LMGs, two 51mm mortars and two anti-tank rifles, a machine-gun company with twelve HMGs and four 81mm mortars, an anti-tank platoon of four guns and an engineer platoon. The bicycle battalions were organized identically to the motorized infantry battalions with the exceptions that all units were motorized except the bicycle companies themselves and the addition of a artillery battery of four 105mm howitzers and a platoon of five Italian CV 33 tankettes. The armored reconnaissance battalion had a company of ten Csaba armored cars, a company of twenty CV 33 tankettes, a light tank company of twenty Toldi Is, a motorized infantry company organized like those in the motorized infantry battalions, except that it had three anti-tank rifles, as well as motorized platoons of engineers, medium mortars, and anti-tank guns. The artillery battalion had four batteries, each with four 105mm howitzers. The engineer battalion had only one company of combat engineers and a bridging column.

The cavalry brigade was, quite probably, the most powerful unit of its type in Eastern Europe due to its extensive supporting arms and numerous heavy weapons. It had two hussar regiments, two bicycle infantry battalions, an armored reconnaissance battalion, a motorized artillery battalion, a horse artillery battalion, a motorized engineer company and bridge column as well as the standard motorized light flak and AAMG companies totalling 7350 officers and men. Each regiment had two hussar battalions in addition to a four-gun battery of horse-drawn 75mm mountain guns, a mounted engineer platoon, a motorized platoon of anti-tank guns, and a platoon of tankettes. Each hussar battalion had three companies of cavalry with twelve LMGs and three anti-tank rifles and a mounted machine-gun company of twelve HMGs and four medium mortars. The bicycle, engineer, and armored reconnaissance battalions were organized exactly like those in the motorized infantry brigades. The motorized artillery battalion differed only in that it had but two batteries of 105mm howitzers. The horse artillery battalion had two four-gun batteries of 76.5mm guns.

My sources are rather contradictory about the identities of the non-divisional units assigned to the Carpathian Group so the information given below must be regarded as less than reliable. I do know that VIII. Corps contributed its bicycle, heavy artillery and AA battalions while other corps contributed the odd battalion or so.

The VIth and VIIIth bicycle battalions were far weaker than their compatriots assigned to the Mobile Corps as they lacked the machine-gun company, artillery battery, tankette platoon, and anti-tank rifles of their more powerful brethren. Their anti-tank platoon only mustered two guns and a machine-gun section of two HMGs was substituted for the machine-gun company. It appears that these units were exchanged with two others sometime after July as my primary source mentions the IInd and VIIth battalions in September and doesn’t mention either of the first two after 7 July, after VIII. Corps had requested their return to Hungary on 3 July as they were considered to be combat ineffective due to breakdowns and tire shortages! Hence my tentative conclusion that they were replaced by the other two. With that in mind I’ve given the Hungarians the ability to replace them for free.

Each of the nine corps in the Honved had one of these bicycle battalions for reconnaissance duties, except I. Corps. No higher headquarters existed for them, so I’ve had to group them by their parent armies. The ID used is First Army because it only had two battalions in its subordinate corps.

The corps motorized heavy artillery battalions were severely under strength in 1941 with only two 150mm howitzers in each of their two batteries. VIII. Corps provided its complete battalion, but I., III., VI. and VII. Corps only provided a single battery. I’ve amalgamated them into a single weak counter with the ID of the Carpathian Group as this only lasted for the duration of the campaign.

In contrast to the other arms the anti-aircraft artillery participated in strength. I., V., and VIII. Corps contributed their complete motorized AA battalions. In addition the 6th, 9th, and 14th motorized light AA batteries were assigned to the Carpathian Group from the infantry brigades of the same number. Each anti-aircraft battalion had one battery of four heavy and another of six light AA guns. Each of the motorized light batteries was organized as above. In addition to the above units, one source mentions the 105th Motorized AA Battalion which had the same structure as the corps-level units. Including the 105th the Hungarians have around three points of flak including the flak organic to the brigades. Rather than give some of these brigades an intrinsic flak strength, I decided to show it as a separate unit with the Karpat ID as it is stronger than the usual army-level amalgamation would be. None of it seems to have advanced with the Mobile Corps after VIII. Corps was halted on the Dneister and this allows me to restrict it as well.

The only combat engineers with the Carpathian Group were VIIIth Combat Engineer Battalion and the 151st and 152nd Motorized Combat Engineer Companies. As VIIIth Battalion had two companies, both non-motorized, I decided to round the movement factor down to eight (non-combat/motorized) given the Hungarians’ systemic problems with vehicle maintenance and supplies.

Infantry weapons consisted of the 8mm Huzagol 35 M. rifle, a few of the excellent 9mm 39 M. submachine-gun as it was just entering service, the ancestor of the German MG 34, the 30 M., as the LMG, and modernized Austro-Hungarian Schwarzlose 07/12 machine guns in the medium/heavy MG role. Mortars were a mix of German and Hungarian-manufactured 51mm and 81mm models. Anti-tank defense was provided by license-built 20mm Solothurn s18-1100 anti-tank rifles and German 37mm guns. Artillery was a grab bag of modernized Austro-Hungarian Skoda 75mm 15 M. mountain guns, 149mm 14 M. howitzers, modern German 105mm 1eFH 18 howitzers and Swedish 150mm Model 31 howitzers. Sweden also provided all of Hungary¹s AA guns, including the famed 40mm Bofors and the far more obscure 8cm. The horse artillery used the ancient Skoda 05/08 76.5mm gun.

AFVs assigned to the Mobile Corps totaled 140 CV 33 tankettes bought from Italy, 49 license-built Csaba armored cars and 80 Toldi I light tanks. Both of the latter were armed with a 20mm gun adapted from the Solothurn anti-tank rifle.

The Carpathian Group began its attack on 30 June with attempts to clear the passes through the Carpathians. The defenders demolished many of the roads and bridges in the area which slowed down the advance considerably. The Soviets surprised the Hungarians with their skillful delaying tactics, but the Soviets made no real effort to hold on to the area between the Carpathians and the Dneister. The Hungarians reached the Dneister by 6 July delayed more by supply problems than by the Soviet defense. The units of VIII Corps were relegated to occupation duties after reaching the Dneister, but the Mobile Corps, with the addition of VIIIth Bicycle Battalion, was placed under command of Army Group South and continued on despite immense supply difficulties and numerous breakdowns. It breached the Stalin Line against light resistance during mid-July and continued to advance as Soviet defenses toughened. By month’s end the Corps’ logistics situation had become perilous as it had out-run its supply lines. Its commander requested a week-long pause to recuperate, but this was ignored by the Germans.

Forced to continue its advance, it cooperated with 1st Panzer Group to pocket Soviet forces near Uman in early August. Afterwards, it headed south to Nikolaev with the objective of cutting the Soviet 9th Army’s line of retreat in cooperation with the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps. Despite heavy Soviet counter-attacks, the 2nd Motorized Infantry Brigade entered Nikolaev from the west as the 16th Panzer Division entered from the east. The aggressive Soviets did succeed, however, in preventing the majority of 9th Army’s troops from being encircled.

The Corps finally got its well-deserved rest after the capture of Nikolaev as it was placed in reserve at Krivoi Rog from 24 August. This only lasted a week or so as the Corps was to defend a 200 km (120 mile) stretch of the Dnepr River from Dnepropetrovsk to Nikopol while the 1st and 2nd Panzer Groups encircled the Soviet Southwestern Front behind Kiev. The most dangerous part of this sector was the island opposite Zaporozhe. The cavalry brigade provided the corps reserve with two hussar battalions, but the rest of its troops were distributed among the motorized infantry brigades.

Nowhere were the Hungarians strong enough to do much more than deploy in widely dispersed strong points supplemented with a line of sentry posts. The Soviets were continually raiding across the river, usually in less than battalion strength, and the Hungarians were hard-pressed to defeat these raiders. The Soviets were particularly troublesome around Zaporozhe Island and Nikopol. In fact a multi-battalion attack on 5 September evicted the two battalions defending the island. The first attempt to retake the island by 14th Cycle Battalion failed and the sector commander had to be evacuated to the rear with nervous exhaustion. The next highest-ranking officer present reported himself sick and his replacement reported his troops to exhausted to attack.

