Tag: World War Two (Page 1 of 2)

Ambrose, Stephen E.: Citizen Soldier: The U.S. Army from the Nomandy Beaches to the Bulge to
the Surrender of Germany. New York: Touchstone, 1997.

Badsey, Stephen.  Arnhem 1944: Operation ‘Market Garden’. London: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1993.

Chapman, Guy. Why France Collapsed: The Defeat of the French Army in 1940. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969.

Farrar-Hockley, Anthony H. Airborne Carpet: Operation Market Garden. New York: Ballantine Books, 1969.

Fuller, J. F. C. The Second World War, 1939-45: A Strategic and Tactical History. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949.

Goralski, Robert. World War II Almanac 1931-1945: A Political and Military Record. 1984 ed. n.p.: Perigee, 1982. New York: Bonanza Books, 1984.

Greiss, Thomas E., ed. The Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean. The West Point Military History Series. Wayne, N.J.: Avery Publishing Group, 1984.

Horne, Alistair. To Lose a Battle: France 1940. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969.

Hubatsch, Walter ed. Blitzkrieg to Defeat, Hitler’s War Directives, 1939-1945. Edited by H. R. Trevor-Roper. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965.

Kleffens, Eelco Nicolaas van. Juggernaut Over Holland: The Dutch          Foreign Minister’s Personal Story of the Invasion of The Netherlands. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941.

Liddell-Hart, B. H. The German Generals Talk.New York: William Morrow and Company, 1948.

Lucas, James. Hitler’s Enforcers: Leaders of the German War Machine 1939-1945. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1997.

Mason, Henry L. “War Comes to The Netherlands: September 1939-May 1940”, Political Science Quarterly 78, no. 4 1963): 548-580.

McDonald, John. Grea tBattlefields of the World.  New York: Collier Books, 1984.

Pearson, Frederick S. The Weak State in International Crises: The Case of The Netherlands in the German Invasion Crises of 1939-40.         Washington: University Press of America, 1981.

Perrett, Bryan. Knights of the Black Cross: Hitler’s Panzerwaffe and Its Leaders. Book Club ed. n.p.: Robert Hale, 1986. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986.

Ryan, Cornelius. A Bridge TooFar. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974

Steenbeek, Wilhelmina. Rotterdam: Invasion of Holland. New York, Ballantine Books, 1973.

Taylor, Telford.  The March of Conquest: The German Victories in Western Europe, 1940. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958.

Whitting, Charles. Hunters from the Sky: The German Parachute Corps 1949-1945. New York: Stein and Day, 1974.

Weather began to lift on September 22, but no supply flights were flown.  Allied fighters dominated the skies everywhere except Arnhem and Nijmegen, where the Germans continued to get Luftwaffe ground support.[109]

The attack organized by Student hit a weak section of the allied line between Grave and Uden. KG Walther, attacking westward, and KG Huber, attacking eastward, cut Hell’s Highway between 101^stand 82^ndAirborne. KG Huber placed the bridge at Veghel under fire and German tanks nearly took Uden.  By the end of the day eight allied battalions were drawn into the battle at Uden, fighting under Brigadier General McAuliffe.  Hell’s Highway north of Veghel was closed to traffic for a crucial day.[110]

The attempt to reach 1^stAirborne was taken up by 43^rdDivision at dawn, supported by the Irish Guards from Guards Armoured.  Armored cars, once again leading the way, reached the Poles at Driel by 0800.  It had taken four days and eighteen hours since Market-Garden to establish what was technically a link with 1^stAirborne.[111] That night Sosabowski crossed 50 men with the four rubber dinghies available to him.  DUKWs and heavier boats were held up by Student’s attacks.  German pressure along Urquhart’s perimeter increased, and the British General signaled Browning that relief was necessary within 24 hours.[112]

September 23 was a clear day, and Allied fighters provided copious close air support to both XXX Corps and 1^stAirborne Division.  German units threatening Veghel were driven off by noon, and Hell’s Highway was reopened.  The last elements of 82^ndand 101^stAirborne and Polish Brigade were lifted in, and river crossing equipment finally reached the Poles at Driel.  That night 200 of Sosabowski’s men ferried across the Rhine to reinforce Urquhart.  [113]

