The Wayward Accountant

SF victory conditions

A Second Front in 1943?
ROUNDUP dissected
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Got anything to say?
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Cover: Radio Man (Ludwig Mactarian, 1945)
US Army Center for Military History
Welcome to the first issue of Line of Communications, a newsletter dedicated to the discussion of the Europa games published by HMS/GRD — although we will also cover the Glory and The Great War series. Following in the grand tradition of Europa and its players, you will also find in these pages historical material concerning both world wars and their ancillary wars.

LOC does not intend to be a replacement, or a rival, to The Europa Magazine. Rather, LOC will strive to offer another point of view, perhaps a fresher one. Besides, TEM must bow to the time and money constraints of a physical magazine; LOC, being a virtual newsletter, can perhaps go where her big sister can’t go.

I’d like to thank all people who helped and supported the idea of LOC, and especially Gar and Arthur for their kind permission to go ahead. Indeed, LOC will not exist without your contribution; so please write. Send in your articles, your game reports, your house rules, interesting images, or even just your comments. LOC is your forum, so use it. This is a newsletter made by players for players, so please help.

On this issue, you’ll find an article by Rich Velay, originally posted to the Europa mailing list, about the feasibility of the Roundup operation — that is, to open a second front in France in 1943. The idea was ultimately abandoned by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but the discussion that preceded this decision has generated a lot of polemics since then.

Another Second Front piece is “The Wayward Accountant”, by Alan Tibbetts, where he takes a hard look at the Second Front Victory Levels chart and SF Rule 42.

In keeping with the Second Front theme, we offer you the first LOC contest, “Anzio Beachhead”. TEM ran a similar contest on number 80, but there were no entries, so here is your chance for fame and glory.

Rounding up this issue, we have an Annotated Sequence of Play for Second Front.
A Second Front in 1943?

Rich Velay

[Editor’s note: This analysis by Rich Velay originated in the Europa mailing list, in response to the question “What if the Western Allies had ignored Sicily in favor of an invasion of France in 1943?”]

As with most any strategy option in Second Front, sure this is feasible, since its success or failure depends largely on the facility with the rules and playing ability of the opponents. It would also be eminently feasible, perhaps even recommended, if one was playing without the SF rules-as-written victory conditions, i.e. Victory Points losses for the Allies suffering disastrous and excessive losses. But since playing without the victory conditions changes SF so much that it is unrecognizable as SF or a simulation of WWII, no more on that topic need be said...

Given that in SF the Allies win or lose the game (as distinct from the war — they can not fail to win the war in SF) through the accumulation of VPs, the only way to judge whether or not a given strategic plan is viable is to analyze what impact that plan (and possible Axis reactions to it) has on the Allies amassing VPs. The Axis can interfere with the Allies gaining VPs in two ways — by preventing the Allies from gaining VPs based on events and territorial gains, and/or by forcing the Allies to lose VPs based on Allied losses.

Since simply trying to deny the Allies VPs will not necessarily cause them to lose any VPs, it follows that doing the upmost to cause the Allies to lose VPs is the preferable Axis response to any Allied landing — regardless of where it might occur or when. There are two basic ways to cause the Allies VP losses in the game — inflicting excessive losses and inflicting disastrous losses. In the context of a 1943 invasion of Western Europe one would of course like to maximize the latter, but it is the former that will probably spell the difference between victory and defeat for the Axis, so I’ll examine excessive losses first and return to disastrous losses later.

One of the most important differences between the Allied army in 1943 compared to 1944 is the absence of a strong US contingent in 1943. Whereas in 1944 the Americans will be the strongest and most numerous contingent within the Allied forces, in 1943 the Allies will be depending upon the British and Commonwealth forces to a much greater degree. For example, in 1943 there is only a single US division in England and nine in the MTO, compared to fifteen CW divisions in the MTO and twenty CW divisions in England (in both cases not counting reserve, training or second-line formations). Thus in 1943 the CW outnumbers the US, in divisional units, by 3.5:1. Of course the situation in 1944 is reversed, what with the US army constantly growing in size and the CW forces remaining virtually static.

Obviously this ratio of 3.5 CW divisions to 1 US division means that the Allies will be taking losses from CW forces in greater numbers than from US forces, regardless of how the Allies use their forces. If one is serious about making a strong invasion of the West in
1943, it can not be a “US only” venture simply because there are not enough US forces to make a viable invasion and break-out on their own — the force ratio between the two major Allies insures that the CW forces have to be a major component of any such operation. This means, of course, that the CW forces will be taking at least as many losses as the US forces, and probably greater losses just because of that disparity in force ratio.

To deal with those expected losses, the British have 7 Inf Repls saved at the beginning of the game, and receive 6 more each month; the Canadians get 1.5 Inf Repls per month, while the New Zealand, South African and Indian contingents get no Inf Repls at all in 1943. And note that the Canadians will certainly want to spend two of the three they have by Aug I 1943 to do their armored division upgrade, leaving them with only 7 Inf Repls for all of 1943. These numbers mean that using any Canadian, NZ or Indian forces in 1943 where they could conceivably take losses is a great risk for the Allied player. For example, if the NZ 15-10 Mech Div were to be cadred while not isolated [thus generating 8/5ths of an Inf Repl] the Allied player would have a deficit of 3 NZ Inf Repls during any 1943 VP check, resulting in a -3 VP penalty. And some penalty would be present until the NZs had the 3 Inf Repls to either rebuild the division to full strength or saved, to offset the deficit. Use of any Indian or Canadian forces would be even more risky, since more of their forces consist of units which depend solely upon Inf Repls to replace, rather than, as with the NZs, a mix of Arm and Inf Repls. The French contingent is in a similarly perilous replacement situation, since the bulk of its forces are not only infantry, but African infantry — and African Inf Repls arrive at a rate of only .5 per month.

While the British have some Inf Repls saved and get 6 per month, this is insufficient to cover even a normal amount of losses, let alone the significant losses they can be expected to suffer while forming the bulk of the Allied forces invading the west in 1943. Combining the arriving Inf Repls with those saved at start, and dividing by the number of turns in 1943, we arrive at, roughly, an Inf Repl rate of 7 pts per month, or about 3.5 Inf Repls per turn. Which means that if the British forces suffer more than 3.5 Inf Repls worth of losses per turn they will be facing some greater or lesser deficit during 1943, and thus have to lose VPs to offset that deficit. It should be pointed out that they only get 4 Arm Repls per month as well, while having saved 6 at the start of the game, averaging out to about 5 Arm repls per month — 13 of which will be needed for CW and Other Allied conversions/upgrades alone during 1943, to say nothing of the 6 required to replace the valuable 4th Arm Bde [7-10] which begins in the replacement pool!
While the US can help out the CW and Other Allied forces with Lend Lease Arm Repls, the US is not the bottomless pit of replacement points in 1943 that it will become during 1944 and 1945. The US only receives 8 Arm Repls per month in 1943 and will be taking losses in Arm Repls themselves, since the strongest Allied units available in 1943 are the two US 16-10 Arm Divs. Rebuilding each of these from cadre to full strength requires 6 Arm Repls, or 6/8ths of their monthly allotment of Arm Repls (not counting any they have given away to the other national contingents that may well need them desperately). Since the US doesn’t have the “cushion” of saved replacement points in 1943 that they would have in 1944, any more than the other Allies do, any significant US losses will also result in VP losses for the Allies.

Even while still ignoring the question of disastrous losses, it should be obvious that the Allies face the very real possibility of taking VP losses for excessive losses while trying any 1943 Western campaign. It can be assumed that any 1943 Western invasion and campaign will result in the most aggressive Axis response possible, since a successful Allied campaign in 1943 will definitely cost the Axis the war and game, while a successful Axis response to such an operation will, in all probability, give them victory in the game (although not the war). It can be expected that these VP losses will exceed any that the Allies gain from captured territorial objects, leaving them with a net VP deficit coming into 1944 even if they remain ashore in the West.

The situation is even more problematic for the Allies, though, since they will also face the much more serious disastrous losses penalties as well. These are doubly damaging since they not only come with their own inherent penalty, but the losses associated with disastrous losses might well also count towards excessive losses as well! For example, taking the NZ division as an example again, should it be cadred while isolated, it will not only generate 4 VP losses per quarter until it can be rebuilt but it will also cost the Allies 16 VPs immediately, due to disastrous losses — 30 VPs if it were entirely eliminated while isolated.