Hungarian Convoy with artillery movers in the Ukraine, 1942, Credit: FORTEPAN / Csorba Dániel

Hungarian Convoy with artillery movers in the Ukraine, 1942, Credit: FORTEPAN / Csorba Dániel

It was obvious that the Hungarians had been given more than they could handle and either had to be reinforced or made responsible for a smaller sector. 16th Panzer Division took over 1st Motorized Infantry Brigade’s sector which allowed it to move opposite Zaporozhe Island. This was only temporary as 16th Panzer was withdrawn on 13 September. This did not bode well for the Hungarians as they were completely shot. 2nd Motorized Brigade’s companies had lost half of their combat strength and more than two-thirds of the Corps’ armored vehicles were out of commission! Fortunately the rapidly developing encirclement around Kiev diverted Soviet attentions, and forces, further north to counter the German pincers. The German 4 Security Regiment arrived on 27 September, which allowed the severely weakened 1st Cavalry Brigade to be withdrawn from the front lines and sent home on 5 October.

It was replaced by IInd and VIIth Bicycle Battalions for the drive northeast from Dnepropetrovsk towards Izyum beginning on 11 October. Material shortages and the extensive mud forced the Hungarians to split their force in two parts, one with all the cross-country trucks, well-supplied with heavy weapons, and the other with all the less mobile units. The lead group reached the Donets River opposite Izyum on 28 October, but not before the Soviets had time to evacuate the riverbank and blow the bridges. The Hungarians were in no shape to attempt to cross the river in the teeth of the Soviet entrenchments and they were long overdue to be relieved. The primary delay had been the German requirement for the Hungarians to furnish security troops. They returned to Hungary beginning in the first half of November and were replaced by four security brigades, with a fifth arriving later.

These were formed from second and third-line reserves using the headquarters of regular infantry brigades, but without most of the support units that each normally had, although a cavalry company and a motorized light AA battery were assigned. Each was only at between 50 and 70% strength and was armed with very little other than small arms. They had no artillery at all and only a small number of machine-guns. Each of their two regiments had three battalions of infantry. To equalize the burden, the Honved assigned battalions from every corps district in the country rather than just use the normal battalions.

Losses suffered by the Hungarians in the campaign weren’t very high, a total of 4524 killed, or just over 10 percent of the 44,444 assigned to the Carpathian Group proper, but equipment losses were severe. 1200 motor vehicles, 28 guns and 30 aircraft were lost, as were all of the tankettes, 80% of the Toldi light tanks and 90% of the Csaba armored cars committed.

Air Force Operations

The Royal Hungarian Army Air Force initially contributed two squadrons each of Italian CR.32bis and CR.42 fighters as well as two squadrons each of Italian Ca.135bis and German Ju 86K-2 bombers as well as four squadrons of reconnaissance aircraft. This was reduced after July to two squadrons of CR.42s, and a squadron each of Ju 86K-2 and Ca.135bis bombers. A flight of Italian Re 2000s was deployed from August for combat evaluation. All aircraft returned to Hungary along with all of the rest of the Hungarians in November. These number are only in aggregate enough for a single Europa counter, and rather than inflict a Mxd aircraft counter on the Axis player, I decided to let him pick which one he would like to use.

The Spanish Army in 1936

by Alberto Arzanegui
This article appeared in the bulletin El Miliciano , nr. 1 (1993). Translated by Wolf Broszies

Without the Spanish Army there would not have been an insurgency in 1936. The leadership of the insurgency was composed nearly entirely from officers of the Army. The insurgent regiments and its soldiers constituted the backbone of the  nationalist side in the Civil War. The parts of the Army staying loyal to the government were not used in the same way, many of its regiments being dissolved and incorporated into the new brigades of the republic. This article discusses the state of the Army  in the summer of 36, right up to the nationalist insurgency.

The Army had for most parts adopted a passive attitude towards the newly declared republic Republic. The new civilian authorities undertook a rapid reform, mainly reducing the number of officers. Thus, in just one year, the number of men serving had gone from 190 generals and 20,303 officers and NCOs to 72 and 13,032 respectively. However the reformes failed to achive their main goal, which was a reduction in budget, which despite the reforms had to be increased. This and other decisions created nothing but discontent among the professional military. The second goal of the reforms, to keep the Army in its barracks, was not fulfilled either: Due to the volatile and violent political situation ts services were constantly needed to maintain law and order. Moroccan troops intervened for the first time in the Peninsula during the Sanjurpo rebellion. This increased the political power of the Army and contributed to its image as the last stalwart of order.

Reform and military resources

In the spring of 1936 the Republic decided to reduce the size of the Army for several reasons:

  • reduce the state budget
  • reduced need for national defense due to the political situation in Europe
  • the desirability of the Army not being disproportionate to principles of a prudent national policy oriented towards the maintenance of peace abroad and the conservation and defense of order and public freedoms in the interior.

At least, these were the official given reasons and conditions. As as result of the reform, the Army was established as follows:

    • Infantry: 40 regiments, 8 mountain battalions, two assault regiments, four machine gun battalions, one cyclist battalion, the Presidential Guard battalion, and the War Ministry group.
    • Cavalry: 10 regiments, a machine cannon group, the Central Repository of Remonta with two deposits of breeding and dressage.
    • Artillery: 16 light regiments, one regiment on horseback, four heavy regiments, four coast defense regiments, two regiments and a mountain group, three mixed groups, two anti-aircraft groups, three groups of artillery information, four army corps and eight divisional parks.
    • Engineers: A regiment of sappers-miners, eight battalions and a group of sappers, a battalion of bridgeing engineers, two regiments of railroad engineers, a regiment of airdome engineers, a transport regiment, four mixed groups of sappers and telegraph engineers, Central Park of Automobiles and a Center of Transmissions and Technical Studies.
    • Intendance: Eight divisional groups and two companies for the Balearic and Canary Islands plus sections at naval bases.
    • Medical: Two commissions with four divisional groups each, sections for the cavalry division and the mountain brigades, companies for the archipelagos and mobile veterinary evacuation sections.
    • Other forces: Republican music band, train corps, 16 mobilization and reservation centers and 60 recruiting boxes.
  • Army of Africa:
    • Spanish Foreign Legion: two legions (regiment-sized) to three banderas (bataillon-sized) plus one of deposit. Six battalions of light infantry, two groups of machine guns, two artillery groups, a battalion of sappers, a transport battalion, three quartermaster groups, two medical groups and two sea companies.
    • Regular Forces Indigenous: five grupos with three infantry tanks, and one cavalry. Ifni Forces: Ifni battalion with three infantry tanks and one cavalry, and the forces of Cape Juby and Rio de Oro. Jalifian Forces: Five Mehalas and Jalalian Police.
  • Forces in Guinea: The five companies of the Colonial Guard.

Army Structure and Command

The supreme head of the Army according to the constitution was the Minister of War. He exercised his authority through the Ministry of War and recieved advice by the Superior Council of War. The Ministry consisted of a subsecretariat in charge of administration and a Central Staff to which he had responsibility for everything related to war.

In place of the old captaincias general, eight Amry divisions were created that were in charge of everything related to instruction, discipline, services, administration, etc., of the units organic to or permanently assigned to them. Apart from these divisions, there were garrisons and autonomous regions such as the naval bases of Cadiz, El Ferrol and Cartagena, and regions such as Asturias, Baleares and Canarias. In case of war, the divisions would be grouped into three army corps: First Army Corps composed from the 1st and 2nd divisions and the cavalry division, second corps fomr the 3rd, 4rth and 5th divisions, and thrid Army corps from 6th, 7th and 8th divison. Each division consisted of:

  • A divisional headquarters.
  • Two infantry brigades to two regiments of two battalions each. Each of these consisted of four companies of infantry, a machine gun company plus a section of supporting arms. The regiments were established with two active battalions but enough equipment to outfit its third battalion at mobilization.
  • A cavalry squadron, with an automatic weapons section and another of infantry cyclist.
  • A light artillery brigade composed of two regiments, one of cannons and another of howitzers, both consisting of two groups of three batteries each. The regiments also had the necessary weapons to constitute their third group.
  • A battalion of sappers-miners from three companies plus a park.
  • A division park, quartermaster, health and transmission groups and veterinary and lighting sections.