By September 24 British 1^stAirborne was down to about 1800 effectives.  These men had been fighting constantly for a week, they were exhausted and running short on ammunition.  Fire support from XXX Corps and fighter-bombers kept the Germans from overrunning the small perimeter, but it was obvious that the bridgehead would eventually suffer the same fate as Frost’s command.  A truce allowed 700 wounded to be transferred to German captivity where they could receive medical attention.[114]  That afternoon General Dempsey made the decision to withdraw.[115]

KG Chill reached Hell’s Highway south of Veghel near dusk. Owing to these attacks, supply vehicles were unable to use the road for most of the day.[116] The road was finally cleared of Germans late on September 25 by 101^st Airborne, with assistance from British 50^thInfantry and 7^th Armoured Divisions.  Due to mines Hell’s Highway didn’t reopen until early the 26^th, but after that it stayed open.[117]

SS KG von Allworden, with King Tiger tanks from 506^th Heavy Tank Battalion, attacked Urquhart’s perimeter on September 25, nearly cutting him off from the Rhine.  A crossing attempt by 43^rdDivision resulted in heavy British losses, with no appreciable gain and Urquhart set the withdrawal for that night.[118]

British artillery opened up an eleven-hour bombardment by at 2100. Crossing operations began at 2140 and continued until dawn, passing 2,587 men to safety through the 700-meter gap left open to 1^stAirborne. Market-Garden ended at 0550 on September 26. Including wounded, the Germans took 6,450 prisoners. Approximate 1,300 members of 1^stAirborne Division were killed during the battle.[119]

Propagandists claimed victory and defeat for both sides.  Brereton classified Market a success.  Montgomery blamed Eisenhower for failing to provide resources, yet claimed the operation was 90 percent successful.[120]  Sober assessment indicates the only strategic use of Allied airborne forces in Europe ended in defeat, but Market-Garden was no great victory for the Germans.  Blame is shared by most of the Allied commanders. Montgomery was in overall command but failed to pay close attention. Brereton made several mistakes including: his insistence on a single sortie per transport per day, unworkable landing zones, and choice of British I Airborne Corps over US Airborne XVIII Corps to command Market. Urquhart must shoulder responsibility for failing to stay in place to command his division. For his part, Horrocks was unable to keep Garden on schedule or get his subordinates to move at night.  The failure of Market-Garden forced the Allies to winter in Holland where their advantage in mobility was wasted.  Stretching to cover the extended frontage forced compromises leading to a weak front in the Ardennes, and facilitated Hitler’s attack there.

Field Marshall Model deserves praise for pulling together scattered German units, and quickly ascertaining the importance of Nijmegen and Arnhem.  Colonel-General Student skillfully handled both defense and offense along Hells’ Highway.  The recuperative powers of German units, and will of the common soldier to fight against great odds and under difficult conditions are trademarks of the Wehrmacht. British 1^stAirborne proved they shared those traits.

Footnotes

[109]Badsey, 72.

[110]Ibid., 72-73, Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 147; Ryan, 534.

[111]Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 153; Ryan, 517-518; MacDonald, 182.

[112]Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 154; Ryan, 535-7; Badsey, 73.

[113]Ryan, 543; Badsey, 75-6.

[114]Badsey, 76; Ryan, 557-9.

[115]Ryan, 568.

[116]Badsey, 80; Farrar-Hockley, Student, 148.

[117]Badsey, 83; Farrar-Hockley, Student, 148.

[118]Badsey, 81; Ryan, 573.

[119]Badsey, 85, Ryan, 580.

[120]Ryan, 597; Badsey, 89.