The Allied player has to remember always that disastrous losses are not only associated with special operations, but that they can occur at any time the Allied units are isolated. Except along the Breton and Bay of Biscay coasts, there are very few minor ports available for capture. Since there are no Mulberries, and given that German-owned Standard or better ports are destroyed on a 5 in 6 chance when captured, it follows that regardless of where the Allies land they will be faced with a real lack of ports for tracing Lines of Communication for isolation purposes.

The Allies also have to recall that the Axis will try to create isolated combat opportunities at every turn — not a major problem for them if the Allies are depending upon only one or two minor ports for their LOCs. A minor port only requires five hits to be rendered inoperable and thus no longer be a valid LOC destination. Given the size of the Axis air forces, the fact that they can use those air forces with complete impunity and the fact that isolation for combat purposes is judged at the start of the combat phase, i.e. after the Axis can bomb out ports during their movement phase, it should be obvious that the Allies will be faced with the possibility of taking disastrous losses every turn until they own more ports than the Axis can
bomb out. This is a basic Axis tactic, bombing out ports to generate isolated combat losses for the Allies and it should be prosecuted with vigor and persistence by any Axis player facing a 1943 West invasion.

With regards to disastrous losses, it should be borne in mind that all of France is worth only about 50+ VPs, in its entirety. Losing just one US Airborne division while isolated will generate 40 VPs worth of losses! An average British invasion stack (1× 3-8 Mar Cmdo X, 1× 2-3-8 Eng X, 2 × 3-8 Inf X and 2 × 2-8 Inf X) would generate 36 VPs worth of losses — more of course if more specialist, “Elite” troops are committed. Since it is impossible for initially invading units to be unisolated during the combat phase of the invasion turn, all invasion losses are disastrous losses, as are all losses taken during airborne special operations. And note that “just” that single invasion group of British forces represents 15 Inf Repls, a loss requiring three months to replace. An average US invasion stack (1 × 4-8 III, 3 × 3-8 III, 1 × 3-8 Eng III and 2 × 1-8 Ranger II) would generate 40 VPs worth of losses.

The above realities should make it clear that even one failed invasion hex is a serious disaster for the Allies, regardless of who takes the losses. Any additional losses — to airborne forces or exchange losses at a captured beach — could easily push the VP losses above what the Allies would garner from holding all of France for a quarter! A couple of invasions like
that and the Allies will not be able to gain enough VPs to win the game even if they remain ashore in mid 1943.

If we take it for granted that a competent Axis player will not allow a viable invasion of Germany or the Netherlands, then the Allies are forced to invade at the Pas de Calais, the Dieppe area, Normandy, Brittany or the Bay of Biscay. Both the Pas de Calais and the Dieppe-Le Havre regions should be hopeless for the Allies — the Axis can relatively easily protect both regions because of the lack of minor ports in either. Assuming that any standard or better ports are destroyed upon capture, any Allied landing in either area will be dependant upon a single minor port for isolation purposes [to say nothing of build-up and supply], meaning that the Axis will have a good chance of getting opportunities to inflict isolated losses after the invasion turn.

Any invasion of Normandy faces the same problem since while there are two minor ports in the area, they are separated from each other by the Cotentin peninsula and it can not be expected that both will fall on the invasion turn — the invasion would be too spread out and weak if attempts were made to include both ports in a beachhead. And for all three of these areas, an initial invasion against a standard or better port — that is, one defended by a Port Fort — should be a near impossibility.

While Brittany has a number of minor ports, making it more difficult for the Axis to insure isolated losses once the Allies are ashore, and while it can be safely assumed that the beach defences in this area will be both relatively and absolutely weaker than those in any of the four previously discussed areas, it is far from a safe bet for an Allied Landing. For one thing, it is at the extreme edge of Allied air power, even if using the map supplement [Ed: published in TEM 59-60]. It is also nearly as easy to seal off as Normandy after a successful landing and we are discussing here the feasibility of making a 1943 West invasion the main thrust by the Allies, not the feasibility of gaining a lodgement and a bastion on the continent. Brittany is worth only 2 VPs to the Allies, and that only when they have captured Brest, which will surely be the best defended part of Brittany. That means that even one point of (non-Elite) disastrous losses, or two points of excessive losses will be enough to completely offset the VPs gained for taking the area — hardly an economical way to work towards the 325+ VPs the Allies need to attain a marginal victory...

The Bay of Biscay also has a reasonable number of minor ports, but as in Normandy, they are often separated by enough distance to make them awkward to include in a single beachhead and they are even further beyond Allied air cover than those in Brittany. The area is also far enough away from Great Britain to impact the build-up of forces on the beachhead. The front here is also extremely extended, with open flanks and only moderate access to good defensive terrain, making surviving here a questionable proposition. Moreover it is bereft of good VP sites and farther from Germany — the real goal — than any other landing site.

All in all, the VP situation vis-à-vis a 1943 invasion of the West is sufficient to call the whole idea into question. There are, however, quite a number of other considerations, beyond simply VPs, that conspire to make any 1943 invasion of the West a very dubious enterprise for
the Allies. Chief among these, in my estimation, would be the significant replacement surge that landing in 1943 grants to the Germans — three months of full replacements is a serious gift to the Axis and one has to think long and hard about whether or not that alone doesn’t make an early landing in the West completely counter-productive. The Axis can safely roll for early activation of all their forming troops, which combined with on-map forces will go a long way towards generating the combat power needed to cause the Allies enough VP losses to make the entire operation a fiasco. After all, any exchange vs CW forces is a significant victory for the Axis, and given the congested nature of any beachhead during the early going, even DRs will likely cause Allied losses.

The German replacement surge will represent a significant force multiplier for the Axis player. Normally, the Germans receive 6 Inf and 6 Arm Repls per month during 1943 — but with all replacement withdrawals cancelled during the “Emergency” they will receive 19 Inf and 18 Arm repls, basically three times as many replacements of both kinds. This substantial increase in replacements will allow the Axis to not only roll for early activation of forming units but will also give them a significant cushion of replacements to be used for replacing any losses incurred in low odds attacks vs the Allies.

So while the Allies are hindered by their replacement situation, especially the disparity between the amounts received by various nationalities, the Axis will have many more replacements than normal, and no need at all to retain any of them. Since few other situations will provide the Axis with the opportunity of winning the game early as an early West invasion does, it is incumbent upon them to make the fullest use of the opportunity offered to them by the Allies choosing this strategy. The Axis, even more than usual, can in effect ignore losses completely, as long as those losses contribute to Allied losses, since the Allies reliance upon CW forces means, as I showed previously, that they will be taking VP losses for even non-isolated losses.

The situation with regards to air forces is also greatly to the Allies disadvantage when contemplating a 1943 invasion of the West. Not only is the Allied air force weaker in terms of number of air units, the air units they do have are uniformly weaker than those with which they would be equipped by the Spring/Summer of 1944. This weaker air force will also have much less “reach” than would be the case later — the bulk of US fighters will have ranges in the 11 to 13 band, rather than in the 15 to 19 band. In 1944 virtually all US fighters will also have tactical bombing strengths of 3-4 pts, rather than the 1-2 pts they possess in 1943. Thus the Allies will be forced to employ many more bomber-type air units on GS and DAS missions, where they fight at a disadvantage as well as having a negative DRM for anti-aircraft fire resolution.
Thus the Allies are forced to fight at reduced ranges, with less air units, which are on average inferior to what they would have in 1944 while the Axis are free to employ the entire Luftwaffe and Italian air forces without regard to losses. And the Axis have five opportunities to call up the Strategic air force and significantly augment their on-map air forces for a turn each call-up. And, as with ground forces, the Allies have a weak link with regard to ARPs — the US have significantly less ARPs during 1943 than the CW do, and yet because the US have the greater number of A and B types needed for GS, DAS and other bombing missions, they can expect to take significant losses. Enough losses, quite possibly, to occasionally inflict excessive losses VP penalties upon them. While this is not a concern in 1944, nor even in 1943 in a normal game, in a game positing a 1943 invasion of the West the demands upon the US ARP rate may well overwhelm it during an air replacement cycle or two. While such expected VP losses would not be large, any VP losses that the Allies take only serve to invalidate the original idea behind invading the West in 1943 in the first place.