Independent of these divisions existed the troops of corps of army and army:

  • Two mixed mountain brigades. Each with a headquarters; four mountain battalions grouped in two half-brigades; a mountain artillery regiment with two groups of howitzers, to three batteries each; a company of sappers-miners and sections of services.
  • Two regiments of two battalions of light tanks of combat and four battalions of machine guns, all dependent on the weapon of Infantry.
  • Eight regiments of infantry, same as divisions, for naval bases and autonomous regions.
  • A cavalry division with: Headquarters; three brigades of cavalry to two regiments of two groups, and each of them with two squadrons of sabers and another one of automatic arms; a group of cyclist infantry from a rifle company and another from machine guns; a group of machine-gun-guns of two squadrons; an artillery regiment on horseback with three groups of three batteries; a company of sappers on horseback and services.
  • Four regiments of cavalry, four squadrons of sabers and one of automatic weapons.
  • Four regiments of heavy artillery formed by two groups of three batteries each.
  • Four regiments of artillery of coast, for the naval bases.
  • Three mixed groups of artillery (light and mountain).
  • Two Defense Against Aircraft (DCA) groups, each consisting of two anti-aircraft guns and an infantry machine gun company.
  • A regiment of sappers-miners, from two battalions to four companies each.
  • A battalion of pontoneros with four units of bridges.
  • A regiment of railways formed by three battalions of three companies.
  • Two autonomous mixed groups with a company of sappers and another of telephones.
  • An artillery regiment.
  • Four artillery parks of corps of army.

…and the rest of service units.

The African Army

The protectorate of Morocco was divided into two military districts: the Oriental (areas of Melilla and Rif) and the Occidental (Ceuta, Tetuan and Larache). Command fell to a division general and his staff with residence in Tetuan. The troops were as follows:

Eastern District :

  • 1st Legion of the Third. In Tauima (Melilla), with the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Flags. Each flag had three companies of infantry and one of machine guns and machines of escort. During the war a fourth company will be added.
  • Groups of Regular Indigenous Forces Melilla nº 2 in Nador; and Alhucemas nº 5 in Segangán. Each had three infantry tanks and one cavalry. The infantry had three companies of rifles and one of machine guns, and of the cavalry three squadrons.
  • Eastern group of light infantry from Africa with battalions of hunters Melilla # 3 in Al Hoceima and Ceuta # 7 in Melilla. Each battalion has four companies of riflemen-grenadiers, one of machine guns, a section of machine of support, another of transmissions, another of workers and train of battalion.
  • Eastern group of artillery with its staff in Melilla and consisting of two groups, one in Melilla with three batteries of 105 mm and one of 155 mm, and the second in the Rif with three 105 mm batteries, all of them howitzers.
  • A mixed battalion of sappers-transmissions with four companies, two of each.
  • Group of machine guns of position of Melilla.

Western Circumscription :

  • 2nd Legion of the Third in Dar Riffien (Ceuta) with the 4th, 5th and 6th flags.
  • Groups of Regular Forces Indigenous Tetuán nª 1 in Tetuán, Ceuta nº 3 in Ceuta and Larache nº 4 in Alcazarquivir. Its structure was the same as the previous two with the exception of the cavalry, which in these were only two squadrons.
  • Western grouping of African hunters with battalions San Fernando nº 1 in Alcazarquivir, Las Navas nº 2 in Larache, Ceriñola nº 6 in Tetuán and Serrallo nº 8 in Ceuta. [At the time the Republic was established, there were five infantry regiments in Morocco, which were dissolved, numbers 40, 41, 42, 43 and 44. The latter gave rise to machine gun battalions No. 2 and No. 3, and the other four to eight battalions of hunters, who were numbered successively. During the ministry of Gil Robles, the numbers 4 and 5 were transformed into the groups of machine guns of position of Ceuta and Melilla.]
  • Western grouping of artillery with its first group of three batteries of 105 mm, one of 155 mm and another one of coast in Ceuta; and the second group in Larache with three 105 mm batteries. Also all of howitzers.
  • Mixed battalion of sappers.
  • Group of machine guns of position of Ceuta.

In addition, it would be necessary to include the service troops: quartermasters, medical, transport, etc, and two companies of marines in Ceuta and Melilla.

During the mandate of Gil Robles reinforced the artillery in the Protectorate with six new batteries: two of 75, two of 105, one of 150 and one of 155.

There were other forces on the African continent that were the Ifni Shooter Battalion, created on June 11, 1934 and with three infantry tanks (similar to regular groups) and one of my cavalry. The Forces of the Sahara, formed by three garrisons featured in Cape Juby (the largest with a disciplinary company), Villa Cisneros and La Agüera. Sections of the different weapons gathered about 500 men. The Jalifian Forces, born as palace guard of the Khalifa and that will form the pictures of the future Moroccan army. There were five mehalas: Tetuán nº 1, Melilla nº 2, Larache nº 3, Rif nº 5 and Gomara nº 6, with headers in Tetuán, Melilla, Larache, Villa Alhucemas and Xauen. Each taxi included three of me) for a total of 360 men. The Jalaphian police were made up of five mezzanines and were about 1,650 men. In Guinea there was a minimal garrison made up of the Colonial Guard. It was constituted by five companies distributed throughout the territory that fulfilled the functions of police. The troops of this unit were mostly indigenous.

Army Strength

The total numbers were as follows:

  • In the peninsular army, that is to say, the eight divisions, the two commandos of the Balearic and Canary Islands, plus the commandant exempt of Asturias, had on the paper 81 generals, 8,851 officers, 6,988 non-commissioned officers and 101,455 troops. The total was 117,385 men. There were also ten generals assimilated.
  • The Army of Africa had three generals, 1,683 officers, 1,572 non-commissioned officers and 30,383 soldiers. The total was 33,641.
  • The General Directorate of Morocco and Colonies had 527 officers, 246 non-commissioned officers and 12,713 troops. Total 13,486.
  • CASE personnel were 4,285 in the territorial army, 594 in Africa and 354 in the Residency forces.
  • In the Reserve there were 481 generals, 4 officers of staff, 97 officers of infantry, 21 of cavalry, 88 of artillery, 71 of engineers and 128 other auxiliary bodies. Complement officers were 1,930 infantry, 630 cavalry, 632 artillery, 158 engineers and 676 other corps. The number of retired military personnel was 13,642.

Mobilization

With the military reform the old structure of mobilization was discarded. Mobilization and Reserve Centers were created tak take over the task of organizing the individual soldiers and assigning them to their units. The soldiers, once they joined thre reserve, passed to a first situation of availability always belonging to the active units in which they served. In case of mobilization, these reserves would complete the templates of the existing units at first, to later unfold these units. Those in the second situation, depended on the mobilization center of their place of residence and would form if necessary reserve units in a number dependent on the nature of the mobilization. The Mobilization Centers were sixteen, one for each infantry brigade. Recruitment is done through 60 Recruit Boxes. The number of handlers for recruitment and replacement was as follows (for years):

1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
142,901 140,275 150.116 153,885 139,139 144,615 148,522 148,423 149,140 157,359

The actual situation

In July 1936, the army units were not fully staffed. The summer period and rumors of uprising had led to a massive granting of permits. Then the real situation of the barracks, by divisions and regions:

Republican zone National zone
Infantry
I 2,957 58%
II 785 62% 2,860 56%
III 3,838 61%
IV 4.335 61%
V 382 55% 2.618 52%
SAW 1.643 84% 3.261 55%
VII 2.802 55%
Balearics 655 52% 729 57%
Canary Islands 1.475 58%
Artillery
I 1.632 54%
II 1,744
III 1.747 58%
IV 1.525 61%
V 792 36% 955 96% (?)
SAW 532 79% 1,242 fifty%
VII 1,174 56%
VIII 1.420
Balearics 836 70%
Canary Islands 1.008 [1]
Chivalry
II 395 62%
III 413 65%
IV 800 63%
V 347 55%
SAW 1,207 64%
VII 807 64%
Engineers
I 3.128 71%
II 284 67%
III 258 61%
IV 268 63%
V 488
SAW 233 55% 248 59%
VIII 212 fifty%

Equipment

As for the armament, the infantry had the rifle of own production Mauser M-1.893 of 7 mm. The most common machine gun was the Hotchkiss M-25 7mm and the heavy Hotchkiss M-14. Elite units (legions, hunters, marines and mountain troops) used the Star S 135 and Gollat ​​9m submachine guns. The mortars were either the Spanish Valero of 50 mm, or those of 81 mm that were copies of the French Brandt.