Weather on the 19^th was no better.  Due to ground fog and rain, only a few of the flights from England were able to take of, and those were late. 1^stAllied Airborne Army failed to inform 2^nd Tactical Air Force of the changes, and no close air support was flown for Browning’s forces in Holland.  The Germans continued to receive effective air support however. The Luftwaffewas so bold as to raid Eindhoven with 120 bombers, killing or wounding 1,000 civilians.[91]

At dawn (36 hours behind schedule) Guards Armoured Division crossed at Son on a Bailey Bridge erected the night before. Leading elements reached Grave by 0820.  It had taken 42 hours and cost 130 casualties for Guards Armoured to travel 53 miles.[92]  Elsewhere, another attack by Gavin’s men failed to take the Nijmegen bridge.  Assault boats were ordered forward for a crossing, but these were located in Belgium, behind XXX Corps start line. It would take some time for the boats to travel a very crowded road to Nijmegen.[93]

Student planned a pincer attack to split the Allied corridor using 59^thInfantry Division from the west, and 107^thPanzer Brigade from the east.  Before this could be executed, 101st Airborne and 8th Armoured Brigade routed 59th Division.  The Panthers and Grenadiers of 107^th Panzer attacked later in the day, and nearly succeeded in reaching Son.  While this attack was occurring Taylor’s third lift arrived, with half the expected troops and guns, followed by a very inaccurate supply drop.  Weather in England was the cause of both delay and confusion.[94]

British 1^st Airborne Brigade staged an early morning attack along the north bank of the Lower Rhine which made slow progress until the fog lifted.  By 1000, without the cover afforded by fog, and lacking any air support, the attack ground to a halt one mile from the bridge.  A second attack further to the north by 4^th

Airborne Brigade cost the British heavy casualties, and gained little ground from KG Spindler.  General Urquhart was liberated from his attic by the attack at 0715, and he returned to the divisional headquarters in Oosterbeek after a 40-hour absence.[95]  After a quick analysis Urquhart sent reinforcements to the doomed 4^thPara Brigade attack.  A signal was also sent to warn the Polish Brigade that the Germans controlled their landing zone.[96]  The Poles never received the message to abort their drop, and at 1600 their gliders landed in no-mans-land between 4^th Parachute Brigade and KG Krafft.  Only a few men and two anti-tank guns survived.[97]

The Germans brought their full weight to bear on Frost’s position at the Arnhem bridge.  Daylong attacks began with an air raid, followed by shelling and ground attacks from SS KG Knaust in the north and SS KG Brinkmann from the east.  The British still controlled ten houses at the north end of the bridge, but had only 250 unwounded men to hold them with.[98]

September 20^th was the last of the four days Browning had promised Montgomery.  It dawned to the same poor weather as the two previous days, allowing only supply missions to be flown.  Although 82^ndAirborne received 80 percent of its supplies, the British recovered only 13 percent of 1^st Airborne’s.[99]

Along what was now dubbed “Hells’ Highway” 107^thPanzer Brigade staged another attack east of Son.  Once again, 101^stand British armor beat them off.  Guards Armoured was broken up to stiffen the two American divisions, especially the position along the Groesbeek Heights.  British and American troops worked together to clear the suburbs near Nijmegen bridge while they waited for the assault boats to crawl their way forward.[100]

The boats finally arrived after noon, and the assault went in at 1500, with air and artillery support.  2^ndand 3^rd Battalions 504^thParachute Infantry Regiment cleared the two bridges on the far shore. A coordinated attack by 505^thParachute Regiment and Guards Grenadiers opened the south end of the bridge, and the first tanks crossed at 1910.  Much to the shock of the Americans, with Arnhem only 10 miles away the British tankers stopped for the night.[101]

General Horrocks explained it this way:
“This operation of Cook’s (American battalion commander) was the best and most gallant attack I have ever seen carried out in my life.  No wonder the leading paratroopers were furious that we did not push strait for Arnhem.  They felt they had risked their lives for nothing, but it was impossible, owing to the confusion which existed in Nijmegen, with houses burning and the British and U.S. forces all mixed up.”[102]

British 1^stAirborne endured a day of uncoordinated German attacks on its Oosterbeek perimeter.  Both sides were exhausted, and neither had a significant advantage in strength. British battalions were down to 100-200 men each, and it was impossible to properly care for casualties.  An agreement was reached whereby the British pulled back slightly, giving the Germans control of several buildings containing British wounded.  Several such temporary tuces were called during the next days.[103]

At his bridge Lt. Col. Frost was short of all types of supplies and the Germans were now using flame-throwers and tanks to dig his remaining troops out of their buildings. Around noon Frost was wounded and turned control over to the commander of the reconnaissance squadron, Maj. Gough.  Four Tiger tanks forced a crossing of the bridge at about1600. Later that night Gough negotiated a truce allowing the Germans to collect 200 wounded from the cellars, including Lt. Col. Frost.[104]

Although the rain continued on September 21, German pressure along the corridor subsided.  Student was reorganizing another attack scheduled for the next day, and Model wanted to concentrate everything on Arnhem and against a breakout by XXX Corps from Nijmegen.