Perhaps more important than its impact upon combat, the weaker and shorter ranged Allied air forces will have a significantly negative impact upon the Allies ability to interfere with Axis operational mobility through harassment, rail bombing and RMY bombing missions. Axis mobility is one of their greatest assets on the battlefield and reducing it is a primary job of the Allied air forces — weaker levels of harassment, and less of it overall, will allow the Axis to engage the Allies on their terms and with maximum force. This will, of course, lead inevitably to greater Allied losses and thus a greater chance for the Allies to suffer excessive or disastrous losses. Moreover, more of the harassment workload will have to be carried by the US A and B type air units, meaning that they will be unavailable, with their needed 3 TBFs per air unit for both GS and DAS. It should also be kept in mind that fighters can NOT bomb at extended range, so their overall poorer range vis-à-vis 1944 is quite significant when one remembers that the vast majority of bombing missions will have to be run by fighters.

The air situation for the Axis is virtually the reverse of that for the Allies — the German air force will be almost as strong in 1943 as it will be in 1944, with little change in overall quality, but in addition the Axis will have the entire Italian air force as well, something one could not reasonably expect in 1944. While the Italian air force is not exactly filled with top of the line air units, some of its air units are easily the equivalent of Allied forces and for many purposes, simple quantity is worth more than quality. Combined with Strategic air force air units, the combined Axis air forces are easily strong enough to face the Allies, since the Axis can pick and choose where and when to make major efforts in support of the ground battle. And as with ground forces, air unit losses are almost meaningless for the Axis, since they don’t count for VPs; and even if you lose the entire combined air forces one or more times in winning the game, you have still won the game.

Another weakness of the 1943 West invasion plan is that unlike invading in 1944, doing so in 1943 will mean the Allies have lost the effect of nearly a year’s worth of bombing of the Axis West bridge, rail and airbase infrastructure — the negative impacts for the Allies with regards to this can hardly be overstated. The lack of such preparation serves to increase Axis mobility in addition to what was discussed above, but also means that the Axis will have more
airbases in total, and more close to the threatened front, than they would in 1944. Both effects will require the Allies to commit air assets to reducing these capabilities while the campaign is ongoing, meaning those air units so employed will not be available for tactical usage during the campaign for harassment, DAS or GS purposes.

Thus it can be seen that invading the West in 1943 will not only strain the Allied air forces with regards to what they have to do to prosecute the land battle, they are still faced with the requirements of mounting the normal anti-infrastructure campaign. The Allies are therefore asking a smaller, less capable air force to accomplish more than would be expected of a stronger, more capable air force in 1944. Asking more of less is hardly a winning strategy...

The Allies should count on greater naval losses to be suffered during a 1943 invasion of the West than during a 1943 MTO campaign. This is again a consequence of their having a weaker air force vis-à-vis the Axis, coupled with the complete impunity with which the Axis can use and lose their air forces. Any landing outside of regular range Allied CAP will, of course, face even greater possible losses, making any landing in the Bay of Biscay, for example, an even riskier prospect. It should also be recalled that Axis CD in the Atlantic is stronger than that in the Mediterranean, so again the navies and air forces are being asked to deal with stronger opposition, with weaker forces. Given the paucity of Allied NRPs, every naval loss is serious and, at -4 VPs per strength point for excessive losses, the consequences of anything beyond insignificant naval losses is potentially very serious. Given that the Allies have only one NRP saved at the start of the game, and receive only three per month thereafter, the fragility of their naval forces should not be discounted nor underestimated. One good naval patrol bombing run getting through to an Allied naval group can easily inflict two or more months worth of naval production in an instant. And always keep in mind that permanent losses inflicted on any Allied TFs will require saved NRPs to be maintained every quarter, to offset excessive losses VPs for the naval strength points missing from the permanently reduced TFs. For example, even with an otherwise full strength combined navy, if one US 12 pt TF has suffered permanent losses, then the Allies would lose VPs for each
strength point of those losses not offset by saved NRPs. So once that 12 pt TF is permanently reduced, the Allies must maintain at least 6 saved NRPs each quarter to avoid excessive naval loss VP penalties.

Supposing a situation wherein the Allies abandon the MTO completely, the Axis will have no difficulty defending all of the Mediterranean islands, mainland Italy and the south of France with Italian units alone, freeing the entire German army to deal with the Allied invasion of the West. Since the replacement surge gives the Axis the ability to virtually ignore losses among German units, the Axis will be well positioned in this situation to go all out and seek to inflict serious losses on the Allies. Defending Italy against a 1943 invasion is a monumental task for the Axis, and relieving them of that requirement is a huge force multiplier for them. Not only will no German units be required in the South, but Italian “trash” will be available for use in rear areas in the West, and to fulfill occupation duties to make up for the activated German Western garrisons — note well that Axis Occupation force requirements in the West are indeed “Axis” and not “German,” so Italian units can fulfill such occupation requirements. Thus the German forces can be concentrated at just the critical points, and given their inherent superiority at concentrating forces tactically, allowing them to more easily concentrate forces operationally is simply another gift given to them by the use of this Allied strategy.

I think that all of the above are some of the stronger arguments against any 1943 Allied invasion of the West. The primary advantage the Allies would be assuming they would get from an early invasion of the West would be the extra 3 to 4 months of good campaigning weather, compared to waiting until 1944 to invade the West. Given the paucity of good VP sites on or near the coast in France and the Axis ability to restrict expansion of any beachhead and the speed of that expansion, the Allies are actually trading off good VP acquisitions in the Mediterranean for marginal ones in the West. Any Allied operations in the Med in 1943 should, at a minimum, secure at least the 2 VPs for Sardinia and the 6 for Sicily by the time of the first VP check in Sep 1943 — while an Allied invasion of the West, even ignoring possible excessive or disastrous losses, will be hard pressed to match that. Indeed, without a significant breakout from a Western beachhead, a landing at Normandy or Bay of Biscay could well have captured no VP sites at all by Sep 1943, while even a successful invasion of Brittany and capture of Brest would garner the Allies only 2 VPs. Along the Bay of Biscay, Allied ownership of all points between Quimper Bay-Nantes-Bordeaux will not equal the VPs gained from owning Sicily and Sardinia, and will require a front line that the Allies simply can not defend in 1943.

So the Allies are trading off relatively easily captured VP sites, that they can capture with little or indeed no risk to themselves in the Mediterranean, for an opportunity to capture fewer VP sites in the West, against greater opposition, at the risk of significant losses and the high probability of taking VP losses with those ground, air and naval losses. In addition to that, they do not force Italy out of the war, leaving all of its forces available to the Axis, do not gain the 10 VPs for forcing Italian surrender nor the 8 VPs for taking Sardinia/Sicily nor the additional 8 VPs for taking Italy up to the weather line — and do this all while they are
at their weakest and while the Axis are not significantly weaker than they will be in 1944. That’s a “cushion” of at least 26 VPs the Allies give to the Axis simply by not prosecuting any operations in the Mediterranean, in addition to any that they lose through excessive/disastrous losses.

Finally, it should be remembered that while battles of attrition by the Allies vs the Axis in the Mediterranean in 1943 — and everywhere in 1944 — are to the Allies advantage, the same is definitely not true in a Western campaign in 1943, because of the significantly enhanced ability of the Axis to attack and the problems for the Allies stemming from their dependance upon CW forces (with their poor replacement rates) to form their main line — to say nothing of the increased replacement rate the Germans enjoy in response to an Allied landing in the West in 1943. Versus an Allied landing in the West in 1943, the Axis will welcome a battle of attrition since they will be almost assured of being able to attrit CW forces, and thus can reasonably expect to get VPs from excessive losses (at no cost to themselves in terms of VPs) while the Allies are not gaining significant VP territorial awards.

Personally, I don’t believe that given a competent Axis player the Allies can mount and support major operations in both the Mediterranean and the West in 1943 — they simply lack the required numbers and do not have the proper mix of nationalities to do so. Even simply getting ashore on the Italian mainland, capturing Sicily/Sardinia/Corsica and taking and maintaining a lodgement in the West is probably beyond their capabilities, although more within the bounds of possibility. They certainly can not breakout into the interior of France and gain enough VPs to offset those that they have lost through abandoning operations in the Mediterranean, and moreover risk losing significant numbers of VPs in the West which they would not risk losing were they restricting themselves to a Mediterranean campaign in 1943.