Most infantry guns were the old Schneider M-08 70mm mountain. The elite units were being equipped with the new Arellano L-32 45 mm. In addition to the organic artillery units, infantry units had some battalion-level pieces. Thus, each battalion of hunters, each flag of the Third, each taxi of Regulares and the Knights of Ifni had a piece of accompaniment. In the rest of the army, each battalion of infantry (three by regiment) and each battalion of mountain had the same thing.

Each DCA group had 8 pieces, the three mixed groups totaling 20 pieces and an unknown number of fixed pieces. In the garrison of Villa Cisneros there were two other cannons and each artillery grouping in Morocco had 28 pieces. If we add all the artillery crews gives us a total of 916 pieces of campaign in the territorial army, 88 in Africa, 192 in coastal regiments and 16 in anti-aircraft groups.

In artillery the basic unit was the four-piece battery. Like half Europe, it counted massively with the famous French barrel Schneider M-06 of 75 mm that represented about 60% of the whole park. In theory he had to equip only two of the groups in the light artillery regiments, although in practice he practically constituted all three. The light batteries in Morocco and those of the Islands had the modern Vickers M-22 of 105 mm manufactured in Spain. The mountain regiments and the group of Asturias had the Schneider M-19 mountain howitzer of 105 mm. The heavy artillery regiments had a group equipped with 150 mm Krupp M-13 guns and the other with 155 mm Schneider M-17.

The four regiments of coast artillery gathered in total 192 pieces mostly of fixed character. They were broken down as follows: Regiment No. 1 had 6 batteries with a total of 24 pieces, Regiment No. 2 had 13 batteries with 52 pieces, Regiment No. 3 had 16 batteries and 64 pieces, and Regiment No. 4 had 13 batteries with 52 pieces. There were also pieces of these characteristics in the mixed groups of the archipelagos, but the number of them is unknown. Of the total, 132 of them were between 101.6 and 381 mm of caliber. Many of them were old pieces from fixed ships, although there were some mobile batteries with Elswick Mark I 127 mm guns and some anti-aircraft parts. Precisely in this type of weapon, there were in acceptable number the Danish M-33 of 20 mm and the French machine guns Hotchkiss of 13.2 mm. The Spanish Army had no anti-tank guns.

The Spanish military industry was concentrated in Trubia, where the 45, 105 and 155 mm guns were manufactured, as well as modernizing those of 75. In Reinosa and Placencia de las Armas artillery pieces were also manufactured.

Between the two regiments of existing cars only had 20 operating cars: 10 Renault FT-17, 5 Schneider M-16 and 5 Trubia A-4, in addition, there were about 62 armored transports. All this stuff was really outdated. In contrast, the group of machine-gun-guns had 28 modern armored vehicles. They were a Spanish version of the 1 Tm Dodge truck and had two 8 mm machine guns.

Finally, the engineering units were equipped with French material from the Great War.

As has been said each infantry regiment had a reserve of arms to constitute its third battalion when it was decided, the light artillery regiments to constitute their third group and generally, the rest of units and bodies had the necessary material to equip up to 25% of its troops in time of peace. In addition, they had the regulatory reserves. In the divisional and army corps parks an enormous amount of arms and equipment was stored from the reserves for a mobilization and of the remnants that had produced the reduction of Azaña. The exact figures of this material are unknown, although it is estimated that no division park had less than 25,000 rifles and at least twice as many corpses, for a total of 400,000 to 500,000 in the whole army. The total quantities of machine guns and machine guns were 2,247 and 1,458 for the Territorial Army and 528 and 220 for the African Army.

Order of Battle in July 1936

Infantry Regiments

nº 1 Wad-Ras Madrid nº21 Valencia Santander

nº 2 León Madrid nº22 San Marcial Burgos

nº 3 Castilla Badajoz nº23 América Pamplona

nº 4 Covadonga Madrid nº24 Bailén Logroño

nº 5 Lepanto Granada nº25 San Quintín Valladolid

nº 6 Granada Sevilla nº26 Toledo Zamora

# 7 Pavia Algeciras # 27 Algiers Caceres

nº 8 Vitoria [2] Málaga nº28 La Victoria Salamanca

nº 9 Otumba Valencia nº29 Zamora La Coruña

nº10 Guadalajara Valencia nº30 Zaragoza Lugo

nº11 Alicante rate nº31 Burgos León

nº12 Vizcaya Alcoy nº32 Milan Oviedo

nº13 Badajoz Barcelona nº33 Cádiz Cádiz

nº14 Alcántara Barcelona nº34 Seville Cartagena

nº15 Almansa Tarragona nº35 Mérida El Ferrol

No. 16 Albuera Lerida nº36 Palma Palma

nº17 Aragón Zaragoza nº37 Baleares Mahón

nº18 Gerona Zaragoza nº38 Tenerife Santa Cruz

No. 19 Galicia Jaca nº39 Canarias Las Palmas

nº20 Valladolid Huesca nº40 Simancas Gijón

Mountain Battalions

nº 1 Chiclana Figueras nº 5 Flanders Vitoria

nº 2 Asia Gerona nº 6 Garellano Bilbao

nº 3 Madrid Seo Urgell nº 7 Arapiles Estella

nº 4 City Rodrigo Barbastro nº 8 Sicilia Pamplona

Combat Tank Regiments

nº 1 Madrid nº 2 Zaragoza

Battalions of machine guns

nº 1 Castellón nº 3 Almería

nº 2 Plasencia nº 4 Manresa

Cyclist Battalion Alcalá de Henares

Presidential Guard Battalion and War Ministry Group Madrid

Cavalry Regiments

nº 1 Castillejos Zaragoza nº 6 Numancia Vitoria

nº 2 Villarrobledo Palencia nº 7 Lusitania Valencia

nº 3 Calatrava Salamanca nº 8 Taxdir Sevilla

nº 4 Spain Burgos nº 9 Santiago Barcelona

nº 5 Farnesio Valladolid nº10 Montesa Barcelona

Aranjuez group of machine gunners

Light artillery regiments

No. 1 Getafe nº 9 Zaragoza

No. 2 Vicálvaro nº10 Calatayud

No. 3 Sevilla nº11 Burgos

No. 4 Granada nº12 Logroño

No. 5 Valencia # 13 Segovia

No. 6 Murcia nº14 Valladolid

No. 7 Barcelona nº15 Pontevedra

nº 8 Mataró nº16 La Coruña

Heavy artillery regiments

nº 1 Córdoba nº 3 San Sebastián

nº 2 Gerona nº 4 Medina del Campo

Mountain artillery regiments

nº 1 Barcelona nº 2 Vitoria

Regiment of artillery on horseback Campamento (Madrid)

Coastal artillery regiments

nº 1 Cadiz nº 3 Cartagena

nº 2 El Ferrol nº 4 Mahón

Mixed Artillery Groups

nº 1 Palma nº 3 Las Palmas

No 2 Tenerife

Defense Groups against Aircraft (ACD)

nº 1 Campamento nº 2 Zaragoza

Mountain artillery group Oviedo

Regiment of sapper miners Madrid

Regiments of railways

nº 1 Leganés nº 2 Leganés

El Pardo transmission regiment

Regiment of Aerostación Guadalajara

Battalions of Sappers

nº 1 Carabanchel nº 5 Zaragoza

nº 2 Sevilla nº 6 San Sebastián

nº 3 Valencia nº 7 Alcalá de Henares

nº 4 Barcelona nº 8 Gijón

Bridging Engineer Battalion Saragossa

Mixed groups sappers-telephones

No. 1 Palma nº 3 Tenerife

nº 2 Mahón nº 4 Las Palmas

TO/Es of Spanish Army units in July 1936

Unity Official Non-commissioned officers Troop
Rto. infantry 49 87 1.122 [3]
Bon. Montana 27 Four. Five 561
Bon. machine guns 22 42 362
Bon. cyclist 36 74 789
Rto. fighting cars 36 87 399
Gpo. War Ministry 10 17 342
Rto. chivalry 35 35 558
Gpo. auto-cannon 16 17 174
Rto. sappers 39 57 853
Bon. sappers 19 27 373
Rto. railways 38 57 779
Rto. transmissions 56 92 783
Rto. art. light 32 54 628
Rto. art. heavy 31 60 576
Rto. art. horse 44 79 967
Rto. art. Montana 3. 4 63 924
Gpo. DCA 13 22 237
Third Flag twenty-one 29 618
Tábor inf. Regular 18 twenty-one 473 [4]
Tábor cab. Regular 17 2. 3 317 [5]
Bon. Ifni Handles 31 38 1,166
Unity Rifles Fusam Machine guns Mortars Cannons
Bon. inf. 446 16 24 17 1
Bon. Montana 541 16 8 17 1
Bon. ametra. 156 4 24 4
Bon. cyclist 635 28 24 28
Rto. Cars [6] 569
Rto. cab. 595 fifteen 8 2
Rto. art. lig. 453 9 36
Rto. art. cab. 790 9 36
Rto. art. feet 266 6 24
Gpo. DCA 111 6 8

The provision of rifles. of sappers, of railroads, of transmissions and of bones. of sappers was 989, 556, 920 and 454 respectively. The gpo. of auto-machine guns had 214 rifles, 5 fusam and 28 vehicles.