Gough attempted a breakout from Arnhem to the north at 0900, which was not successful.  What was left of Frost’s men didn’t surrender as a group, some kept fighting for two more days.  With the major part of 2^nd Parachute Battalion eliminated the Germans gained use of the bridge.  Frost’s small force had held out for 88 hours, with little support, and without relief. [105]

The defenses at Oosterbeek were reorganized, but remained frail.  The Heveadorp ferry was cut adrift after KG von Tettau took Westerbouwing hill on the southwestern edge of the division perimeter.  From there the Germans could observe any daylight river crossing by or in support of the British airborne division.[106]

The Irish Guards finally kicked of their advance from Nijmegen at around noon, just as the Germans were making their first unopposed crossing of the Arnhem bridge.  The Guards pushed halfway to Arnhem, but lacking air support and low on ammunition they were halted.  SS KG Knaust reached the same vicinity at 1600 and set up a strong defense.  Horrocks ordered 43^rdInfantry Division forward to assume the lead from Guards Armoured and link up with 1^st Airborne. With this last advance Urquhart was finally able to establish radio contact with XXX Corps artillery, and began to receive effective fire support.[107]

1^st Polish Parachute Brigade’s main body finally got airborne, but bad weather forced 44 of the 114 Dakotas to turn back.  The Luftwaffemet the air caravan with more than 100 fighters, 25 of which got through the escort to claim thirteen transports.  Aircraft carrying Urquhart’s supplies also ran into German fighters, losing 23 planes to enemy fighters and flak, and delivering only 41 tons of supply to the British.  The Poles secured a small perimeter near Driel and along the south bank of the Rhine, opposite 1^st Airborne.  They were unable, however, to conduct any crossing due to a lack of boats.[108] Had they landed just a day sooner they could’ve used the Heveadorp ferry.

Footnotes

[91]Badsey, 55, 58; Ryan, 457.

[92]Badsey, 56; Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 124; Ryan, 410.

[93]Badsey, 56.

[94]Badsey, p. 57; Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 127.

[95]John MacDonald, Great Battlefields of the World, (New York: Collier Books, 1984), 180.

[96]Badsey, 55-6; Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 135; Ryan, 410.

[97]Badsey, 57; Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 139.

[98]Badsey, 57-8.

[99]Ibid., 59.

[100]Ibid., 60, Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 127-8.

[101]Badsey,  60-1; Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers: The U.S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the Bulge to the Surrender of Germany(New York: Touchstone, 1997), 129; Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 129-130.

[102]Ambrose, 129.

[103]Badsey, 59-60.

[104]Ibid., 64; Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 139, 145, 147.

[105]Badsey, 68.

[106]Ibid., 69; Ryan, 501.

[107]Ryan, 495-503; Badsey, 69; Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 151.

[108]Badsey, 69-70; Ryan, 496.

Beginning the night of September 16 and over the course of the next day over a thousand Allied planes attacked German airfields and antiaircraft positions. On September 17 the first Market transport departed at 945, the last of 1,051 transports and 516 gliders lifted off by 1135. Pathfinders jumped at 1240 and assault troops began landing by 1400.  By 1408 the Allies had landed some 20,000 men, 330 artillery pieces, 511 vehicles, and 490 tons of supplies.  The daylight drops were very accurate, and only 48 transport planes and 71 gliders were lost from all causes.[67]

Watching from his headquarters at Vught as Allied transports streamed overhead, Student remarked: “Oh, how I wish I had such powerful means at my disposal!”[68]  Before nightfall Student received a complete copy of the Market-Garden plans taken from a crashed glider, probably one from I Corps Headquarters. The plans included flight schedules, landing zones, unit lists, and mission taskings.[69]

At II SS Panzer Corps General Bittrich started receiving reports within minutes of the main drop.  By 1430 he issued orders to 9^thSS Panzer to occupy the Arnhem bridge and immediately attack enemy forces near Oosterbeek.  10^thSS Panzer was to move immediately to Nijmegen and “occupy the bridge in strength”.[70]  It would take some time to get units moving, among other things vehicles would have to be unloaded from rail cars and troops recalled from Sunday leave.