Overall, from almost every perspective, an Allied Western invasion in 1943 is a losing proposition for the Allies in the game, just as it was for them in real life. Historically the Allies accepted that they were not yet strong enough, nor well prepared enough, to fight the Germans in the West in 1943, and I think the game makes that case quite well. Post-war fantasies, inter-Allied sniping over strategy and revisionist history notwithstanding, the Allies were just not ready to meet the Germans in strength, face to face, in 1943 — just as the game shows. Largely this is because the CW forces are not able to carry the brunt of the fight themselves, as the British high command and Churchill well knew — risking the lifeblood of the Empire for a chance at ending the war in 1943, when one could reasonably expect to end it in 1944 without a CW bloodletting of historical proportions, was not a very attractive option for the military and political leadership of the weakest nation among the “Big Three.”

So... A Second Front in 1943? Absolutely... if that Second Front is in the Mediterranean, where the expected gains are greater than in the West, and where the probable losses are substantially less. The Allies simply can not win the game “fast,” whereas they definitely can lose the game fast by attempting more than they are capable of.
Situation It is the beginning of the “Victory in Europe” scenario in Second Front. The Anzio beachhead lies exposed to attack. Step into the shoes of Major General John P. Lucas (CO VI Corps) and send us your best plan on how to defend the beachhead.

Remember to set up supply points at the beachhead, as per the Errata (available at Rich Velay’s site). The weather is Mud, seas are calm.

Besides the set-up instructions and the orders to your units, write also a description of why your strategy is the best one; this description will help the judges better evaluate your entry.

Please send your entry to loc@luis.claudio.nom.br. All entries must be received by July 31, 2007.

There is no prize, but the winner will get full bragging rights about his accomplishment.
Second Front Rule 42 — “Victory” — reads as this:

At the end of the game, calculate the final VP total and consult the victory chart to determine the winner and his level of victory. Levels of victory are:

- **Marginal Victory:** The player wins a marginal victory. His performance is about equal to or slightly better than his historical counterpart.

- **Substantial Victory:** The player wins a substantial victory. His performance significantly surpasses that of his historical counterpart.

- **Decisive Victory:** The player wins a decisive victory. His performance greatly surpasses that of his historical counterpart.

Note: Unlike most previous Europa games, these victory conditions judge players’ performances against their historical counterparts. An Axis decisive victory, for example, means the Axis player did much better in the game than the Axis did in the war—it does not mean, however, that the Axis actually won the war. By 1943 the historical (and game) situation is such that, given competent play on both sides and no freak occurrences, the Allies will almost always win the war.

On August 19, 2001 GR/D changed the Second Front Victory Level Chart. Essentially, 65 points were added to both the MTO and Grand Campaign VP totals required to achieve a given level of victory. The ETO portion of the chart was left unchanged.

**The MTO**

Okay, let's take a historical trip through the MTO scenario from SF, count VPs, consult the victory chart, and see how rule 42 holds up.

**Sep 43** Allies take Sicily (6 VP), Sardinia (2), Taranto (2), Bari (2) for 12 territorial VP +10 VP for surrender of Italy. Total 22 VP.

**Dec 43** Allies take Napoli (4 VP), and rack up 16 territorial VP for the quarter, running total 38 VP.

**Mar 44** Allies take no new territorial VPs, stay at 16. Running total 54 VP.

**Jun 44** Roma (10), Civitavecchia (1) fall to Allies, for 27 territorial VPs. Running total 81.

**Sep 44** Allies capture Livorno (2 VP) and Firenze (3), netting 32 territorial VPs. Running total 113 VPs.

**Dec 44** No new territorial VPs, Allies get 32 VPs this quarter. Running total is now 145.
Mar 45 Again the Allies capture no VP cities, yet rack up 32 more VPs. Running total is 177.

End of game The Allies overrun all of northern Italy with the possible exception of Fiume, taking 24 more territorial VPs, and racking up an amazing 56 territorial VPs. The Axis surrender in Italy +10 VP. Neither Fiume (1 VP), nor the capture of the RSI government were credited. Running total stands at 243!

The Allies definitely lost some VPs for Disastrous Operations, particularly at Anzio and Salerno. We’ll say 2 × 1-8 Rgr Bn (Anzio), 1 × 2-5 Airborne III (Sicily), and 12 attack factors of non-elite units (along the way), a net -28. Given the Allied caution with their fleet and large numbers of air and ground replacements there should be minimal or no Excessive Losses, but we’ll say they took -12 VP in naval and -20 VP in ground/air. Total, -60 VP.

Final total 183 VP.

Consulting the VP chart the Allies need 135 points for a Marginal Victory, 145 for a Substantial and 155 for a Decisive. According to my historical count above the Allies just won a Decisive Victory, with 28 VP to spare. This hardly looks like the rule 42 inscription: “Decisive Victory: The player wins a decisive victory. His performance greatly surpasses that of his historical counterpart.” Going back to good old rule 42 historical results were a marginal victory. Hum?

The ETO Things don’t start moving until mid-1944, so that’s when our story picks up here. As you can see above, by the June 44 quarterly VP check the MTO had historically run up 81 VPs and was holding 27 victory points worth of territory.

Using a couple of historical maps we can trace the advance of the Western Allies. The ETO-only VP count is as follows:

Jun 44 Allies take Cherbourg 1, running total 1.

Sep 44 Allies capture Caen, Brest, Paris (a big 12), Antwerp, Tours, Brussels, Rouen, Toulouse, Marseilles, Nantes, Per-de-Bouc, Nice, Sete, Le Havre, Lyon, Toulon, Grenoble, St Etienne, Clermont-Ferrand, Reims, Bordeaux, Boulogne, Lille, Nancy, Charleroi and Gent — that’s 63 new territorial VPs in France and Belgium. They gain 64 territorial VPs. Running total 65 VPs.

Dec 44 New territorial VPs for Eindhoven (1), Strasbourg (1), Mulhouse (1) and Aachen (1). Allies roll up 68 VPs this quarter. Running total is now 133.

Mar 45 Manheim, Ludwigshafen, Mainz, Saarbrücken, Wiesbaden, Darmstadt, Bonn, unnamed major city in hex 16A:1420 and Köln fall to the Allies, adding another 15 territorial VPs to their column. This quarter the Allies hold 83 territorial VPs. Our running total stands at 216 VPs.

End of Game The Allies overrun Holland and almost all of western Germany. The Ruhr pocket is cleaned up for 24 VP, and the Allies end on a line running Lübeck-Magdeburg-Leipzig-Chemnitz-Pilsen. Behind this line German forces still hold Emden, Wilhelmshaven,
Wesermunde, La Rochelle and I think Dunkerque (along with some non-VP ports like St Nazaire and Lorient). There are 89 new territorial VPs, and for the last count 172 is added to the total. Running total stands at 388, not bad at all.

I didn’t credit capture of the German government or Axis surrender since either would require the western Allies to take Berlin.

We must add +5 VP for the French government’s return from exile.

Excessive Allied losses — I don’t see a single one. Disastrous losses: Normandy 1 × 4-5 Para III, 1 × 3-8 Inf III, 2 × 2-1-10 Tank II; Market-Garden: 2 × 2-5 Para X. Total Allied losses amount to –46 VPs. Just to be safe we’ll add 50% making it –69 VP.

ETO grand total 388 + 5 - 69 = 324

Needed to win Decisive Victory = 250, Substantial 220, Marginal 190. The historical result was not a marginal victory per the definition in rule 42, it was a VERY decisive victory (74 points to spare).

**Crusade in Europe (1943-45)**

From the ETO 324 VP, from the MTO 173 VP (had to take out 10 VP for Axis surrender in Italy). Grand total 479 VP. According to the “new” VP point count that’s 64 more than needed to win a decisive victory in Europe.

**Victory in Europe (1944-45)**

This scenario begins in April 44 with the Allies holding 8 VP. According to my count that’s about right, given the disastrous losses taken in Sicily and at Anzio. However, the Allies start this scenario blessed with the “Anzio Death Trap” [Editor’s note: see the contest on page 14.] which has the potential to cost them a large number of isolated casualties and associated
negative VPs. But rule 42 says “no freak occurrences” so we’ll assume the Anzio beachhead survives, and we end up with about the same VP total and well above the 415 needed for a decisive Allied victory.

So much for the historical prospective, let’s try a bit of alternate history.