Notes

  1. A figure that reflects both regions: the Canary Islands and the Balearic Islands.
  2. Later it was called of Oviedo.
  3. This regiment is of two battalions.
  4. Of the total, 394 soldiers were Moors.
  5. Of the total, 260 were Moors.
  6. It had 67 vehicles.

Sources

The Spanish Army’s Order of Battle in July 1936 from the Nafzinger Collection

Generalstab Publications Bibliography

Military history in 19th century Prussia used to be an exclusive club run for and by staff officers. Despised by their brethren who would rather be in the middle of an bombardment than caught reading a book, these “demigods” as they were derisively called, in turn looked down on academic historians as amateurs dabbling with things best left to professionals. The main task of the Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung (historical department) of the General Staff was to prepare future officers for war – intellectually, but also mentally. This called for brutal honesty, but maybe not too much of it, lest the spirit for war be stunted.

The resulting studies were oft biased, uncritical towards the officer corps, glossing over routs and setbacks.  They exclusively focused on operations to the detriment of such mundane topics as logistics, supply, intelligence and economy, The price for this folly has since been paid (and mostly, mind you, not by the Germans), so we can now return to these works and value them for the qualities they also possess: Attention to detail, familiarity with the topic, the often clear and vivid description of events, and access to sources that in many cases have been lost to wars. One-sided as they may be, when partnered with other viewpoints these books are still an necessary source for anyone interested in the topics they cover.

Historical Works

Die Kriege Friedrichs des Großen

Hg. vom Großen Generalstab. Berlin 1890/1914

Erster Theil: Der Erste Schlesische Krieg 1740-1742
1. Band, „Die Besetzung Schlesiens und die Schlacht bei Mollwitz“
2. Band „Von Mollwitz bis zum Beginn des Mährischen Feldzuges“
3, Band
 Der Feldzug in Mähren und der Feldzug in Böhmen und Oberschlesien“,

Zweiter Theil: Der Zweite Schlesische Krieg 1744-1745
1. Band, „Böhmen 1744“,
2. Band, „Hohenfriedeberg“,
3. Band, „Soor und Kesselsdorf“,

Dritter Theil: Der Siebenjährige Krieg 1756-1763
1. Band, „Pirna und Lobositz“,
2. Band, „Prag“,
3. Band, „Kolin“,
4. Band, „Groß-Jägersdorf und Breslau“,
5. Band, „Hastenbeck und Roßbach“,
6. Band, „Leuthen“,
7. Band, „Olmütz und Crefeld“,
8. Band, „Zorndorf und Hochkirch“,
9. Band, „Bergen“,
10. Band, „Kunersdorf“,
11. Band, „Minden und Maxen“,
12. Band, „Landeshut und Liegnitz“,
13. Band, „Torgau“,

Geschichte des siebenjährigen Krieges in einer Reihe von Vorlesungen mit Benutzung authentischer Quellen. Großer Generalstab (Hg.), Berlin 1824/1841

1. Band: Der Feldzug von 1758, Berlin, – also online at archive.org
2. Band: Der Feldzug von 1758, Berlin, – also online at archive.org
3. Band: Der Feldzug von 1759, Berlin, 1828, – also online at archive.org 
4. Band: Der Feldzug von 1760, Berlin, 1834, – also online at archive.org
5. Band: Der Feldzug von 1761,, Berlin, 1836 – also online at archive.org
6. Band: Der Feldzug von 1762 und der Schluss des Krieges 1763, Berlin, – also online at archive.org

Das preußische Heer der Befreiungskriege (3 Bd., Berlin 1914).

Band 1: Das preußische Heer im Jahre 1812, Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn: Berlin, 1912

1806. Das preußische Offizierkorps und die Untersuchung der Kriegsereignisse. Großer Generalstab, Berlin 1906

Der Deutsch-dänische Krieg 1864 hrsg. vom Großen Generalstabe, Abteilung für Kriegsgeschichte

Vol 1. E. S. Mittler und Sohn, Berlin 1886, 515 pages – Political background, mobilisation and operations in Jutland until April 18th, 1864
Vol 2., E.S: Mittler und Sohn, Berlin, 1887, 566 pages – Operations in Jütland and Alsen up to the end of the war.
Vol 3, Kartenband, E.S: Mittler und Sohn, Berlin, 1887 – maps

Der Feldzug von 1866 in Deutschland redigiert von der Abteilung für Kriegsgeschichte des Großen Generalstabs, E.S. Mittler und Sohn, Berlin 1867

Der deutsch-Französische Krieg 1870-71

redigiert von der Abteilung für Kriegsgeschichte des Großen Generalstabs

Erster Theil: Geschichte des Krieges bis zum Sturz des Kaiserreiches
Erster Band: Vom Beginn der Feindseligkeiten bis zur Schlacht von Gravelotte, E. S. Mittler und Sohn, Berlin 1874
Zweiter Band: Von der Schlacht von Gravelotte bis zum Sturz des Kaiserreichs, E. S. Mittler und Sohn, Berlin 1875

Zweiter Theil: Geschichte des Krieges gegen die Republik
Erster Band: Von der Einschließung von Paris bis zur Wiederbesetzung von Orleans durch die Deutschen, E. S. Mittler und Sohn, Berlin, 1878
Zweiter Band: Die Ereignisse im Norden Frankreichs von Ende November, im Nordwesten Anfang Dezember und die Belagerung von Paris von Anfang Dezember bis zum Waffenstilstande. Die Operationen im Südosten von Anfang November bis Ende Januar, E. S. Mittler und Sohn, Berlin, 1880
Dritter Band: Die Ereignisse im Südosten Frankreichs von Mitte Januar bis zur Beendigung der Feindseligkeiten. Rückwärtige Verbindungen. Der Waffenstillstand. Rückmarsch und Okkupation. Rückblicke. E. S. Mittler und Sohn, Berlin 1881

Die Kämpfe der deutschen Truppen in Südwestafrika. Auf Grund amtlichen Materials bearbeitet von der Kriegsgeschichtlichen Abteilung I des Großen Generalstabes. 3 Bände

1. Band: Der Feldzug gegen die Hereros. (1.-3. Heft) 248 pages, 24 pictures and 27 maps, E. S. Mittler und Sohn, Berlin, 1906
2. Band: Der Hottentottenkrieg. (4.-6. Heft). 349 pages, 47 pictures and 28 maps, E. S. Mittler und Sohn, Berlin, 1907

And then there is “Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918”

General Military Studies

Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften. In 6 Bänden, Großer Generalstab-Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung (ed); E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1908

Erster Band (Heft 1.-6.), E.S. Mittler und Sohn Berlin 1887
Zweiter Band (Heft 7-12), E.S. Mittler und Sohn Berlin 1889
Dritter Band (Heft 13-18), E.S. Mittler und Sohn Berlin 1895
Vierter Band (Heft 19-24), E.S. Mittler und Sohn Berlin 1898
Fünfter Band (Heft 25-30), , E.S. Mittler und Sohn Berlin 1902
Sechster Band (Heft 31-36), E.S. Mittler und Sohn Berlin 1905

Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte und Taktik
Volume 1: Heeresbewegungen im Kriege 1870-71, E. S. Mittler und Sohn, Berlin
Volume 2: Das Abbrechen von Gefechten, E. S. Mittler und Sohn, Berlin 1903. 25. Maps
Volume 3: Der Schlachtenerfolg, mit welchen Mitteln wurde er erstrebt?, Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn: Berlin, 1903
Volume 4: Die Festung in den Kriegen Napoleons und der Neuzeit.  E. S. Mittler und Sohn, Berlin
Volume 5: Der 18. August 1870, E.S. Mittler und Sohn Berlin 1906