With British paras dropping practically in his lap, Field Marshall Model quickly left Oosterbeek. He headed east to co-locate with II SS Panzer Corps at Doetinchem, arriving there at 1600.  Before evacuating the area Model sent orders to II SS Panzer Corps and Armed Forces Command Netherlands.[71]

General Horrocks opened Garden at 1400 with a 35-minute bombardment by 408 guns.  The defending Kampfgruppe(battlegroup) was named after its commander, Colonel Walther, one of Student’sFallschrimjaeger.  This scratch formation consisted of two Luftwaffeparachute battalions, two SS infantry battalions, and 6^thPenal Battalion.  Guards Armoured lost nine tanks to Kampfgruppe(KG) Walther, but by 1930 had advanced seven miles to Valkenswaard.  There the Guards stopped for the night. British commanders failed to initiate aggressive patrolling, leaving KG Walther free to regroup and dig itself in for the next day.[72]  Horrocks was behind schedule; he should have reached Eindhoven in three hours.[73]

Meanwhile, American paratroopers were having mixed luck.  Taylor’s “Screaming Eagles” quickly seized bridges at Veghel and St. Oedenrode against weak resistance. The Wilhelmina Canal bridge at Son was blown with the Americans a mere 50 yards away, and the alternate bridge at Best remained in German hands.  Divisional engineers erected a wooden footbridge at Son before nightfall, but until XXX Corps arrived with bridging equipment no vehicles large than a jeep would cross the canal.  Colonel Sink and the 506^thParachute Regiment crossed at Son by midnight and headed for Eindhoven.[74]

Gavin’s 82^nd held the Groesbeck heights and critical bridges at Grave and across the Maas-Waal Canal southwest of Nijmegen. They also had part of a battalion in Nijmegen, which destroyed what were thought to be the detonating device. Grenadiers from 10^thSS Panzer Division had arrived to defend the bridge however, and Gavin’s weak battalion was pinned down in the city streets near the bridge.[75]

Urquhart’s troops dropped as accurately as the Americans, but immediately experienced problems.  It took longer than expected to organize after the drop, especially for the recon squadron.  It wasn’t until about 1530 that Lieutenant Colonel John Frost’s 2^nd Parachute Battalion headed out for Arnhem supported by a few recon jeeps.  1^stand 3^rdParachute battalions also advanced on Arnhem, each by a separate route.[76]  Crowds of enthusiastic Dutch civilians met the Tommies, further slowing the advance.  German fire was first encountered at 1600 along the northern route near Wolfheze.  1^stBattalion had run into SS Major Sepp Krafft’s 440 man training battalion.[77]

At Oosterbeek 3^rdBattalion encountered hastily assembled German forces rallying around Model’s abandoned headquarters.  Only Frost’s 2^nd Battalion found a clear road into Arnhem. They were in sight of the rail bridge when it was blown at 1830 and found the pontoon bridge had been removed.  Frost’s men observed 30 German vehicles head south across the Arnhem bridge.  By 2000 2^ndParachute Battalion occupied buildings surrounding the north end of the Arnhem road bridge.[78]

Radio communications within 1^stAirborne were not working well and General Urquhart left his headquarters to check on his division.  He lost his jeep to enemy fire and spent the first night with Brigadier Lathbury’s 1^stParachute Brigade, out of contact with division headquarters.[79]

September 18^th opened with heavy fog closing down airbases in England, France and Belgium, followed by rain lasting most of the afternoon and into the night.  This, combined with Brereton’s insistence that planes in Belgium remain on the ground while his transports were airborne, reduced Allied air support to a trickle. German airfields were clear however, and Luftwaffefighters flew 190 sorties.[80]