**Alternate History**

Several people, myself included, have expressed concerns about the Allies being able to put in a historical performance. Rich Velay has been very successful in winning SF as the Axis under the “old” Victory Levels Chart, with the changes favoring the Axis his strategy should be even more formidable. We’ll assume we are playing against Rich Velay’s strategy, which abandons Sicily and Sardinia as fast as the Axis can run away, but fights a dogged battle for Italy. His all-or-nothing beach defenses in France are awe inspiring, at least as far west as Le Havre. With that said here’s our unhistorical account:

Allies hold Sicily and Sardinia for all 7 quarters and the end of game check. That’s 8 VPs x 8 = 64 VPs. (I believe these were the points that got added to the MTO victory chart.)

Italy surrenders at some point, probably in early-44, Allies +10 VPs.

Allies take Taranto and Bari prior to the Jun 44 check (4 VPs for 5 checks) = 20 VPs.

Napoli falls in Sep 44 (4 VP for 4 checks) = 16 VPs.

Game ends in May 45 with the Germans holding Roma, Monte Cassino and the GUSTAV line. The Allied player (“Call me Monty” Tibbetts) has been very, very cautious, never risked his fleet, never used ANY elite units, and never took any excess losses. (How else can you explain such a poor performance?)

Checking the total we have 110 VPs and an Allied Decisive Victory under the old VP count! Under the new VP count those same 110 points are an Axis Decisive Victory in the MTO. Guess that shows what a swing of 55-65 VPs will do for your game.

Fortunately, there are two theaters in Second Front, and we only counted one. Here’s the other half of our alternate history tale.

In the ETO things don’t progress as well as they did historically, but the Allies still get ashore (in Brittany) in May 44 and the war proceeds as follows:

June 44 Brest falls for 2 VP running total 2 VP

Sep 44 the Allies take few chances but get as far as Paris (12), Rouen (2), Caen (1), Nantes (2), Tours (1)Bordeaux (4) and Toulouse (1). They get 23 new VPs plus Brest for a running total of 27.

Dec 44 finds the Allies along the German-French border and holding all of Belgium, exactly three months behind their historical counterparts. They hold 64 territorial VPs and the French government is now in Paris (+5 VP). Running total for the ETO is 96.

Mar 45 and the Allies creep up to the Westwall and reach the Rhine in Holland, taking 3 more territorial VPs. 67 VPs for this quarter + 96 =163 running total.
The Germans manage by some miracle to hold the Allies along the March 45 front and the game ends with a final VP check netting the Allies another 67 VP, the ETO running total stands at 230.

After a very conservative and therefore casualty impaired campaign (no excessive or disastrous losses) the Allies have garnered a substantial victory in the ETO scenario. (The recent errata made no changes to the ETO VP chart.)

If playing the Crusade in Europe grand campaign the Allies have 340 VPs from both fronts and a marginal victory (under the old chart a substantial victory, only 10 points short of a decisive one).

The luckless Axis still hold Rome, northern Italy, most of Holland and every square meter of 1939 Germany. Well, every meter not under Stalin’s protection that is, but Stalin isn’t part of SF. Perhaps the heroic stand along the Westwall inspired German forces in the east to fulfill Hitler’s orders to hold back the Soviet hordes. Or maybe “Uncle Joe” signed a separate peace after seeing how hard his Western Allies were willing to fight.

According to our good friend rule 42, the Allies Marginal Victory means: His performance is about equal to or slightly better than his historical counterpart. You do say!

My erstwhile opponent “Mr. Rich Velay’s strategy” (not Rich himself of course) has done rather well compared to his historical counterpart, very well indeed. But what does he have to show for his good works? Nada!!! (At least according to the Victory Level Chart.)

Conclusions
The heart of the situation is the comparison to “historical results” made in rule 42. I find it difficult to reconcile the VP counts with the historical comparisons attempted by rule 42. It appears that recent errata to the MTO victory levels have brought that theater roughly in line with what actually happened — i.e. an Allied Decisive Victory was the historical result and a count of points based on historical rates of advance yields a decisive Allied victory. However, the historical comparison section of rule 42 remains completely out of synch, if the Allied player’s performance is to be considered equal or slightly better than his historical counterpart he must win decisively, not marginally. With no changes to the ETO victory levels we are still faced with the Allies winning the game handily on points, but not needing to come anywhere close to historical results — and therefore the ETO historical comparison is totally off. The campaign scenarios are similar to the ETO scenario — neither the level of victory generated by a point count, nor the historical comparison seem to be accurate.

It may be time to take yet another look at Second Front rule 42 and the Victory Level Chart. Something less than a performance equaling the Allied historical counterparts appears to be correct for an Allied Marginal or Substantial Victory. An Allied player pulling off an historical performance should be rewarded with a Decisive victory. An Axis victory of any proportion would mean achieving something far greater than historical Axis results. Given the success of Rich Velay and other Axis players, any major upward revision of ETO and Grand Campaign victory point totals may put the game completely out of reach for the Allies.
This Annotated Sequence of Play is a player aid that I put together for my own use when playing *Second Front*. Too often, I found out that I had forgotten some important detail, so I decided to write down the main ones in a structured way. My additions to the original Sequence of Play are written in blue.

The following lists the activities that may occur during the course of a game turn. Within each phase, activities are numbered in the order they should be conducted. Activities within a numbering may be done in any order. Some activities are applicable only to a single side. The appropriate rules sections for the activities are given in parentheses. Activities due to optional rules appear in italics; ignore these unless using the appropriate optional rules.

**Start of Game Turn**

Each game turn consists of an Axis player turn followed by an Allied player turn (4).

From Mar I 44 on, Allied strategic air wings may fly carpet bombing missions (26C2d).

Strategic air war effects start in May I 44 (26A).

From Jul I 44 on, all German units listed on the UIC as having no ATEC become ATEC neutral (10I).

From Jul I 44 on, Allied naval units have their gunnery strengths halved (not quartered) when firing at night (34A4).

From Sep I 44 on, all Allied units listed on the UIC as having no ATEC become ATEC neutral (10I).

1. Determine weather (36).

Weather affects movement (6, TEC), AEC effects (10C, TEC), combat (9), supply (12), construction and demolition abilities (14A1), transport and bombing missions (20F, 20G), airborne landings (24), and amphibious landings (32).

Sea conditions affect gunnery strengths of naval units (29B, 33A), bombing strengths of air units bombing naval units (20G), naval transport to beaches (31B), and amphibious landings (14K and 32B).

Rivers and lakes freeze in weather zone C during cold weather (frost, winter, and snow; 36A2).

*When weather changes from cold to non-cold, rivers flood (44A4).*

**Initial Phase**

Disrupted units recover at the start of their player turn (24A).

A port may be used if it is owned at the start of the initial phase (30A).
1. Check for Axis surrender (38A2).

Germany surrenders if the Axis player controls 6 or fewer major cities in 1939 Germany, and the German government has been captured or relocated out of Berlin at any time (38A2).

2. Check for Italian surrender (38B2).

Only during Axis initial phases. Only three attempts per game may be performed (38B2).

Emplace Mulberries (30A8).

3. Check the isolation (3G) and supply (12) status of units and hexes, and airbases (44D1).

A unit or hex is isolated (3G) if there is not an overland supply line from the item to any regular source of supply (12C).

A unit or hex is isolated if an LOC cannot be traced from it to a hex that is in general supply (44B1a).

A unit is in supply (12B) if a supply line can be traced from the unit to a supply source (12C). The supply line may have overland, road, and railroad/ naval elements (Game Play Chart 1). Railroad element may not have more than 7 low-volume hexes. One of the rail nets must have at least 10 REs of capacity. Naval elements may not be traced in the combat zone of an enemy naval group or through a danger zone (34K).

Some hexes and hexsides count against the length of a supply line (43C3).

A unit isolated and out of supply has its attack strength halved (12D).

A c/m unit out of supply has its movement rating halved (12D).

On the second and subsequent turns out of supply, a unit has its attack, defense, AA, and movement factors halved; it has a reduced ZOC and it doesn’t have AEC/ATEC capabilities (12D).

Units isolated and out of supply for four turns or more must roll for elimination (12D, Success Table).

Out-of-supply airbases affect the capabilities of air units (44D1).

When the German government is captured, all German units out of supply in the next initial phase surrender (38A1).

When the Italian government is captured, all Italian units out of supply in the next initial phase surrender (38A1).