Urkundliche Beiträge und Forschungen zur Geschichte des Preussischen Heeres

Erstes Heft: Die Anfänge der alten Armee, E. S. Mittler und Sohn, Berlin, 1901
Zweites Heft:
Drittes Heft:
Viertes Heft:
Fünftes Heft: Erinnerungen aus dem Leben des Friedrich Karl v. Schmidt.  E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1909
Sechstes Heft: Der Preussische Kavalleriedienst vor 1806. E. S. Mittler und Sohn, Berlin, 1904

Collected Editions

Moltkes militärische Werke, Herausgegeben vom Großen Generalstabe, Abtheilung für Kriegsgeschichte, Berlin, E. S. Mittler, 1892-1906

I: Militärische Korrespondenz, Berlin, E.S.Mittler, 1892-1895

Erster Teil: Moltkes militärische Korrespondenz: Krieg 1864
Zweiter Teil: Aus den Dienstschriften des Krieges 1866.
Dritter Teil: Aus den Dienstschriften des Krieges 1870/71: Der Krieg bis zur Schlacht von Sedan; Vom 3. September 1870 bis zum 27. Januar 1871; Waffenstillstand und Friede.
Vierter Teil: Aus den Dienstschriften des Jahres 1859.

II. Die Thätigkeit als Chef des Generalstabes der Armee im Frieden, Berlin, E.S.Mittler, 1895-1906

Erster Teil: Moltkes taktische Aufgaben aus den Jahren 1858-1882
Zweiter Teil, Vol 1: Moltkes taktisch-strategische Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1857-1871
Zweiter Teil, Vol 2: Maps and Appendices
Dritter Teil: Moltkes Generalstabsreisen aus den Jahren 1858 bis 1869. 401 pages with 22 maps, Berlin 1906

III. Moltkes kriegsgeschichtliche Arbeiten, Berlin, E.S.Mittler, 1899-1902

Erster Teil: Geschichte des Krieges gegen Dänemark 1848/49.
Zweiter Teil: Kritische Aufsätze zur Geschichte der Feldzüge von 1809, 1859, 1864, 1866, und 1870/71.
Dritter Teil: Der italienische Feldzug des Jahres 1859

IV “Kriegslehre”, Berlin, E.S.Mittler, 1910-1912

Erster Teil: Die operativen Vorbereitungen zur Schlacht.
Zweiter Teil: Die taktischen Vorbereitungen zur Schlacht
Dritter Teil: Die Schlacht

References

Second Balkan War
http://mlahanas.de/Greece/History/SecondBalkanWar.html

Greek War of Independence
http://www.mlahanas.de/Greece/History/GreekWarOfIndependence.html

A History of the Greek Revolution – Turkish Rule
http://www.hellenism.net/cgi-bin/display_article.html?a=95&s=25

Wikipedia article on Greece during WWI
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greece_during_World_War_I

The Abdication of King Constantine I of Greece
First World War.com – Memoirs & Diaries – The Abdication of King Constantine I of Greece

Greece and the Allies 1914-1922, G. F. Abbott,1922, Methuen & Co Ltd
http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/22677

Lecture 14: Greek nationalism, the “Megale Idea” and Venizelism to 1923, Steven W Sowards, 1996
http://staff.lib.msu.edu/sowards/balkan/lect14.htm

Arnold J. Toynbee and Kenneth P. Kirkwood, Turkey, 1926, London: Ernest Benn, p. 94
Greco-Turkish War (1919-1922)
http://www.mlahanas.de/Greece/History/GrecoTurkishWar1919_22.html

Wikipedia article on the Greco-Turkish War
Greco-Turkish War (1919–22) – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Greco-Turkish War 1920-22, Peter Kincaid Jensen, International Journal of Middle East Studies, (Cambridge University Press, 1979), Volume 10, Issue 04, pp 553-565

GREEK BARBARISM – Part 2 – Greek Atrocities and Massacres of Turks During Greek Occupation of Izmir and Adjoining Territories, 1919

https://groups.google.com/forum/?fromgroups#!topic/talk.politics.european-union/4O-d_06W2JM
Turkey and Greece: A History of Colliding

Cyprus: A Place of Arms (London: Praeger, 1966), chapter 6
http://cyprus-conflict.net/turkey-greece%20history.html

The political and diplomatic Background to the Metaxas dictatorship 1935-36, Harry Cliadakis.http://www.metaxas-project.com/library/political-diplomatic-background-metaxas-dictatorship.pdf

“Neither Fascist nor Authoritarian: The 4th of August Regime in Greece (1936-1941) and the Dynamics of Fascistisation in 1930s Europe”., Aristotle Kallis
Neither fascist nor authoritarian – Research Portal | Lancaster University

King George II article on Wikipedia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_II_of_Greece

Greece becomes part of the British sphere of influence
http://www.fhw.gr/chronos/14/en/1923_1940/foreign_policy/facts/12.html

The American College of Greece – Art (Ioannis Metaxas)
http://www.acgart.gr/ACG-COLLECTION/ARTISTS/A/ApAn/ApAn1940meta.htm

Great Britain, House of Commons PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, Vol. 346, col. 13. http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1939/apr/13/european-situation

The Political and Diplomatic Background to the Metaxas Dictatorship, 1935-36, Harry Cliadakis, Journal of Contemporary History, SAGE, Vol 14 (1979), p117-38
www.arts.yorku.ca/hist/tgallant/documents/cliadakismetaxas.pdf

Ioannis Metaxas

http://ww2db.com/person_bio.php?person_id=263
[Comments on page by Metaxas’ grand-daughter Ioanna Phoca-Metaxa]
Translation of memoirs from Italian Ambassador to Greece Emanuele Grazzi
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/2616050/posts

THE CHRONICLES OF A CAREER – Sir Anthony Eden, LEWIS BROAD, Hutchinson & Co 1955, p152-154.
http://www.archive.org/stream/siranthonyedenth012634mbp/siranthonyedenth012634mbp_djvu.txt

The Battle of Greece

Battle of Greece

The German Campaign in the Balkans (Spring 1941) a model of crisis planning, General Major Burkhart Mueller-Hillebrand, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1952
The German Campaign in the Balkans 1941, by Mueller-Hillebrand

MEMOIRS – Winston Churchill (abridged), Houghton Mifflin 1959, Chapter 18 vol 2, pages 420-433, 792, 797
Operation Harling COMBATSIM.COM: Operation Harling: Destruction of the Gorgopotamos Rail Bridge, 1942

Axis Occupation of Greece during World War II
http://www.mlahanas.de/Greece/History/AxisOccupationWorldWarII.html

THE GREEK CIVIL WAR 1943 – 1949,  Major Jeffrey C. Kotora, USMC,  1985, Marine Corps Command and Staff College

Command Decisions, Chapter 10, Richard M Leighton, United States Army Center of Military History. CMH Pub 70-7. OVERLORD Versus the Mediterranean

Ideology, calculation, and improvisation: spheres of influence and Soviet foreign policy 1939–1945, Geoffrey Roberts, Review of International Studies (1999), 25, p655–673

Strategic Deception Behind the Normandy Invasion
Major Jon S. Wendell, United States Air Force
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1997/Wendell.htm#_ftn30

Deceit on D-Day Outtakes from Victory and Deceit, A. Nofi
StrategyPage.com – Military Book Reviews

Bulgaria and the Aegean Sea (1941-1944) Military- Political aspects, Dimiter Yonchev
http://www.kroraina.com/knigi/dj/index.html (in Bulgarian)

Sofia was bombed? : Bulgaria’s Forgotten War with the Allies, Irina Gigova
http://www.academia.edu/928716/Sofia_Was_Bombed_Bulgarias_Forgotten_War_with_the_Allies

U.S. State Department [Eizenstat] Report on Allied Relations and Negotiations With Turkey
http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/regions/eur/rpt_9806_ng_turkey.pdf

The Republic of Turkey & Nazi Germany
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/05/26/979480/-The-Republic-of-Turkey-Nazi-Germany