Guards Armoured started off at 0600, and by 1230 managed to sneak some armored cars into Eindhoven where they linked up with Col. Sink’s 506^thParachute Regiment. Eindhoven had been liberated from the company size German defense force during the morning of September 18. Using bridges over the Dommel River taken by 101^st, Guards Armoured passed east of Eindhoven and reached the destroyed bridge at Son by evening.[81]At 1300 two battalions of 327^thGlider regiment along with divisional troops, 146 jeeps, and two bulldozers – 2,656 men – were added to Taylor’s force.[82]

At Best a strong force of American paratroopers from the 502^ndRegiment was ordered to take the Wilhelmina Canal bridge.  Opposing them was a majority of the 59^thInfantry Division, sent there the previous day by Student. German engineers blew the bridge at 1100, and fighting generally died down throughout the 101^stDivision area.[83]

Further north in the 82^nd Airborne sector Gavin was faced with capturing the Nijmegen bridge.  Lieutenant Colonel Warren’s battalion from 508^thParachute Infantry Regiment got close to the southern end of the bridge, but was unable to capture it. Two later attacks by fresh troops also failed.  The Germans had been reinforced by part of 9^thSS Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion.[84]

Germans troops were active elsewhere along the 82^ndAirborne perimeter. At dawn small units began attacking the Americans holding Groesbeek Heights, eventually threatening the southern landing zone. Lt. Col. Warren’s battalion, recently withdrawn from Nijmegen, charged across the LZ and cleared it just before the 1300 glider landing took place. Arriving were 385 gliders with 1,782 men and the remainder of General Gavin’s artillery.  To the north, a German probe was driven off at Veghel.[85]

Day long attacks from Kampfgruppevon Tettau, which included a company of captured French Renault tanks, tied down 1^stAirlanding Brigade positioned west of the British landing zones. [86]  SS Kampfgruppe Spindler, an amalgamation of several German units arriving over the night, engaged Lathbury’s Parachute Brigade west of Arnhem.  Lathbury was wounded, and Urquhart forced to hide in an attic. Brigadier Hicks of the Airlanding Brigade took command of 1^st Airborne Division.[87]

In Arnhem itself Lt. Col. Frost had about 600 men, mortars and four 6-pounder (57mm) anti-tank guns ensconced in houses covering the north end of the bridge.  Frost also had radio contact with division headquarters and support from four 75mm guns. German infantry, unsupported by artillery or tanks, failed to dislodge Frost’s men, and a 0930 charge across the bridge from the south by 9^thSS Recon Battalion was routed. [88]

At 1500 Urquhart’s second wave arrived to a greeting from the Luftwaffe.  In addition to heavy flak, 90 German fighters attempted to intercept the transports and gliders.  Allied fighters managed to hold off the German planes, but lost 20 of their number.  Some 2,100 men arrived on 124 Dakotas and 296 gliders.  The following supply lift dropped 87 tons of cargo, mostly into German laps, with only 12 tons reaching 1^st Airborne.[89]

Radio communications within 1^stAirborne were almost non-existent. Pressured from the east and west, with its commander missing, the Red Devils were in serious trouble. It might have been possible for the division to salvage a bridgehead using the Heveadorp ferry, first reported on the day of the landing.  Instead Hicks sent the 1^st Airborne after its original, and now unreachable, objective.[90]

Footnotes

[66]Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 34

[67]Badsey, 36-38, Ryan 180, 190,
209.

[68]Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 78.

[69]Badsey, 41; Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 78.

[70]Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 80.

[71]Badsey, 41; Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 78.

[72]Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 104-5.

[73]Ryan, 251.

[74]Ryan, 252-3; Badsey, 41;
Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 110.

[75]Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 97-8; Badsey, 41; Ryan
288.

[76]Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 87-90; Badsey, 43.

[77]Ryan, 260.

[78]Badsey, 44.

[79]Badsey, 43; Ryan, 233-4;
Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet,
91-2.

[80]Badsey, 45.

[81]Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 110; Badsey, 46.

[82]Badsey, 52.

[83]Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 110-2.

[84]Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 112-6.

[85]Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet Airborne Carpet, 116-7;
Badsey, 52-3.

[86]Badsey, 49.

[87]Badsey, 49; Farrar-Hockley, Airborne Carpet, 119, 121.

[88]Badsey, 49; Ryan, 350-3.

[89]Badsey, 53-54.

[90]Ryan, 339-41, 388-9;
Badsey,  44, 54.