A player may convert his airborne HQs during his initial phase if they’re in regular supply (24E).


The garrison may be activated if there are enemy units in the district or in an adjacent district. Garrisons may be placed in any cities in the district. (37E).

Declare an emergency (38A3) and/or special Westwall restoration (37B5).

An emergency may be declared from Jul I 43 to Mar II 44, if the Allied player has at least 3
REs of units in France, Benelux, or Greater Germany, in regular supply, and owns at least one city there (38A3).

Westwall restoration may be declared once per game if there is an Allied ground unit in the ETO theater within 10 hexes of any Westwall hex. The restoration takes two turns (37B5). When the Westwall restoration is declared, an emergency may also be declared (38A3).

When declaring an emergency, infantry divisions may be reorganized (44B5).

5. Check required garrisons and occupation forces (37E, 39B).

The Allied player must keep air units in garrison, besides the ground units (23I2, 37E1).

If the garrison is below the required level, the Allied player must pay Infantry Replacement Points as a penalty (37E1).

The occupation force of a dot city must be 1 RE in size, the occupation force of a major city must be 3 REs in size. Italy must also be occupied after Italian surrender. A city need not be occupied if there are Allied units in regular supply within 5 hexes of the city, or if a supply line cannot be traced from the city to an Axis regular source of supply (39B).

6. Perform reinforcement and replacement activities (25, 35, 40).

Stacking limits are not in force (8B).

Air Replacement cycles begin in Jan I, Mar I, May I, Jul I, Sep I, Nov I (25). At the start of a cycle, unspent ARPs may be lost (25D).

Pairs of identical aborted air units may be regrouped (25A).

ARPS for withdrawn air units must be spent before other uses (25B).

Reinforcements combined with withdrawals appear in the same airbases (25C).

A player may only use part of his ARPs on a given turn (25D).

Two ARPs replace an eliminated air unit (25D1), one ARP repairs an aborted air unit (25D2).

Damaged LCs may be repaired with a die roll (1 or 2), or with NRPs (34G, 35).

Naval Replacement Points may be used for repairs on naval units, damaged LCs, replacement of sunken naval units, replacement of intrinsic CD levels in a port, and for conversion in mine points (35).

Production of Replacement Points, NRPs, and Resource Points occurs on the turn I of each month. The production is reduced if any city in the district is isolated or enemy-owned (40B1), or if there aren’t enough German training/reserve/replacement units in the district (43F1a).

If a non-German reserve/training/replacement unit enters in a ZOC or participates in combat, the owning player forfeits Replacement Points (43F1b).

French Military Regions, Belgium and Netherlands generate production 12 turns after being liberated (38D, 38E, 38F).
Reinforcements may be placed in enemy ZOCs (40A).

In order for a cadre to be rebuilt or for a conversion/reorganization/upgrade to take place, the unit must be in a city, it must be able to trace a supply line to an unisolated regular source of supply, and may not be in an enemy ZOC (40A1).

The Axis player may attempt early activation of forming units (40A2).

Only a limited number of certain units may be replaced (40B2, 40B3).

Units may be disbanded (40D1), at a maximum of 5 REs per initial phase (43F2).

Armor RPs may be given from one force to another. An armor RP may not be spent in the initial phase in which it is transferred, but may be sued thereafter (40D3).

Carrier groups may be called (34I2).

*One German punitive unit may be replaced for free (44C2).*

Relocate governments (37G1).

Relocating a government affects the morale (37G3, 38A1, 38B1).

7. Transfer units between replacement pools (40B1a).

Ground units may be transferred between replacement pools if an overland supply line (of any length) may be traced from a friendly-owned unisolated city in the originating theater to a friendly-owned unisolated city in the destination theater (40B1a).

Build capacity on rail nets (7A4b).

The player must have two connected, unisolated rail marshaling yards on the net. For each 3 resource points spent (maximum 12 per turn), the net’s capacity is permanently increased by 1 RE (7A4b).

Deduct Rail Marshaling Yards bombing hits from the previous player turn from the current capacity for this turn only (20G1a).

Build forts, build/augment permanent airfields (14A1), and improve Westwall hexes (37B5).

In order to build a fort or a 3-capacity airfield, the unit must be in supply and spend one resource point. It takes one turn in clear or rough terrain, and two turns elsewhere. Quick construction (14A1b) may be used (14A1).

Rebuild destroyed ports (14A5).

In order to rebuild a destroyed port, the unit must be in supply and spend one resource point. It takes two turns. Quick construction may not be used (14A5).

*Dismantle forts and permanent airfields (44B2).*

*For each three items dismantled, the player receives one resource point (44B2).*

Determine the status of the strategic air war (26A) and call up strat air assets (26B/C).

The Axis player may use half of his strategic air units when they are called up, as well as the indicated ARPs. He may call up his strategic air assets up to five times per year.
(26B).
Allied strategic air wings may not be intercepted or patrol attacked. Each of the four strategic air forces may be called up to five times a year (26C). Fighter cover may be needed (26C3).
Remove damage from coast defenses (33B).
Sweep enemy mines in friendly coastal hexes and more than 7 hexes from enemy ports (34E).
8. Various air units become operative (16B/C).
Air units that flew harassment missions in the previous player turn do not become operative (16C1, 20G2d).
9. Make inoperative at each airbase air units in excess of the base’s capacity (16C, 17A).
Gliders do not count against the capacity of an airbase (23D).
10. Make partisan attacks (39C).
Insufficient occupation forces result in more partisan attacks (39B).
Partisans may attack airbases or rail lines (39C).
11. Fly combat air patrol operations (20E).
Both players may fly CAP missions (16C1).
Only night fighters may fly CAP by night. They may not interact with air units in day air operations (23G).
Fly harassment air operations (20G2d).
The non-phasing player may fly harassment missions (16C1).
Total bombing points delivered to the target hex: less than 2 = no effect; 2-3 = 1 harassment hit in the hex; 4-9 = 2 harassment hits in the hex; 10-19 = 2 harassment hits in the hex and 1 harassment hit in each adjacent land hex; 20+ = 2 harassment hits in the hex and 2 harassment hits in each adjacent land hex (20G2d).
Assign air units to naval patrol air operations (20G2h).
Both players may assign air units to naval patrol (16C1).
Supply air drops do not need prior planning (24C).
Plan amphibious landings (32C).
Amphibious landings may be planned for all intrinsically amphibious units, and for a number of (non-amphibious) REs equal to the number of LCs currently in play (32C).

Movement Phase
Beaches captured during the previous exploitation phase are friendly from now on (30B).
At any time during the phase

Fly appropriate air operations (16C, 16D, 20).
Resolve airborne landings (24).

Airborne landings may not be made in prohibited terrain, mountain, wooded-swamp, or forest hexes. Supply points may be dropped on any hex, except all-sea or all-lake hexes (20F2).

Ground units count at double RE size for air drop missions (20F2).
Gliders used in air drop missions are eliminated (23D).
An air-droppable unit may become disrupted when landing (24A).
Air landing/glider units may only drop when solely transported by gliders (24D).
Resolve V-Weapon attacks (43D).
The Allied player must augment the British Home Defense garrison when V-1 attacks begin (43D3).

Naval Movement Sub-Phase

This sub-phase consists of a series of naval movement steps. There are five identical steps.

During each step, the following actions may take place (27C, 27D):

1. Move naval groups (28).

Phasing naval groups have a movement allowance of 30 MPs per step, non-phasing naval groups have a movement allowance of 15 MPs per step.
Axis TFs must spend one resource point to leave port (34H).
Naval transport: cavalry and c/m units count double their RE size (3A3, 31).
Naval groups spend 1 MP to enter an all-sea hex, 2 MPS to enter a coastal hex (28).
A naval group may not move through a narrow strait unless both sides are friendly-owned (28).
A cargo-only naval group may enter a river or a canal hexside, if both sides are friendly-owned. Each hexside costs 1 MP (28). (Kaiser Wilhelm canal: 34A2).
Resolve mine attacks (27D, 34E).
Off-map movement: 30A5, 34A1, TEM 59/60.
Cargo naval groups may move in protected waters (34A3).
In each step, phasing naval groups may move 10 MPs at night (34A4).

Resolve aerial bombing of naval units (20G2g/h).