World War II: Turkey
World War II — Turkey

The Duke of Edinburgh
http://www.royal.gov.uk/ThecurrentRoyalFamily/TheDukeofEdinburgh/TheDukeofEdinburgh.aspx

Greek civil war http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/greek.htm
Greek Civil War
http://www.economicexpert.com/a/Greek:Civil:War.htm

General Reading
The Greek Dilemma War and Aftermath, William Hardy McNeil, J.B. Lippincott Company, 1947
http://www.scribd.com/doc/47404466/William-Hardy-McNeill-The-Greek-Dilemma-War-and-Aftermath-J-B-Lippincott-Company-1947

28th October 1940: “OXI” (NO) DAY – the day Greece – Feldgrau.net

Liberation and Aftermath

Dodecanese campaign

The surrender of Italy in 1943 opened up an opportunity for Britain in the Aegean. Italian troops garrisoned much of Greece including many Aegean islands.  On Rhodes, Allied hopes were pinned on the 40,000-strong Italian force stationed there changing sides. However, quick action by the Germans forced the Italians to surrender, and they were disarmed, along with all the other Italians occupying Greece (with the exception of Kefalonia where they were massacred instead).  The British still managed to occupy the islands of Kos, Leros and Samos with a small force by the middle of September. But, as November drew to a close, local German air superiority had won the day, and the remaining British units were forced to withdraw. The defeat was a blow for Churchill, but he was as yet undeterred in his plans for the Eastern Med. (This campaign is covered in detail in David Hughes’ “Disaster in the Aegean” scenario published in TEM 57 and Frank Watsons’ “Dodecanese Adventure” article in the same issue.)

Tehran/Cairo conferences

Churchill continued to push for an East Mediterranean strategy at the Cairo and Tehran talks in late 1943. His primary objective now was to open the Aegean and secure a sea route to the Turkish ports, with the aim of bringing Turkey into the war on the Allied side. A major outcome would be a sea route to the Soviet Union through the Dardanelles that bypassed the dangerous waters of the Arctic–echoing his ill-fated 1915 Gallipoli campaign. However the Americans were opposed to the idea for several reasons. They suspected the British of not being wholly committed to the planned invasion of Northwestern Europe, were suspicious of Britain’s political motives with a view to post war influence in the region, and not least were concerned about getting bogged down in the difficult terrain and politics of the Balkans. Another attempt at taking Rhodes was seriously considered by the British, but the US reiterated it would not provide a single landing craft for the attack. (At this stage in the war, the British could only spare minor forces,  like they did in the Dodecanese, from their main commitments, and US support thus was needed to ensure success in secondary operations against the Germans.) In the end the realpolitik of the US and the Soviet Union put an end to all the British ideas of major activity in the Eastern Mediterranean until the Germans evacuated Greece in October 1944. The British, though, kept the diplomatic channels working and were able to agree with the Soviets that Greece was to come under the British sphere of influence (while Rumania and Bulgaria were to be left to the Soviets).

Strategic Deception

In order to deceive the Germans about the upcoming invasion of Normandy, elaborate operational ruses were devised and fed to Nazi intelligence under the overall guise of Operation Bodyguard. One such ploy was Operation Zeppelin, a planned invasion of Greece by (almost) non-existent forces. This phantom invasion threatened landings in Greece, Albania, the Adriatic or even the Black Sea. The desired (and realised) outcome of this plan was that the Germans were forced to keep formations in Hungary in reserve to defend against this perceived threat, instead of in France where they would have been far more useful.

Bulgaria

Bulgaria had mostly managed to remain at arm’s length from the war until 1943. Although it joined the Axis in 1941, it never declared war on the Soviet Union and did not participate in Barbarossa. Yugoslav Macedonia and most of Thrace were given over to Bulgarian administration after the Balkan campaign, and Bulgaria spent the next 3 years trying to control these sectors with a variety of harsh methods. By late 1943, though, things were starting to go seriously wrong. Heavy Allied bombing raids on Sofia had shaken the Bulgarians confidence in the alliance with Germany. The Soviets were pushing westwards hard from Ukraine, and a communist insurgency threatened the stability of the government.  In addition there were constant fears about the Allies landing in the Aegean or in Thrace and posing a direct threat to Bulgaria itself, not to mention the possibility of Turkish involvement on behalf of the Allies. The Bulgarian 2nd Corps units stationed in Thrace were therefore a first line of defence for the homeland against an Allied attack in the Aegean, but had the situation deteriorated it is likely that these units would have withdrawn to the passes of the Rhodope mountains to defend the Bulgarian homeland. In the end, the Red Army entered the country unopposed on September 5th, 1944 and on the 9th a communist coup succeeded in taking control of the government and country.  Subsequently the Bulgarians began fighting alongside the Third Ukrainian Front to drive the Germans from the Balkans, and they remained in the Soviet sphere of influence for another 46 years.

Turkey

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk died in November 1938 and was succeeded as President of Turkey by İsmet İnönü. An alliance agreement was signed with Britain and France in 1939. However, this agreement largely failed, as Turkey refused requests to help Greece and stayed out of the war until it symbolically joined the Allies in 1945.
The British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Chief of the Imperial General Staff Sir John Dill met with the Turks in early 1941 as part of their efforts to create a united Balkan Front, but the Turks were in no mood to confront the Germans. The Turkish Army was in a poor state and in dire need of modern equipment, plus the economy required many resources. In addition Turkey was fearful of fighting both the Soviets and Germans (who were still allies) at the same time. Only if attacked would they enter the war.
General James Marshall-Cornwall headed a second British Military mission to Ankara in April. The Turkish authorities demanded impossible amounts of Allied assistance.  While these talks were taking place, the Wehrmacht unleashed its assault on Yugoslavia and Greece. Turkey remained neutral.
In June 1941 Turkey signed the German-Turkish Treaty of friendship with Germany, although Hitler had written to İnönü three months earlier guaranteeing the Turkish borders. Stymied, Allied negotiators decided to send just enough supplies to keep the Turks friendly, without actually pressuring them further  to enter the war at that stage.

Churchill held direct talks with İnönü at Adana in southern Turkey in January 1943, aiming to bring the Turks into the war by late 1943. This would open up the shipment route to southern Russia and divert German forces away from the Eastern Front. The demands of İnönü in terms of resources and equipment were again prohibitive, and thus Turkey still remained neutral.

Turkey did possess one item of strategic importance–chromite ore which is the major source for chromium. Chromium is an essential component in the steelmaking process, and Germany had no supplies under its control after 1943. The US and Britain signed preclusive trade agreements with Turkey for chromite ore and were the sole buyers from 1940-1942.  To their consternation, the Turks then signed a trade agreement with Germany beginning in 1943, and according to Allied estimates the amount was sufficient to meet or even exceed German requirements. Diplomatic pressure from the Allied powers was brought to bear, but did not deter the Turks from continuing to send the precious ore to the Reich. When German negotiators arrived in Ankara in April 1944 to extend the existing agreement, the Allies had had enough. A note from the US and British Ambassadors containing a direct threat was sent to the Turkish Foreign Minister. It ended “…any renewal of agreements or the conclusion of fresh agreements on the same lines will entail the application to Turkey of blockade measures such as the two Governments have throughout the war applied to neutral countries”. Six days later, all shipments of chromite ore to Germany ceased.

Turkey continued to resist all efforts to get it to join the Allies until February 1945, when it made a token declaration of war on Germany in order to become a member of the United Nations. This declaration did not have any practical effect on the war, and Turkey sent no troops into battle.

Aftermath

The British had long-standing interests in the Aegean and tried to protect them throughout the war.  They sent valuable forces to disaster in 1941 and after that played a strong hand in the resistance against the Axis occupiers.  Despite all of Churchill’s diplomatic manoeuvring, they were unable to successfully return until October 1944 when the Germans evacuated the country in order to avoid being cut off by the Red Army advancing through Rumania and Bulgaria.

Almost as soon as they landed, they became caught up in the “Second Round” of the Greek Civil War when ELAS attacked them and Greek Government forces. The lightly armed irregulars of ELAS were no match for the well trained and supported British, and by February, the ELAS had agreed to peace via the Varzika Agreement.

This agreement was however to provide only a temporary respite for the war-weary citizens of Greece. The civil war flared up again in May1946 and continued for another 3 years until the ELAS was finally dispatched with US and British assistance. Over 100,000 people were reportedly killed before the Communist forces were defeated.