Resolve reaction move naval groups (28A).
The success table is consulted. If successful, the reacting naval group may move with 15 MPs (28A).
Resolve naval combat (29).
The combat zone of a TF is the hex it occupies and the adjacent hexes. Naval groups in port
do not have a combat zone (28B).
Level 2 CDs (and greater) have a combat zone in their hexes and the adjacent hexes. Level 1 CDs have a combat zone in their hexes only.
Each two gunnery hits on a CD results in a CD hit (29B2). Coast Defenses may suffer a maximum of 4 hits from all causes in a player turn (33B).
Damage to naval groups is resolved either with rule 27A3, or optional rule 44G1.
If an LC/NT is sunk, any cargo is eliminated. If its cargo capacity is reduced, cargo in excess is randomly eliminated (31).
Disengagement must be checked at the end of a round of naval combat between naval units (29C).
Embark and disembark cargo (30, 31).
Make amphibious landings (32).
Amphibious landings may not be conducted in stormy seas.
Amphibious tanks must consult the success table when landing (14K).
Amphibious units: 27B6 (rewritten by errata in TEM 40).
   Carry out landing sequence (27C) when cargo disembarked:
      a) Resolve coastal raids (14H4).
Marine commandos may raid coast defenses (one unit per CD level). The commando raid is resolved before the CD fires. A successful raid inflicts two hits on the CD (14H4, Success Table). Coast Defenses may suffer a maximum of 4 hits from all causes in a player turn (33B).
      b) Resolve naval combat between naval units and coast defenses (29, 33B).
      c) Disembark cargo (31, 32).
      d) Check for landing craft damage (34G).
Damaged LCs can’t be used for naval transport or amphibious landing until they’re repaired (34G).
      e) Resolve enemy reaction to landing (32D).
The Success Table is used for each invaded hex (32D).
Prepare task forces to provide naval gunfire support (NGS) (33A).
A TF must spend 90 MPs preparing for NGS (33A).
NGS may only be delivered to adjacent hexes (in the naval sense; 27B5, 33A).
   Lay/sweep mines and resolve mine attacks (34E).
   Resolve damage from danger zones (34F).
One step must be dedicated to replenishment of naval units. Units that do not replenish have low fuel (movement allowance halved) in the first turn and are scuttled (34D) in the second turn (34B). Alternatively, a naval unit must spend 30 MPs in a naval base (30A9, 43G).
Ground Movement Sub-Phase

2. Break down units/detach panzer battalions (15).

3. Move units, including admin, road, and rail movement (6, 7).

Movement is affected by ZOCs (5), terrain (TEC), weather (36), supply (12D), and harassment (20G2d). Commandos may attempt to move without paying ZOC costs (14H1).

Each harassment hit costs 1 MP to leave the hex or to remain in the hex (20G2d).

Ground units may carry Resource Points, reducing their movement rating (12E).

Roads may not be broken, they exist even where the railroad was broken (7B). *Roads may be used regardless of weather in certain hexes (44A2).*

Rail transport (7A): cavalry and c/m units count double their RE size (3A3, 7A). Units lose their ZOCs, move according to the Rail Movement Rates table (Game Play Chart 1). May not enter or leave an enemy ZOC, except if another unit negates it. *Off-map rail lines are connected (44A3).*

Strategic rail movement (7A2): the unit may move up to 200 hexes, may not move otherwise, may not attack, may not exploit.

If a unit uses a low-volume rail line, it counts double its RE size against rail capacity on that net (7A3).

Admin movement (6A): units lose their ZOCs, pay half regular MP cost of terrain. Some types of terrain are prohibited. The unit may not spend MPs for any purpose except admin movement, operational rail movement (7A1) or naval transport (31). It may not start or move adjacent to enemy units, nor can it enter enemy-owned hexes.

If an enemy unit enters a garrisoned district, the owning player may immediately activate part of the garrison (37E).

Temporarily increase capacity on rail nets (7A4a).

The player must have two connected, unisolated rail marshaling yards on the net. For each resource point spent, the net’s capacity is increased by 10 REs that turn (maximum half its current capacity) (7A4a).

Execute overruns (13).

Overruns may be realized at 10:1 or 12:1 odds. Stacking limits the number of units that can overrun (8B). Overrun odds are affected by supply (12D), terrain (TEC), and support (11). Units being overrun lose their ZOCs. All phasing units must pay the overrun cost (Game Play Chart 1). Units that may retreat before combat may retreat before an overrun (13). NGS may not be used (33A). Special replacements may be accrued (40B4).

*Resource points may be captured (44B2).*

When an enemy ground unit gains ownership of an airbase hex, each air unit there (operative or not) may try to escape (17B).

A captured airbase may be used immediately (17C).
When an enemy ground unit gains ownership of a port with naval units in port, the naval units may try to escape or be scuttled (34D).
When an enemy ground unit gains ownership of a hex with a national government, it must try to escape or be captured (37G2).
Break rail lines, damage airbases and ports (7A5, 17D, 30A2), and demolish bridges (44A1).

A unit spends 2 MPs in a hex to break a rail line there or to put one hit of damage on an airbase (7A5, 17D). A unit spends 4 MPs to demolish a bridge (44A1). A German railroad engineer spends 1 MP to break a rail line (44C1).

A German-owned port may be destroyed if the Axis player loses ownership of it (30A3).

Units may spend MPs to damage ports, rail lines, and bridges only if an LOC can be traced from an unisolated enemy ground unit to the item (44B3).
Use the abilities of construction units (14A1).

A construction unit may build a temporary airfield by spending 6 MPs in clear or rough terrain, 12 MPs elsewhere. A construction unit must be present at all times for a temporary airfield to exist (14A1).

A construction unit may demolish a port spending 3 MPs to achieve a hit (14A1).
Repairing damaged items costs MPs: 2 MPs to remove one hit from an airbase, 4 MPs to remove one hit from a port or a broken rail line (14A1). Repairing a bridge costs 4 MPs (non-major rivers) or 8 MPs (major rivers; 44A1).

Quick construction (14A1b) may be used.
Civilian labor may be used in Germany (14A1c).

Fire AA against harassment (43B).

4. Assemble broken down units/attach panzer battalions (15).

If a unit is assembled from components at different supply (or disrupted, 24A) states, the assembled unit assumes the supply state of the most out-of-supply (or disrupted) component (15A).

Stacking limits are in force at the end of the movement phase (8B).

**Combat Phase**
Beaches captured during the previous movement phase are friendly from now on (30B).
OSS units may make surprise attacks (37D).

1. Check the isolation status of units and hexes (3G).
A unit or hex is isolated (3G) if there is not an overland supply line from the item to any regular source of supply (12C).

A unit or hex is isolated if an LOC cannot be traced from it to a hex that is in general supply (44B1a).

2. Fly defensive air support air operations (20G2c).
Type HB air units may not fly DAS (20G2c).
Mission range is half the printed movement rating for types B, T, or HT; printed movement rating for other types (20G2c). Staging is not allowed (23B).
The target hex of a DAS mission is a hex with friendly units that may be attacked (20G2c).
DAS missions are resolved when the combat in that hex is resolved (16C3).
For each RE of attacking units (excluding artillery), one air unit may provide DAS (20G2c).
Bombing strength from a DAS mission is halved (20G2c).
Code T air units contribute with ATEC when flying DAS (23H2).

3. Fly ground support air operations (20G2b).
Type HB air units may not fly GS. (20G2b).
The target hex of a GS mission is a hex to be attacked (20G2b).
GS missions are resolved when the combat in that hex is resolved (16C3, 20G2b).
For each RE of attacking units (excluding artillery), one air unit may provide GS (20G2b).

4. Allocate NGS to potentially defending hexes (33A).
A TF that provides NGS suffers ammo depletion and its NGS strength is halved while it does not replenish (34C).
Each Allied TF may provide NGS up to 6 times a year. Each Axis TF may provide NGS up to 4 times a year (34I1).

5. Resolve combat hex by hex (9, many other rules).
When an attack is declared against a canal-intensive hex, it may be flooded (37A3, 37A4).
Commandos may retreat before combat (9I, 14H2). Marine commandos may retreat to a naval transport (44B4).
Combat is affected by stacking limits (8B), terrain (9H, TEC), AEC/ATEC effects (10, TEC), support (11), supply (12D), engineering effects (14A2, 14A3), artillery (14B) and NGS (33A), specialized armor (14C), surprise (14H3), GS (20G2b) and DAS (20G2c), amphibious landings (32B), weather (36B), morale (37G3, 38A1, 38B1), and Allied co-operation (43E).
Transport counters (14J1) are not used in the combat phase. APC counters (14J3) are used in the combat phase.
German Political Police units affect combat results (14G).
Combat losses use the printed values of the units. Divisional units that suffer losses in combat are cadred (9E).
Required losses (half of the losses; 9J) are incurred when using AEC/ATEC (half or more; 10) and engineering (14A2, 14A3) modifiers.
Retreats must be implemented immediately. Units retreating may carry Resource Points (12E). Units retreating may overrun (43A).
German c/m units may ignore enemy ZOCs when retreating to a friendly-occupied hex.
Commando units may try to ignore enemy ZOCs when retreating and may try to help other units retreat. (14H1).

Special replacements may be accrued (40B4).

Stacking limits are in force at the end of the combat phase (8B).

**Exploitation Phase**

Beaches captured during the previous combat phase are friendly from now on (30B).

**At any time during the phase**

Fly appropriate air operations (16C, 16D, 20).

**Naval Movement Sub-Phase**

1. This is the same as the naval movement sub-phase of the movement phase except that amphibious landings (32) may not be made.

**Ground Movement Sub-Phase (c/m units only)**

2. Break down units/detach panzer battalions (15).

C/m and non-c/m units may break down (15A).

3. Move units, including road but not admin or rail movement (6, 7).

Movement is affected by ZOCs (5), terrain (TEC), weather (36), supply (12D), and harassment (20G2d). Commandos may attempt to move without paying ZOC costs (14H1).

Each harassment hit costs 1 MP to leave the hex or to remain in the hex (20G2d).

Ground units may carry Resource Points, reducing their movement rating (12E).

Roads may not be broken, they exist even where the railroad was broken (7B). *Roads may be used regardless of weather in certain hexes (44A2).*

Mixed units may not move (14I) now.

If an enemy unit enters a garrisoned district, the owning player may immediately activate part of the garrison (37E).

Execute overruns (13).

Overruns may be realized at 10:1 or 12:1 odds. Stacking limits the number of units that can overrun (8B). Overrun odds are affected by supply (12D), terrain (TEC), and support (11). Units being overrun lose their ZOCs. All phasing units must pay the overrun cost (Game Play Chart 1). Units that may retreat before combat may retreat before an overrun (13). NGS may not be used (33A). Special replacements may be accrued (40B4).

*Resource points may be captured (44B2).*

When an enemy ground unit gains ownership of an airbase hex, each air unit there (operative or not) may try to escape (17B).
A captured airbase may be used immediately (17C).
When an enemy ground unit gains ownership of a port with naval units in port, the naval units may try to escape or be scuttled (34D).
When an enemy ground unit gains ownership of a hex with a national government, it must try to escape or be captured (37G2).

Break rail lines, damage airbases and ports (7A5, 17D, 30A2), and demolish bridges (44A1).

A unit spends 2 MPs in a hex to break a rail line there or to put one hit of damage on an airbase (7A5, 17D). A unit spends 4 MPs to demolish a bridge (44A1).

A German-owned port may be destroyed if the Axis player loses ownership of it (30A3).

Units may spend MPs to damage ports, rail lines, and bridges only if an LOC can be traced from an unisolated enemy ground unit to the item (44B3).

Fire AA against harassment (43B).

C/m construction units may not use their construction abilities (14A1d).

4. Assemble broken down units/attach panzer battalions (15).

C/m and non-c/m units may assemble (15A).

If a unit is assembled from components at different supply (or disrupted, 24A) states, the assembled unit assumes the supply state of the most out-of-supply (or disrupted) component (15A).

Fighters on CAP return to base (16C4).

Stacking limits are in force at the end of the exploitation phase (8B).

**End of Player Turn**

1. Check the supply status of naval units (34B).
   Combine naval groups (28).

2. Axis Player Turn Only: Award victory points each Mar II, Jun II, Oct II and Dec II turn (42).

Victory points are also awarded when some events occur (42).

**When Appropriate**

Resolve air unit escape (17B).
Abandon 0-capacity airfields (17D).
Resolve port destruction attempts (30A3).
Resolve naval unit escape (34D).
Activate eligible garrisons (37E).

Destroy resource points (44B2).
**When Air Operation is Initiated (16D)**

If both sides simultaneously want to initiate an air operation, choose at random which side gets to initiate the operation. Alternate air ops until one of the players no longer wants to initiate an air op (16D, Errata).

At the start of an air operation, the initiating player declares whether it is a day or night operation (23G).

Air units may not use an airbase if its capacity is 0 (17A).

Type F air units must use airbases in a partial sea or partial lake hex (23H4).

Type HB air units may not use temporary airfields (23E2).

Air units with the R and J prefixes may not use temporary airfields (23F).

1. **Mission Movement Step:** Fly mission to operation’s target hex; fly escort missions (18, 20).

Tactical bombing and escort missions may not be flown at night (23G).

The target hex need not be revealed prior to the air units arriving there (16D).

Staging is allowed, except for DAS or naval patrol missions (23B), type HB units (23E2), and rocket-propelled aircraft (23F).

Rail Marshaling Yards may not be bombed if non-functioning. RMYs in major city hexes may be bombed twice in a turn (20G1a).

Transfer range is three times the printed movement rating (20A). Escort range is the printed movement rating (20B). Transport range is the printed movement rating (20F) or twice the printed movement rating (20F1). Bombing range is the printed movement rating, except when indicated otherwise (20G).

Extended range may be used in various missions (23C). Gliders may not be flown using extended range (23D).

Naval Patrol missions must roll for contact with the naval target group. Only one force from any given airbase may attempt contact per hex (20G2h).

Escort for Naval Patrol missions must come from the same base as the mission group (20G2h).

Code I air units may only fly transfer and interception missions (23H9).

Allied Anti-Shipping forces may only fly naval patrol bombing missions (23J).

Fly patrol attack missions (20D).

The patrol zone of a fighter is equal to half its printed movement rating (rounded down), maximum 8 hexes (19).

Patrol attacks are made by the reacting player against enemy air units that pass through a fighter’s patrol zone (20D).

Only night fighters may patrol attack at night (23G).

Resolve patrol attacks (21C).
2. Interceptor Movement Step: Fly interception missions (20C).

Interception range is half the printed range (20C), or the printed rating for rocket-propelled aircraft (23F). *The range may be augmented (44D2)*.

Interception missions are flown by the reacting player against enemy air units in the target hex of their mission (20C).

If an airbase is in the target hex of an enemy air operation, the reacting player’s fighters at that airbase may scramble to escape (23A2).

Only night fighters may fly interception at night (23G).

3. Air Combat Resolution Step: Resolve air combat (21).

Type F air units flying a bombing mission have their air attack ratings reduced by 2 (but not below 1). A fighter may jettison its bombload to fight normally, but its bombing strength is reduced by 2/3 (23A1).

A day air unit flying at night has its air attack strength reduced to 0 (23G).

4. AA Fire step: Resolve antiaircraft fire (22 or 44F).

Harassment may be affected by AA fire (43B).


Bombing strengths are affected (20G) by weather (36) and terrain (TEC).

Code M air units flying the naval units in port or naval patrol bombing missions have their tactical bombing strength doubled (23H6).

When a code V air unit flies a naval patrol bombing mission (only), it may fly using bombs (as a code S air unit) or using torpedoes (doubling its tactical bombing strength) (23H7). The code B air unit uses its strategic bombing strength instead of its tactical bombing strength (23H8).

A day air unit flying at night has its bombing strength halved (23G).

A fighter’s bombing strength is increased by 1 (prior to any other modifications) in airbase bombing missions (20G2a).

Type D air units have their bombing rolls modified by +1, except when combined with other types of air units (23E1).

Coast Defenses bombing missions: each two hits on the CD results in a CD hit (20G2i). Coast Defenses may suffer a maximum of 4 hits from all causes in a player turn (33B).

6. Air unit return step: Return air units to base and flip to inoperative status (16B).

When a glider is used in a regular transport mission, it must roll for elimination (23D).

Type HB air units may not use temporary airfields (23E2).

Air units with the R and J prefixes may not use temporary airfields (23F).

Day air units landing at night may crash (23G).

Code X air units abort when landing (23H10).