Greek-British ties continue to this day. Both countries are members of the European Union and NATO. Prince Philip the Duke of Edinburgh is a grandson of Greek King George I.

German Occupation

British support in 1941

When Italy attacked Greece from Albania in December 1940, Metaxas requested assistance from the British. At that time, however, only a few RAF assets were available, plus some small forces sent to Crete to allow Greek troops there to redeploy to the mainland. Almost completely unassisted, the Greek Army was able to repel the Italians and push into southern Albania before a stalemate developed.

Churchill sent his close aide Anthony Eden and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff Sir John Dill on a lengthy diplomatic and military mission to try and mobilise the friendly Balkan nations to defend Greece from the expected German attack in the spring of 1941. The idea was to persuade Yugoslavia and Turkey to join the fight, but both countries refused.

Direct British intervention was therefore the only feasible option. Churchill instructed Eden that as desirable as it was to send the Greeks assistance, it should not be done “if the prospects were no more hopeful than for another Norwegian fiasco”. The Allied commanders in Egypt, however, considered that there was a good chance of success. The Italians had been swept away in Libya and a sizeable Allied force was able to be deployed.

Churchill’s memoirs show that he was still hesitant about committing ground forces to Greece, but he wrote of Anthony Eden’s message from Athens:

“… Collapse of Greece without further effort on our part to save her by intervention on land, after the Libyan victories had, as all the world knows, made forces available, would be the greatest calamity. Yugoslavia would then certainly be lost; nor can we feel confident that even Turkey would have the strength to remain steadfast if the Germans and Italians were established in Greece without effort on our part to resist them. No doubt our prestige will suffer if we are ignominiously ejected, but in any event to have fought and suffered in Greece would be less damaging to us than to have left Greece to her fate . . . . In the existing situation we are all agreed that the course advocated should be followed and help given to Greece.”

This proved to be the decisive argument and the War Cabinet agreed. Thus the British and Greek governments agreed in early 1941 that ‘Lustre Force’ would be deployed to Greece. Originally planned for 100,000 men, bickering between Allied commanders and events in Cyrenaica resulted in only around 70% of the planned number actually being sent, comprised mostly of Commonwealth units. The force was severely lacking in tanks, artillery and air cover.  In addition, the decision weakened the British forces in North Africa, allowing Rommel’s Afrika Korps to counterattack.

The presence of significant Allied forces on the Continent, especially so close to the oilfields at Ploesti, crossed a red line for the Germans.  They quickly drew up plans to expel them and did so with Operation Marita in April 1941. Shortly afterwards Operation Merkur captured Crete and ended all British presence in continental Europe (apart from Gibraltar), despite the valiant efforts of the Allied troops on the island. Greece had been completely defeated within 8 weeks and some 25,000 Commonwealth soldiers became POWs. At the time these losses were a severe setback to the war in North Africa.

Although the Greek expedition had been a military failure in itself, Anthony Eden stood up in the House of Commons to defend the venture. “In this war,” said Eden, “we are fighting not for gains but causes. Greece is the embodiment of those causes. I believe that had we not gone to her help we could not have raised our heads again.”

The effect of the campaign on Barbarossa is debatable and outside the scope of this article. What is beyond doubt is that although conventionally defeated, Greece (and Yugoslavia) became a festering sore for the Axis, requiring large amounts of troops and resources to control resistance movements that could not be pacified.

Axis occupation

Greece was divided into 3 occupation zones – Italian, German and Bulgarian. Italy administered most of western Greece apart from Athens, as well as a portion of Crete and a significant portion of the Aegean islands (including the Dodecanese). Bulgaria was granted Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace – territory it had held up until the end of The Great War. Germany controlled the rest including Athens, Central Macedonia and Thessaloniki, as well as the far east of Thrace along the border with Turkey.

During the occupation, the already severely weakened Greek economy was strained even further by the Germans who requisitioned large amounts of raw materials and food. A “war loan” to Germany only added to the misery.  A famine struck during the winter of 1941-42, exacerbated by an Allied blockade, and an estimated 300,000 people perished. Eventually the Allies partially lifted the blockade so that the Red Cross could distribute emergency supplies.

Immediately after the defeat of Greece, there was little that could be termed as resistance. After a few months, small guerrilla bands and networks to aid escaped POWs began to appear but were of little concern to the occupiers as yet.

In 1942, organised resistance movements began to appear, in two main groups. One was the ELAS (Ethnikos Laikos Apelevtherotikos Stratos, Greek People’s Liberation Army), the military arm of the EAM (Ethnikon Apelevtherotikon Metopon, National Liberation Front). The EAM was a front for the KKE (Kommounistikon Komma Ellados) or Communist Party of Greece. On the other side of politics was the EDES (Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellinikos Syndesmos) or National Republican Greek League. The EDES was only small to begin with and consisted of around 300 former Greek Army officers and men.

Sporadic attacks occurred on Axis troops during the summer of 1942 but by the autumn both groups clashed with the Italians in larger scale operations. In October, a British SOE (Special Operations Executive) unit headed by Colonel E.C.L. Myers made contact with ELAS and EDES, and a combined attack destroyed a key viaduct and railroad at Gorgopotamos (Operation Harling). This was SOE’s first major success of the war. It inspired the Greek guerrilla movement and many other bands began to spring up, each with their own political aims right across the spectrum. By the end of winter EDES and ELAS had increased their numbers to 1500 and around 4500 respectively.

Meanwhile, internal politics in the KKE was producing some contradictory outcomes. In the first half of 1943, ELAS made some attacks on EDES and other small non-communist forces. However the KKE then signed up to a ‘National Bands Agreement’ in July 1943 establishing a common HQ and operational areas for all resistance groups, thereby ensuring the continued flow of British weapons to ELAS.

Events of the next 3 months turned out to be a pivotal point in the struggle.  The KKE sensed that an Allied return to Greece was imminent after the Italian surrender in September. The KKE leaders in favour of seizing power over all of Greece by any means became the dominant faction, and they wished to complete this goal before the Allies arrived. They estimated that the strength of ELAS (around 15,000 under arms) was sufficient to crush all opposition, and importantly they no longer needed British supplies as they had captured the equipment of the entire Italian 24th (Pinerolo) Division, which had surrendered to them.

In October 1943, the ELAS launched a campaign to destroy all the other resistance groups. This incident led to the British ceasing all weapons shipments to the ELAS and throwing their resources entirely to EDES. It was also the beginning of the Greek Civil War, which would continue in various forms for another 6 years.
This “First Round” of the war initially lasted around a week. EDES repulsed the ELAS attacks but other smaller groups were dispersed or destroyed by the ELAS. The fighting was interrupted when the Germans began an assault of their own. Both major groups suffered significant losses, with the ELAS getting the worst of it. German operations continued well into the winter of 1943/44, concentrating on Macedonia and Epirus. Once the Germans paused, EDES counterattacked ELAS and regained some lost ground. Naturally the British were extremely concerned by the situation and eventually managed to broker a truce between EDES and ELAS in February 1944.

It was now that political developments came to the fore. On March 10th the KKE declared that it had set up a provisional government – the PEEA (Politiki Epitropi Ethnikis Apelevtheroseos, Political Committee of National Liberation). This posed a direct threat to the Greek government-in-exile. Although the KKE had taken great care to project the PEEA as an anti-fascist rather than a communist organisation (to widen its appeal), the strings were being pulled in secret by the KKE’s Central Committee. The first impact of this declaration was a mutiny by elements of the Greek forces in exile on 31st March (which was quickly put down by the British).  The Greek government in exile had to respond. It called a conference in Lebanon in May 1944, and under the stewardship of George Papandreou a new government of national unity was formed, to include members of all parties and the PEEA. The KKE delegates, however, had overstepped their authority in signing up to the plan, and as a result the KKE had been outmanoeuvred. It tried to stall for time but larger diplomatic forces had also been at work. A Soviet delegation flew to the KKE headquarters on the 26th of July. Although there are no records of what exactly took place, shortly thereafter the KKE dropped all its objections and joined the new government.

Although German forces still continued ground operations during 1944 (mostly against ELAS), the Soviet advance had cast the die and they prepared to depart. By October the British were in Athens and the Axis occupation had effectively ended after 3 and a half years. Over 300,000 civilians and thousands of guerrilla fighters had died, and the country was in ruins.

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